Qui se souvient de la crise de l’\u00e9t\u00e9, de la crise financi\u00e8re du mois d’ao\u00fbt? Oubli\u00e9, tout \u00e7a? Toujours les m\u00eames questions. C’est la rentr\u00e9e, les activit\u00e9s reprennent. Mais les activit\u00e9s ne sont pas tr\u00e8s gaies. Le Financial Times<\/em> se distingue, depuis l’origine de la crise, par une vision tr\u00e8s noire, tr\u00e8s pessimiste. On reconna\u00eetra au quotidien de la City<\/em> une incontestable expertise dans la mati\u00e8re financi\u00e8re. Son inqui\u00e9tude est donc inqui\u00e9tante. Le th\u00e8me de cet article de ce jour<\/a> est le contraire de l’apaisement, mais plut\u00f4t le sentiment d’une mont\u00e9e de pessimisme, vers une crise majeure.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abAs bankers have returned to their desks this week after the summer break, they have been searching frantically for signs that the markets are gaining a semblance of calm after the August turmoil.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbHowever, the money markets are notably failing to offer any reassurance. While the tone of equity markets has calmed, the sense of crisis in the interbank markets actually appears to be growing especially in London.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIn particular, the cost of borrowing funds in the three-month money markets as illustrated by measures such as sterling Libor or Euribor is continuing to rise, suggesting a frantic scramble for liquidity among financial groups.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThis trend is deeply unnerving for policymakers and investors alike, not least because it is occurring even though the European Central Bank and the US Federal Reserve have taken repeated steps in recent weeks to calm down the money markets.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWhat is happening right now suggests that the moves by the Fed and ECB just haven’t worked as we hoped, admits one senior international policymaker. Or as UniCredit analysts say: The interbank lending business has broken down almost completely . . . it is a global phenonema and not restricted to just the euro and dollar markets.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIf this situation continues, it could potentially have very serious implications. One of the most important functions of the money markets is to channel liquidity in the banking system to where it is most needed. These markets seize up for any lengthy period, there is a risk that individual institutions may discover they no longer have access to the funds they need.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThis danger has already materialised for vehicles that depend on the asset-backed commercial paper sector short-term notes backed by collateral such as mortgages. In recent weeks, investors have increasingly refused to re-invest in this paper.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAs Axel Weber, a member of the ECB council, admitted this weekend: The institutions most affected currently are conduits and structured investment vehicles . . . Their ability to roll these short-term commercial papers is impaired by the events in the subprime segment of the US housing market.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThis problem is affecting the wider banking system because these vehicles are now tapping other sources of finance mainly liquidity lines from banks.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIt appears that the prospect of receiving new liquidity demands has prompted banks to rush to raise funds and, above all, hoard any liquidity they hold.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe high demand from banks to secure liquidity for the next three months, coupled with their desire not to lend out what liquidity they have, has made it virtually impossible to execute trades even at the official prices quoted for such borrowing.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThat has created some extraordinary dislocations such as the fact that the cost of borrowing three-month money in the sterling Libor markets is now higher than borrowing six-month or 12-month money. The system has just completely frozen up everyone is hoarding, says one bank treasurer. The published Libor rates are a fiction.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThis situation could become increasingly dangerous in part because many other markets, such as swaps, are priced off the three-month Libor and Euribor rates. So the interbank freeze could have knock-on effects throughout the financial system.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLa crise est une crise typiquement postmoderne dans sa substance: la mise \u00e0 jour, dans une situation d’urgence de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 de l’argent disponible par rapport au volume d’argent sur lequel portent les transactions. La disproportion \u00e9norme en d\u00e9faveur des liquidit\u00e9s, alors que de nombreuses banques cherchent justement \u00e0 retrouver des liquidateurs, est une illustration de l’\u00e9tat du syst\u00e8me, syst\u00e8me financier mais aussi syst\u00e8me politique et philosophique si l’on peut dire. La pression psychologique de cette situation, entre r\u00e9alit\u00e9 d\u00e9couverte \u00e0 sa juste mesure et mesure de l’importance du virtualisme dans la richesse affich\u00e9e constitue un redoutable cocktail qui put \u00eatre g\u00e9n\u00e9rateur de panique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tEffectivement, on se rapproche du m\u00e9canisme de la vraie crise qui a dynamis\u00e9 la Grande D\u00e9pression \u00e0 partir de 1931-32. Dans ce cas, ce furent les particuliers qui commenc\u00e8rent \u00e0 retirer leurs liquidit\u00e9s des banques, acculant celles-ci \u00e0 des faillites retentissantes, nourrissant la sensation de l’effondrement du syst\u00e8me, l’angoisse, la panique, etc. C’est ce ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne qu’\u00e9voquait r\u00e9cemment<\/a> Evans-Pritchard, de Times<\/em>. L’on voit \u00e0 cette occasion que la situation \u00e9voqu\u00e9e au niveau des banques par rapport au syst\u00e8me dont elles d\u00e9pendent peut effectivement se transmettre au niveau du public et retrouver les pires moments du d\u00e9clenchement de la Grande D\u00e9pression US, mod\u00e8le \u00e0 privil\u00e9gier parce qu’il concerne un effondrement intervenant dans une situaton d’\u00e9conomie [\u00e9galement avec ses tendances virtualistes] triomphante les Roaring Twenties<\/em> aux USA, \u00e0 l’inverse des \u00e9conomies europ\u00e9ennes ravag\u00e9es par la Grande Guerre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 5 septembre 2007 \u00e0 12H39<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Qui se souvient de la crise de l’\u00e9t\u00e9, de la crise financi\u00e8re du mois d’ao\u00fbt? Oubli\u00e9, tout \u00e7a? Toujours les m\u00eames questions. C’est la rentr\u00e9e, les activit\u00e9s reprennent. Mais les activit\u00e9s ne sont pas tr\u00e8s gaies. Le Financial Times se distingue, depuis l’origine de la crise, par une vision tr\u00e8s noire, tr\u00e8s pessimiste. On reconna\u00eetra… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6676,3083,2851,4478,2891,7003,2852],"class_list":["post-69189","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-banques","tag-depression","tag-financial","tag-ft","tag-grande","tag-liquidites","tag-times"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69189","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69189"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69189\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69189"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69189"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69189"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}