{"id":69206,"date":"2007-09-10T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-09-10T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/09\/10\/en-direct-de-bagdad-potemkine-la-capitale-liberee-par-le-surge\/"},"modified":"2007-09-10T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-09-10T00:00:00","slug":"en-direct-de-bagdad-potemkine-la-capitale-liberee-par-le-surge","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/09\/10\/en-direct-de-bagdad-potemkine-la-capitale-liberee-par-le-surge\/","title":{"rendered":"En direct de Bagdad-Potemkine, la capitale lib\u00e9r\u00e9e par le \u201c<em>surge<\/em>\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>C&rsquo;est une \u00e9trange bataille que celle qui se livre entre les diverses r\u00e9alit\u00e9s de la situation en Irak. La version officielle, pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e par <em>Brand<\/em> Petraeus est celle d&rsquo;une situation en am\u00e9lioration assez sensible, o\u00f9 une dynamique de remise en ordre et de reprise de contr\u00f4le est en voie de se d\u00e9velopper. Petraeus se garde d&rsquo;affirmer que la victoire est en vue mais plut\u00f4t que les \u00e9l\u00e9ments constitutifs d&rsquo;une victoire sont rassembl\u00e9s. Pour soutenir cette analyse, il produit des chiffres statistiques, qui sont \u00e9videmment contest\u00e9s de toutes parts. Il est soutenu par le puissant appareil de communication de Washington et de la presse en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl y a aussi la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 Disons, la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 r\u00e9elle? Par exemple, ce reportage de Kim Sengupta pour <em>The Independent<\/em> <a href=\"http:\/\/news.independent.co.uk\/world\/middle_east\/article2947410.ece\" class=\"gen\">aujourd&rsquo;hui<\/a>. Il s&rsquo;agit de Bagdad. A la description qu&rsquo;en fait le journaliste, on comprend bien la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 de la situation. Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;un r\u00e9el morcellement de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 ethnique de Bagdad, avec regroupements ethniques provoqu\u00e9es ou non, par l&rsquo;action de milices ou pas, des contr\u00f4les syst\u00e9matiquement contraignants, des pressions naturelles pour cantonner les gens dans leurs propres zones de s\u00e9curit\u00e9. Il appara\u00eet \u00e9vident \u00e9vident que la r\u00e9duction des affrontements ethnique r\u00e9sulte des modifications de la g\u00e9ographie ethnique: puisqu&rsquo;il n&rsquo;y a plus de chiite \u00e0 tuer dans les quartiers chiiites ni de sunnites \u00e0 tuer dans les quartiers chiites, on tue moins de ce point de vue-l\u00e0. Bien entendu, on comprend vers quelle situation on s&rsquo;oriente.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe journaliste parle \u00e9videmment du couvre-feu; mais la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 en-dehors du couvre-feu n&rsquo;est pas loin de ressembler \u00e0 la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 durant le couvre-feu. Au bout de cette logique, on sait qu&rsquo;une ville morte \u00e0 cause de la peur et des contraintes psychologiques g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9es par cette sorte de situation repose dans le silence et dans la paix.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>On the surface, the Iraqi capital is less overtly violent than it used to be. The number of car bombings have fallen to only 23 a month from 42 in the same period last year, there are fewer sounds of explosions and gunfire than in the past, and there is, generally, less tension. And some of that must be due to the presence of more troops.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>But for many Iraqis, the Americans have turned their land into a prison. The barriers, which have turned Baghdad into a series of ghettos, are meant to keep the bombers out, but they also keep residents penned in. People may feel safer inside their neighbourhoods, but are more wary of venturing outside them. A short journey across the city can take hours with roads blocked off and numerous checkpoints, discouraging people from visiting relations and friends and reinforcing the sense of isolation.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>A city divided by high concrete walls, barbed wire and checkpoints; armoured columns moving through deserted evening streets lit by the glow of searchlights and emptied by official curfew and fear. This is Baghdad, seven months into the surge, and George Bush&rsquo;s last throw of the dice in Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<MLI>The walls, being put up by American contractors at a record speed, are formalising the break up of Baghdad. The city where Sunni, Shia and Christians once lived in comparative social amity  although not the same access to political power  is now so divided along sectarian lines that it may be impossible ever to reunify it.<D><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Shia fighters have driven out Sunni families from areas such as Huriya, Shaab and Shalla. The Sunnis, in turn, have done the same to the Shias in places such as Khradrah, Amil and Jamiya. The properties are the source of more funding for the militias who organise their rentals. The Mehdi Army, led by the radical Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, has been in the forefront of this ethnic cleansing, having to do little apart from put red markings on Sunni homes they want, a message the owners seldom argue with.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Residents seeing their neighbours being driven out are too afraid to do anything. At Huriya, which has lost all its Sunni households, Hakim al-Karim, a 42-year-old computer software designer, said We know a man who was killed because he was a Sunni and they wanted his house. No one did anything, but do not blame us, there is nothing we could do. If they find out they will kill you. Who are you going to go to? The Americans? They are not going to stay in my street to protect my family. The police? You don&rsquo;t even know who they really work for.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The purge of the neighbourhoods have helped bring down the number of violent deaths, driving people out means there are fewer sectarian targets left for the militias to kill.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Et puis, l&rsquo;autre aspect de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 r\u00e9elle est \u00e9galement que, sur le fond des choses, le ds\u00e9sordre continue \u00e0 r\u00e9gner s&rsquo;il arrive \u00e0 \u00eatre maquill\u00e9 dans certains points choisis comme lieu-Potemkine de d\u00e9mopnstration. Sengupta cite Omar Rachid, qui voyage souvent entre Amman et Bagdad : \u00ab<em>The checkpoints in the west of Baghdad to the Jordanian border are controlled by Sunnis. They ask your name and if it is Ali there are problems because Ali is a Shia name. But then there are Sunnis also called Ali. So then they ask you about your tribe. It can be dangerous to get the answers wrong.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 10 septembre 2007 \u00e0 12H40<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>C&rsquo;est une \u00e9trange bataille que celle qui se livre entre les diverses r\u00e9alit\u00e9s de la situation en Irak. La version officielle, pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e par Brand Petraeus est celle d&rsquo;une situation en am\u00e9lioration assez sensible, o\u00f9 une dynamique de remise en ordre et de reprise de contr\u00f4le est en voie de se d\u00e9velopper. Petraeus se garde d&rsquo;affirmer&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[632,6264,6565,7022],"class_list":["post-69206","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bagdad","tag-petraeus","tag-potemkine","tag-sengupta"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69206","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69206"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69206\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69206"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69206"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69206"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}