{"id":69210,"date":"2007-09-11T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-09-11T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/09\/11\/le-jsf-israelien-a-la-moulinette\/"},"modified":"2007-09-11T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-09-11T00:00:00","slug":"le-jsf-israelien-a-la-moulinette","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/09\/11\/le-jsf-israelien-a-la-moulinette\/","title":{"rendered":"Le JSF isra\u00e9lien \u00e0 la moulinette"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Des pr\u00e9cisions de source ind\u00e9pendante venues de Washington indiquent que le Pentagone a exerc\u00e9 une pression consid\u00e9rable sur les Isra\u00e9liens pour que ceux-ci ne prennent pas de mesures trop spectaculaires dans leurs pr\u00e9visions d&rsquo;engagement dans le programme JSF, comme il avait \u00e9t\u00e9 annonc\u00e9 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=4337\" class=\"gen\">le mois dernier<\/a>. Finalement, le Pentagone n&rsquo;a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 entendu, bien au contraire, malgr\u00e9 un report de deux semaines de la d\u00e9cision isra\u00e9lienne par rapport \u00e0 ce qui avait \u00e9t\u00e9 annonc\u00e9. Ce d\u00e9lai indique qu&rsquo;il y a eu d\u00e9bat chez les Isra\u00e9liens, \u00e0 cause des pressions US, et que l&rsquo;orientation anti-JSF a \u00e9t\u00e9 largement confirm\u00e9e en toute connaissance de cause. Non seulement l&rsquo;entr\u00e9e en service du JSF est repouss\u00e9e (de 2014 \u00e0 2015-2016) mais le nombre d&rsquo;avions qui seront command\u00e9s dans le plan budg\u00e9taire 2008-2012 est r\u00e9duit de 75% : de 100 \u00e0 25 avions. L&rsquo;espoir de r\u00e9tablir ensuite l&rsquo;enti\u00e8ret\u00e9 de la commande initiale est en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral per\u00e7u comme assez vain.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tQuelques pr\u00e9cisions de <em>Defense News<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/story.php?F=3021352&#038;C=thisweek\" class=\"gen\">10 septembre<\/a>:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>The biggest victim of reordered, post-Lebanon war spending priorities is the Israel Air Force, which now stands to acquire much fewer  perhaps only half  of the 100 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) initially planned for its future force.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Under the 2008-2012 spending plan, IDF brass approved funding for just one squadron of 25 JSF aircraft, which will become operational around 2015-2016, defense and industry sources here said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>In the follow-on, five-year plan, the Air Force hopes to receive funding for another two squadrons, which would boost its JSF force to 75 by the end of the decade. However, defense and industry sources say this assessment is overly optimistic.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>They&rsquo;re now talking about one squadron of 25 planes  and if we&rsquo;re lucky, we may get another squadron of 25 in the next five-year plan, said a prominent airpower lobbyist. He added, Few are seriously talking any more about the full 100 planes.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl est \u00e9galement remarquable que la r\u00e9action officielle de Washington ait \u00e9t\u00e9 extr\u00eamement apaisante. Elle d\u00e9veloppe l&rsquo;id\u00e9e que la d\u00e9cision isra\u00e9lienne ne change rien \u00e0 la situation, y compris au niveau de la coop\u00e9ration USA-Isra\u00ebl \u00e0 l&rsquo;int\u00e9rieur du programme : \u00ab<em>Despite the prospective cuts in JSF buys, U.S. sources said it should not have an impact on the ongoing bilateral program, which is running behind schedule due to protracted, but now resolved, technology transfer problems.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCette r\u00e9action, contrastant avec les pressions exerc\u00e9es par le Pentagone, indique que les USA veulent absolument \u00e9viter tout remous s\u00e9rieux public \u00e0 l&rsquo;int\u00e9rieur du programme. Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une indication de la fragilit\u00e9 de l&rsquo;architecture du programme et de la crainte que toute r\u00e9action brutale de la partie US puisse avoir des effets indirects d\u00e9stabilisants aupr\u00e8s des partenaires \u00e9trangers.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDu point de vue de l&rsquo;appr\u00e9ciation de la capacit\u00e9 op\u00e9rationnelle de l&rsquo;avion, et malgr\u00e9 les conditions <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=4339\" class=\"gen\">tr\u00e8s particuli\u00e8res<\/a> de la d\u00e9cision,  ou peut-\u00eatre \u00e0 cause d&rsquo;elles, au contraire,  la d\u00e9cision isra\u00e9lienne, surtout avec la nouveaut\u00e9 d&rsquo;une r\u00e9duction tr\u00e8s forte de la commande jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 un nombre presque symbolique, repr\u00e9sente un revers important pour le programme. Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;un rejet presque complet de l&rsquo;avion, la commande de 25 \u00e9tant consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme une commande de complaisance, d\u00e9cid\u00e9e pour \u00e9viter une r\u00e9action brutale de Washington.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;expertise isra\u00e9lienne dans l&rsquo;exp\u00e9rience du combat, \u00e0 cause des guerres successives d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl et des capacit\u00e9s des forces isra\u00e9liennes, reste une r\u00e9f\u00e9rence de grand poids. L&rsquo;appr\u00e9ciation d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl selon laquelle le JSF n&rsquo;a qu&rsquo;une importance marginale dans ses plans de combat pour les vingt ans \u00e0 venir, dans une \u00e9poque si incertaine et si dangereuse, constitue un \u00e9v\u00e9nement s\u00e9rieux pour le programme. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 11 septembre 2007 \u00e0 12H51<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Des pr\u00e9cisions de source ind\u00e9pendante venues de Washington indiquent que le Pentagone a exerc\u00e9 une pression consid\u00e9rable sur les Isra\u00e9liens pour que ceux-ci ne prennent pas de mesures trop spectaculaires dans leurs pr\u00e9visions d&rsquo;engagement dans le programme JSF, comme il avait \u00e9t\u00e9 annonc\u00e9 le mois dernier. Finalement, le Pentagone n&rsquo;a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 entendu, bien au&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3144,2774,250],"class_list":["post-69210","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-commande","tag-israel","tag-jsf"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69210","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69210"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69210\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69210"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69210"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69210"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}