{"id":69136,"date":"2007-08-21T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-08-21T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/08\/21\/tsahal-ou-le-retour-au-bon-vieux-temps\/"},"modified":"2007-08-21T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-08-21T00:00:00","slug":"tsahal-ou-le-retour-au-bon-vieux-temps","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/08\/21\/tsahal-ou-le-retour-au-bon-vieux-temps\/","title":{"rendered":"<em>Tsahal<\/em>, ou le retour au bon vieux temps"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>L&rsquo;orientation des forces arm\u00e9es isra\u00e9liennes d\u00e9crites ces derni\u00e8res semaines, et notamment l&rsquo;annonce probable du recul d&rsquo;un \u00e0 deux ans de la commande de JSF (de 2014 \u00e0 2015-16), est largement confirm\u00e9e par une analyse de UPI (Joshua Brilliant le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.spacewar.com\/reports\/Analysis_Israel_turns_to_old_tech_999.html\" class=\"gen\">17 ao\u00fbt<\/a>). Cette analyse est faite \u00e0 l&rsquo;occasion d&rsquo;un reportage sur des manuvres dans le N\u00e9guev, qui montrent effectivement un retour \u00e0 des tactiques anciennes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>The Israeli army has been training like crazy to get back into shape after years of neglect.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Commanders thought tank wars were over since Israel repeatedly proved its military superiority as it became a high-tech force.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Future wars, the generals thought, would involve precision-guided munitions fired from afar, enemy missiles that may be tipped with nuclear or chemical warheads, and the kind of guerrilla warfare the Palestinians have been waging.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Tanks were considered nice to have, said Maj. Gen. in the reserves Eyal Ben-Reuven. But Israel didn&rsquo;t need that many, and several battalions were disbanded. The army became so engrossed in fighting the intifada soldiers were taken off their tanks and sent to police the Palestinian territories.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>That  <\/em>[summer 2006 Lebanon] <em>war was a wakeup call. It dispelled the notion that air power alone could suppress rocket attacks. Hundreds of Katyushas and mortar bombs rained on northern Israel and 33 days of fighting failed to stop them. Commanders concluded that boots on the ground were needed to stop those rockets.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The army&rsquo;s shortcomings eroded Israel&rsquo;s deterrence. For the first time in 30 years, Syrian officers have been telling one another that they can fight Israel, said a former head of the Northern Command, retired Maj. Gen. Yossi Peled.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Even if they are wrong, the fact that that is their attitude means we may be on the way to another war, he warned. It could start with guerrilla-type attacks or seizing an Israeli post, analysts said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOn observera combien toutes ces remarques, jusqu&rsquo;aux plus pr\u00e9cises concernant les nouvelles menaces possibles contre Isra\u00ebl, renforcent l&rsquo;id\u00e9e d&rsquo;une r\u00e9vision d\u00e9chirante dans les milieux militaires isra\u00e9liennes. Cette observation renforce le constat que la guerre de l&rsquo;\u00e9t\u00e9 2006 a \u00e9t\u00e9 effectivement <em>a wakeup call<\/em> dans le sens de la r\u00e9alisation que la fameuse guerre de quatri\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ration (G4G) existe d\u00e9sormais et que c&rsquo;est le type de conflit le plus probable auquel Isra\u00ebl doive faire face.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOn trouve bien entendu la confirmation des remarques faites autour de l&rsquo;attitude nouvelle des Isra\u00e9liens <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=4339\" class=\"gen\">\u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9gard du JSF<\/a>, l\u00e0 aussi avec la r\u00e9alisation que la guerre est en train de changer de forme, si ce n&rsquo;est d\u00e9j\u00e0 fait. Nous sommes entr\u00e9s dans l&rsquo;\u00e9poque de la G4G. Qu&rsquo;un <em>establishment<\/em> militaire de l&rsquo;importance et de la notori\u00e9t\u00e9 de celui d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl soit en train d&rsquo;accepter ce fait fondamental de l&rsquo;\u00e9volution des conflits est sans aucun doute un fait fondamental.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 21 ao\u00fbt 2007 \u00e0 05H02<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>L&rsquo;orientation des forces arm\u00e9es isra\u00e9liennes d\u00e9crites ces derni\u00e8res semaines, et notamment l&rsquo;annonce probable du recul d&rsquo;un \u00e0 deux ans de la commande de JSF (de 2014 \u00e0 2015-16), est largement confirm\u00e9e par une analyse de UPI (Joshua Brilliant le 17 ao\u00fbt). Cette analyse est faite \u00e0 l&rsquo;occasion d&rsquo;un reportage sur des manuvres dans le N\u00e9guev,&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5701,2879,4714,4895],"class_list":["post-69136","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-g4g","tag-revolution","tag-tsahal","tag-upi"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69136","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69136"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69136\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69136"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69136"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69136"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}