pr\u00e9visions<\/a> de Robert Baer, \u00e9galement un ancien officier de la CIA, sur une attaque prochaine de l’Iran.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abSo our former colleague, operations officer par excellence Robert Baer, reports (in this week’s Time) that, according to his sources, the Bush\/Cheney administration is winding up for a strike on Iran, that Bush’s plan to put Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on the terrorism list points in the direction of such a strike, and that delusional neo-conservative thinking that still guides White House policy concludes that such an attack would lead to the fall of the clerics and rise of a more friendly Iran.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbHold on, it gets even worse: Baer’s sources tell him that administration officials are thinking that as long as we have bombers and missiles in the air, we will hit Iran’s nuclear facilities.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbVIPS member Phil Geraldi, writing in The American Conservative, earlier noted that Karl Rove has served as a counterweight to Vice President Dick Cheney, determined as Cheney seems to be to expand the Middle East quagmire to Iran.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAnd former Pentagon analyst, retired Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski, who worked shoulder-to-shoulder with the most rabid Pentagon neo-cons just before the attack on Iraq, has put into words (on LewRockwell.com) speculation several of us have been indulging in with respect to Rove’s departure.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIn short, it seems a good bet that Rove, who is no one’s dummy and would not want to have to spin an unnecessary war on Iran, lost the battle with Cheney over the merits of a military strike on Iran, and only then decided to spend more time with his family.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbWhatever else Rove has been, he has served as a counterweight to Dick Cheney’s clear desire to expand the Middle East quagmire into Iran.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAs for White House spokesperson Tony Snow, it seems equally possible that, before deciding he has to make more money, he concluded that his stomach could not withstand the task explaining why Bush\/Cheney needed to attack Iran.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Dans l’article, McGovern fait \u00e9galement une r\u00e9v\u00e9lation, sur le recrutement par la CIA d’un ministre de Saddam en 2002 et les affirmations par celui-ci de l’inexistence des armes de destruction massive. Mais la Maison-Blanche n’\u00e9tait pas int\u00e9ress\u00e9e par l’information (Le plus int\u00e9ressant dans cette r\u00e9v\u00e9lation n’est-il pas d’apprendre que des analystes de la CIA aient pu croire que la Maison-Blanche aurait \u00e9t\u00e9 soulag\u00e9e d’apprendre que le casus belli<\/em> contre l’Iran n’existait pas? Cela en dit long sur les cloisonnements et les antagonismes existant \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur du syst\u00e8me, outre les divergences et les machinations politiques.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t \u00abConsider, for example, the daring recruitment in mid-2002 of Saddam Hussein’s foreign minister, Naji Sabri, who was turned into working for the CIA and quickly established his credibility. Sabri told us there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abMy former colleagues, perhaps a bit naively, were quite sure this would come as a vast relief to President George W. Bush and his advisers. Instead, they were told that the White House had no further interest in reporting from Sabri; rather, that the issue was not really WMD, it was regime change.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 23 ao\u00fbt 2007 \u00e0 05H25<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Il existe une sorte de CIA dissidente, l’association VIPS (Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity) regroupant depuis 2002 d’anciens officiers de la CIA, en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral d\u00e9missionnaires \u00e0 la suite de la politisation et des pressions politiques exerc\u00e9es sur l’Agence. Les VIPS ne se contentent pas de se r\u00e9unir par se rappeler ensemble le bon vieux temps,… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3860,3985,3104,2773,1132,981,6970],"class_list":["post-69144","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-adm","tag-baer","tag-cia","tag-iran","tag-mcgovern","tag-saddam","tag-vips"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69144","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69144"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69144\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69144"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69144"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69144"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}