With a shortfall of some $100 billion over the coming six years, the U.S. Air Force may have to resort to charity from the Pentagon and Congress to keep major programs on track in 2009, including keeping C-17 transports in production, officials said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tCe qui appara\u00eet remarquable et compl\u00e8tement insolite dans le monde de la bureaucratie qui ne vit que par la programmation et la planification, c’est l’absence de programmation s\u00e9rieuse de l’USAF. Il semble que l’USAF ne sache plus combien d’avions elle veut et combien elle pr\u00e9voit d’en commander, ou bien qu’elle ait adopt\u00e9 comme politique de refuser de faire des pr\u00e9visions comme marque de son m\u00e9contentement de se trouver trop courte de $100 milliards pour les 6 prochaines ann\u00e9es. Deux cas de programme sont examin\u00e9s dans l’article : celui du chasseur F-22 et celui de l’avion de transport strat\u00e9gique C-17.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t L’incertitude concernant le F-22 est exprim\u00e9e de cette fa\u00e7on, o\u00f9 l’on voit expos\u00e9s des d\u00e9saccords entre le pouvoir politique et les militaires, voire des d\u00e9cisions parall\u00e8les et contradictoires comme s’il y avait deux pouvoirs concurrents : \u00abLockheed Martin will complete the last of 183 F-22 fighters two years later (in 2011) at its plant in Marietta, Ga. But if production is to continue uninterrupted and grow to the 381 planes the service eventually wants, funding will have to be found in 2009 to keep the line running.<\/em> () The Air Force has repeatedly said it wants 381 F-22s.<\/em> () Originally planned as a 750-plane program to replace the F-15 fighter, cuts over the past 15 years have reduced it to 183 jets. The Bush administration sought to terminate the program, but the service kept F-22 alive and even managed to broker a deal that stretched production out until Joint Strike Fighter manufacture started.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Concernant le transport C-17, la confusion est encore plus grande. Il importe moins ici de conna\u00eetre le nombre de C-17 d\u00e9j\u00e0 construits et de ceux qui sont ou pas en commande. Apr\u00e8s avoir d\u00e9crit les multiples avatars du programme de production du C-17 et surtout des intentions de programmation, ces quelques paragraphes qui terminent l’article illustrent bien l’\u00e9trange climat existant autour de ce programme.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00bb We’re beginning to see that transformation programs are ebbing away in the 2009 budget submissions of the military services, said Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute, Arlington, Va. The Air Force is cutting both the Joint Tactical Radio System and its next-generation cruise missile radar. It doesn’t have money for C-17s, it doesn’t have the money for the Alternative Infrared Sensor System. We are seeing the fraying of the investment agenda as a result of budget pressures.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbBut Thompson also blamed the Air Force for not doing a good enough job making its case for new equipment, especially more C-17s. Some people wrongly believe that if the Air Force doesn’t budget for additional C-17s, Congress will still provide them, he said. The reality is that C-17 backers in Congress are running out of patience with the service’s failure to signal a requirement.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe service hasn’t issued a requirement yet, the senior official said, because it continues to study whether to retire its oldest C-5s to replace them with C-17s.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe delay, however, is potentially devastating for the service’s agenda on Capitol Hill, Thompson said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe Hill doesn’t object to the Air Force saying, I want the planes, but can’t afford them,’ the problem is the Air Force won’t even say it needs them, he said. Even though the head of Air Mobility Command has been asked to develop a rationale for 30 more C-17s, the service has only requested two planes on its unfunded priorities list, providing little justification to the Hill to spend the money needed to keep the production line.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tC’est bien le terme de d\u00e9sordre qui caract\u00e9rise la situation de l’Air Force, qui n’est certes pas un cas isol\u00e9 (l’U.S Army est \u00e9galement dans une situation budg\u00e9taire d\u00e9sesp\u00e9r\u00e9e). Il semble que, de plus en plus, les forces arm\u00e9es, \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur d’un syst\u00e8me qui re\u00e7oit des sommes colossales, soient confront\u00e9es \u00e0 des probl\u00e8mes de programmation insurmontables comme si l’afflux d’argent poussaient les besoins et les co\u00fbts dans une spirale d’augmentation g\u00e9om\u00e9trique que personne ne semble capable d’expliquer, voire de comprendre. Il s’agit d’une situation de d\u00e9sordre qui fait croire que la situation budg\u00e9taire du Pentagone est d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 hors de contr\u00f4le.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tLe ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne observ\u00e9 est ainsi remarquable, le premier dans ce sens qui soit d’une telle importance. Les augmentations continuelles du budget du Pentagone ne cessent de cr\u00e9er plus de d\u00e9sordre et ne cessent de diminuer le contr\u00f4le qu’on a sur la gestion et les programmes. Le paradoxe est donc pouss\u00e9 \u00e0 son extr\u00eame : les augmentations \u00e9normes du budget du Pentagone cr\u00e9ent une p\u00e9nurie \u00e0 mesure<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 21 ao\u00fbt \u00e0 05H44<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
La caract\u00e9ristique essentielle du colossal budget du Pentagone (en principe $648 milliards pour 2008 avec les guerres ext\u00e9rieures sont incluses, mais \u00abmore than $680 billion\u00bb, observe l’article cit\u00e9 sans autre explication) est qu’il ne semble qu’ajouter aux probl\u00e8mes budg\u00e9taires des forces: plus l’argent coule \u00e0 flot, plus les probl\u00e8mes semblent insurmontables. Le cas de l’Air… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6547,3356,249,4523,6963,41],"class_list":["post-69137","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-c-17","tag-desordre","tag-f-22","tag-penurie","tag-programmatin","tag-usaf"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69137","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69137"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69137\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69137"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69137"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69137"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}