{"id":69202,"date":"2007-09-09T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-09-09T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/09\/09\/la-concurrence-entre-le-desordre-irakien-et-le-desordre-washingtonien-fallon-versus-petraeus\/"},"modified":"2007-09-09T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-09-09T00:00:00","slug":"la-concurrence-entre-le-desordre-irakien-et-le-desordre-washingtonien-fallon-versus-petraeus","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/09\/09\/la-concurrence-entre-le-desordre-irakien-et-le-desordre-washingtonien-fallon-versus-petraeus\/","title":{"rendered":"La concurrence entre le d\u00e9sordre irakien et le d\u00e9sordre washingtonien : Fallon <em>versus<\/em> Petraeus"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>L&rsquo;une des caract\u00e9ristiques de la situation irakienne est le d\u00e9sordre. Quelques fins analystes occidentaux (notamment les officiels fran\u00e7ais) affirment que c&rsquo;est le but r\u00e9el des US: installer le d\u00e9sordre en Irak pour emp\u00eacher l&rsquo;Iran de dominer la r\u00e9gion. Dans ce cas, le succ\u00e8s d\u00e9passe toutes les esp\u00e9rances puisque le d\u00e9sordre emp\u00eachera \u00e9galement les Etats-Unis de faire quoi que ce soit d&rsquo;efficace&#8230; Il (le d\u00e9sordre) est en effet aussi fermement install\u00e9 dans la direction et l&rsquo;<em>establishment<\/em> washingtonien, y compris chez (entre) les chefs militaires. C&rsquo;est une strat\u00e9gie nouvelle et originale de dupliquer chez soi la discorde qu&rsquo;on veut installer chez l&rsquo;ennemi.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;article du Washington <em>Post<\/em> de <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2007\/09\/08\/AR2007090801846_pf.html\" class=\"gen\">ce jour<\/a> est particuli\u00e8rement \u00e9clairant \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard. Bien qu&rsquo;on y trouve la marque d&rsquo;un de ses auteurs, Thomas E. Ricks, dont on ne sait s&rsquo;il travaille sur le Pentagone pour le <em>Post<\/em> ou au <em>Post<\/em> pour le Pentagone, le texte donne une description saisissante du d\u00e9sordre washingtonien et pentagonesque. En v\u00e9rit\u00e9, on doute qu&rsquo;il y ait tellement plus de d\u00e9saccords et d&rsquo;affrontements entre les milices, les groupes, les bandes, etc., en Irak, qu&rsquo;entre hauts fonctionnaires, parlementaires, et surtout entre officiers g\u00e9n\u00e9raux  notamment entre g\u00e9n\u00e9raux et amiraux<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEn effet, l&rsquo;un des plats de r\u00e9sistance de l&rsquo;article est la m\u00e9sentente entre le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Petraeus et son sup\u00e9rieur direct, l&rsquo;amiral <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=3989\" class=\"gen\">Fallon<\/a>. Cette m\u00e9sentente est d\u00e9crite en des termes emphatiques qui en disent long,  comme elle nous en dit long sur la structure m\u00eame du d\u00e9sordre washingtonien, ou la structure du pouvoir \u00e0 Washington en forme de d\u00e9sordre. Il est tr\u00e8s r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur que l&rsquo;\u00e9quipe du Pentagone impliqu\u00e9e dans la guerre irakienne (le secr\u00e9taire Gates, le chef de Central Command l&rsquo;amiral Fallon, le chef du th\u00e9\u00e2tre irakien le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Petraeus) ait \u00e9t\u00e9 constitu\u00e9e dans la p\u00e9riode fin 2006-d\u00e9but 2007 en th\u00e9orie pour permettre une certaine unit\u00e9 d&rsquo;action dans l&rsquo;application de la nouvelle strat\u00e9gie (<em>surge<\/em>). Il s&rsquo;av\u00e8re qu&rsquo;ils sont tous trois d&rsquo;avis diff\u00e9rents et, pour certains (Gates), fluctuants, tandis que l&rsquo;opposition entre les deux principaux chefs est f\u00e9roce. Aux diff\u00e9rences de conception connues s&rsquo;ajoutent, semble-t-il, des oppositions d&rsquo;individus, d&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eats, etc. Le d\u00e9sordre comme <em>way of life<\/em>  <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>For two hours, President Bush listened to contrasting visions of the U.S. future in Iraq. Gen. David H. Petraeus dominated the conversation by video link from Baghdad, making the case to keep as many troops as long as possible to cement any security progress. Adm. William J. Fallon, his superior, argued instead for accepting more risks in Iraq, officials said, in order to have enough forces available to confront other potential threats in the region.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The polite discussion in the White House Situation Room a week ago masked a sharper clash over the U.S. venture in Iraq, one that has been building since Fallon, chief of the U.S. Central Command, which oversees Middle East operations, sent a rear admiral to Baghdad this summer to gather information. Soon afterward, officials said, Fallon began developing plans to redefine the U.S. mission and radically draw down troops.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>One of those plans, according to a Centcom officer, involved slashing U.S. combat forces in Iraq by three-quarters by 2010. In an interview, Fallon disputed that description but declined to offer details. Nonetheless, his efforts offended Petraeus&rsquo;s team, which saw them as unwelcome intrusion on their own long-term planning. The profoundly different views of the U.S. role in Iraq only exacerbated the schism between the two men.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Bad relations? said a senior civilian official with a laugh. That&rsquo;s the understatement of the century. . . . If you think Armageddon was a riot, that&rsquo;s one way of looking at it.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Fallon has made the case that Petraeus&rsquo;s recommendations should consider the political reality in Washington and lay out a guide to troop withdrawals, while Petraeus has resisted that, beyond a possible token pullout of a brigade early next year, according to military officials. The Joint Chiefs have been sympathetic to Fallon&rsquo;s view.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>In an interview Friday, Fallon said he and Petraeus have reached accommodation about tomorrow&rsquo;s testimony. The most important thing is I&rsquo;m very happy with what Dave has recommended, he said. As for the earlier discussions, he begged off. It&rsquo;s too politically charged right now.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 9 septembre 2007 \u00e0 13H18<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>L&rsquo;une des caract\u00e9ristiques de la situation irakienne est le d\u00e9sordre. Quelques fins analystes occidentaux (notamment les officiels fran\u00e7ais) affirment que c&rsquo;est le but r\u00e9el des US: installer le d\u00e9sordre en Irak pour emp\u00eacher l&rsquo;Iran de dominer la r\u00e9gion. Dans ce cas, le succ\u00e8s d\u00e9passe toutes les esp\u00e9rances puisque le d\u00e9sordre emp\u00eachera \u00e9galement les Etats-Unis de&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3272,3273,3356,6296,857,6264],"class_list":["post-69202","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-central","tag-command","tag-desordre","tag-fallon","tag-irak","tag-petraeus"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69202","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69202"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69202\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69202"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69202"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69202"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}