{"id":69157,"date":"2007-08-27T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-08-27T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/08\/27\/la-guerre-civile-fait-rage-a-washington-pas-a-bagdad\/"},"modified":"2007-08-27T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-08-27T00:00:00","slug":"la-guerre-civile-fait-rage-a-washington-pas-a-bagdad","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/08\/27\/la-guerre-civile-fait-rage-a-washington-pas-a-bagdad\/","title":{"rendered":"La guerre civile fait rage, \u2014 \u00e0 Washington, pas \u00e0 Bagdad"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Qui commande ? Plus personne. GW Bush a fait du d\u00e9sordre qu&rsquo;il a laiss\u00e9 s&rsquo;instituer, ou qu&rsquo;il n&rsquo;a pu faire autrement que de laisser s&rsquo;instituer, un facteur important sinon le facteur fondamental de la vie politique washingtonienne. Cela ne lui est pas d\u00e9savantageux et peut-\u00eatre l&rsquo;a-t-il laiss\u00e9 s&rsquo;instituer avec le secret et inconscient espoir qu&rsquo;il en serait renforc\u00e9. C&rsquo;est une r\u00e9ussite. Lui \u00e9tant dans une position si isol\u00e9e, ce d\u00e9sordre sert surtout \u00e0 emp\u00eacher le regroupement d&rsquo;une \u00e9ventuelle opposition structur\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tSur le fond et m\u00eame si le r\u00e9sultat est l\u00e0, ce n&rsquo;est pas \u00e0 l&rsquo;origine un calcul de sa part, c&rsquo;est un aspect naturel du d\u00e9veloppement de sa pr\u00e9sidence. Derri\u00e8re les affirmations pompeuses, r\u00e9p\u00e9t\u00e9es et sans substance, derri\u00e8re les dissimulatins et les tromperies, les affirmations erron\u00e9es dites en toute sinc\u00e9rit\u00e9, rien qu&rsquo;une absence compl\u00e8te de substance. Cela dure depuis si longtemps que cela finit par user ses adversaires, \u00e0 les diviser, \u00e0 les \u00e9parpiller dans leurs int\u00e9r\u00eats respectifs et leurs ambitions. Par inadvertance, Bush divise et cela lui permet de continuer \u00e0 r\u00e9gner, et il en devient m\u00eame <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=4360\" class=\"gen\">habile<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tUne situation particuli\u00e8rement inhabituelle, c&rsquo;est le d\u00e9sordre r\u00e9gnant dans le corps militaire. Tout le monde dit ce qu&rsquo;il veut et se contredit, sans souci des positions de ses autorit\u00e9s naturelles,  et en l&rsquo;absence d&rsquo;une r\u00e9elle politique officielle. <em>The Independent<\/em>, ca matin, parle donc d&rsquo;une guerre civile, \u00e0 Washington, pas \u00e0 Bagdad.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>America&rsquo;s generals are at war, and not just with al-Qai&rsquo;da and the resistance in Iraq. Now they are fighting among themselves about the best way forward in the ever-deepening tragedy of Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>A virtual civil war has erupted as senior US generals disagree in public about whether to cut and run or stay the course. On the airwaves, the internet and in newspapers the argument is raging with commanders in the field coming to the point of insubordination with Pentagon generals.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCette situation inqui\u00e8te Constanze Ser\u00e9, sur <em>Huffington Post<\/em> le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.huffingtonpost.com\/constance-sere\/the-politicization-of-mil_b_61871.html\" class=\"gen\">26 ao\u00fbt<\/a>. Elle commence son commentaire par ce rappel \u00e0 l&rsquo;ordre, aux grands principes, \u00e0 la responsabilit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Since when did American military commanders start inserting themselves into political debates? When did men in uniform  honored, but never elected  start giving the American people lectures on politics? Evidently, when the Bush administration told them to, as part of its surge against American public opinion.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>But officers should be reminded: Just following orders is no justification when an order goes against the American historical and Constitutional tradition. And it&rsquo;s also in statute, specifically, the National Security Act of 1947, the preamble of which reads:<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress&#8230;to provide for&#8230; unified direction under civilian control.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>And that means you, Major General Benjamin R. Mixon, commander of American forces in northern Iraq. You are a repeat offender. In one such instance, on July 13, Mixon ends his response to a question regarding the much-debated decrease in troop levels by delivering these instructions to Congress as it seeks to craft an Iraq strategy:<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>&#8230;[It] needs to be well thought out, and it cannot be a strategy that is based on &lsquo;well, we need to leave.&rsquo; That&rsquo;s not a strategy, that&rsquo;s a withdrawal.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>In looking at Mixon&rsquo;s words, which is more obvious: his condescension toward Congress  or his contempt for Congress?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Suivent d&rsquo;autres exemples, d&rsquo;autres d\u00e9clarations. Un g\u00e9n\u00e9ral (le pr\u00e9sident du comit\u00e9 des chefs d&rsquo;\u00e9tat-major, rien que \u00e7a) annonce qu&rsquo;il recommandera une r\u00e9duction des forces en Irak. Un de ses subordonn\u00e9s, en Irak, lui dit quasiment qu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une fuite, d&rsquo;une couardise. <em>Who cares<\/em>? Guerre civile, \u00e9crivons-nous par go\u00fbt de la formule. D\u00e9sordre civil, devrions-nous \u00e9crire \u00e0 l&rsquo;image de notre d\u00e9but de ce commentaire. Les interventions se font en toute impunit\u00e9, elles font m\u00eame partie du jeu, <em>That&rsquo;s the name of the game<\/em>. Aucune sanction, aucun rappel \u00e0 l&rsquo;ordre \u00e0 l&rsquo;horizon.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;\u00e9rosion des structures l\u00e9gales et des r\u00e9f\u00e9rences morales de la Grande R\u00e9publique est, dans ces conditions, absolument vertigineuse. Tout fait d\u00e9sormais partie de la bataille politicienne, tout est utilis\u00e9 dans le sens des int\u00e9r\u00eats particuliers et personnels. Nous avons d\u00e9pass\u00e9 le stade du complot ou du coup de force possible. A-t-il jamais exist\u00e9 d&rsquo;ailleurs? Nous en doutons, le d\u00e9sordre ayant finalement pr\u00e9c\u00e9d\u00e9, emp\u00each\u00e9 et \u00e9touff\u00e9 la conscience de ce d\u00e9sordre et l&rsquo;\u00e9ventuelle intention de r\u00e9agir. Et puis, c&rsquo;est la Grande R\u00e9publique, o\u00f9 le coup de force n&rsquo;est pas de mise. La vertu m\u00e8ne \u00e0 tout, y compris au vice supr\u00eame.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tA Washington, le d\u00e9sordre r\u00e8gne, et, finalement, GW en est le souverain sans pouvoir, le ma\u00eetre de c\u00e9r\u00e9monie. Il dure, donc il existe.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 27 ao\u00fbt 2007 07H24<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Qui commande ? Plus personne. GW Bush a fait du d\u00e9sordre qu&rsquo;il a laiss\u00e9 s&rsquo;instituer, ou qu&rsquo;il n&rsquo;a pu faire autrement que de laisser s&rsquo;instituer, un facteur important sinon le facteur fondamental de la vie politique washingtonienne. Cela ne lui est pas d\u00e9savantageux et peut-\u00eatre l&rsquo;a-t-il laiss\u00e9 s&rsquo;instituer avec le secret et inconscient espoir qu&rsquo;il&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2880,3356,5160,2645,3248],"class_list":["post-69157","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-civile","tag-desordre","tag-generaux","tag-guerre","tag-washington"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69157","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69157"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69157\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69157"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69157"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69157"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}