djihad<\/em> internationale, aliment\u00e9e sans fin par des transferts venus du Pakistan d’islamistes de toutes nationalit\u00e9s, parfaitement arm\u00e9s et entra\u00een\u00e9s. On trouve m\u00eame, observe Townsend, des Tch\u00e9tch\u00e8nes parmi les combattants. (A propos : ces Tch\u00e9tch\u00e8nes que les Britanniques ont tendance \u00e0 favoriser, notamment en accueillant certains de leurs dirigeants, dans leur vindicte anti-russe que partagent nombre de centres anglo-saxons. Comme le monde est petit et plein de surprises.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tPar cons\u00e9quent, l’on en serait au point, en Afghanistan, d’un nouvel Irak comme aimant rassembleur des islamistes anti-occidentaux. Les Anglo-Saxons semblent dou\u00e9s dans l’art de cr\u00e9er des abc\u00e8s de fixation \u00e0 leurs d\u00e9pens. Pendant ce temps, note Townsend, les instituts sophistiqu\u00e9s font le bilan des morts talibans, d’apr\u00e8s les d\u00e9comptes officiels qu’on sait toujours pleins de justesse, et concluent implicitement que l’ennemi a \u00e9t\u00e9 vaincu par \u00e9limination, \u00e0 la fa\u00e7on de la CIA et du d\u00e9compte des morts vietcongs, en 1967-68.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tTownsend :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00ab Several truths soon emerge in Helmand that contradict official accounts of the conflict Second are claims concerning the enemy itself. Ostensibly the British troops are reported to be battling the Taliban, but already that appears something of a misnomer. Soldier after soldier described an altogether different beast. The Taliban in their sandals, distinctive black robes and armed with AK-47 rifles are very much last summer’s adversary.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe conflict in Helmand has morphed way beyond that of crushing the Taliban. The nightmare scenario has unfolded: the Helmand valley has mutated into a geopolitical battleground for jihadists, a blooding ground for budding martyrs from across the globe.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbConvoys of Toyota Land Cruisers carrying holy warriors stream daily from Pakistan’s porous border to target British teenagers.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbYou have to ask whether British troops should have been sent here in the first place; our presence has only succeeded in attracting trouble, said one senior officer. Experienced Chechen separatists recently arrived to take the battle to the British.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbApocryphal maybe, but intelligence is also rumoured to have heard the lilt of Brummie fighters discussing killing British soldiers. After one particularly fierce exchange, one insurgent was heard lamenting: Jihad is sure hard. Men from the 1st Battalion The Royal Anglian Regiment portray an increasingly well-trained foe. One said: They look smarter than the Taliban. Most now wear the Pakistan dishdash. Their fire and weaponry is getting more accurate all the time. Someone is training these guys.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbWandering through the biblical landscape of southern Afghanistan, it was hard not to wonder just who and what will turn up next. Those on the ground discuss how a military victory is achievable in the face of this seemingly inexhaustible reservoir of fighters.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbStatistics tell their own story. Briefings in London last summer placed the number of Taliban as low as 1,000. Since April the Royal Anglians alone have killed more than 600, the nature of certifying kills suggesting that their tally is certainly greater. By any calculation, the enemy should all be dead. Instead they are more deadly.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 19 ao\u00fbt 2007 \u00e0 12H04<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
L’Afghanistan, c’est la guerre contre les talibans revenus en nombre apr\u00e8s avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 vaincus une premi\u00e8re fois? Pas si s\u00fbr. L\u00e0 aussi, comme dans la question des pertes britanniques, impression mitig\u00e9e et flottante. Il se pourrait bien que l’on se trompe. …A lire l’article d\u00e9cid\u00e9ment fort int\u00e9ressant de Mark Townsend dans l’Observer, il se pourrait… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3236,5993,5195,4146,6957],"class_list":["post-69131","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-afghanistan","tag-bilan","tag-decompte","tag-talibans","tag-tchetchene"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69131","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69131"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69131\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69131"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69131"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69131"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}