aujourd’hui<\/a>. Cockburn met bien en \u00e9vidence qu’une attitude d’hostilit\u00e9 de quelque faction que ce soit en Irak contre Al Qa\u00efda, ou contre tout autre organisation terroriste ou de r\u00e9sistance, ne signifie pas un gain \u00e0 mesure pour les USA. La politique, surtout dans des p\u00e9riodes si troubl\u00e9es, ne se r\u00e9duit pas \u00e0 une simple arithm\u00e9tique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abAbu Risha’s death underlines the degree to which the White House and General Petraeus have cherry-picked evidence to prove that it is possible to turn the tide in Iraq. They have, for instance, given the impression that some Sunni tribal leaders turning against al-Qa’ida in Anbar and parts of Diyala and Baghdad is a turning point in the war.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIn reality al-Qa’ida is only a small part of the insurgency, with its fighters numbering only 1,300 as against 103,000 in the other insurgent organisations according to one specialist on the insurgency. Al-Qa’ida has largely concentrated on horrific and cruel bomb attacks on Shia civilians and policemen and has targeted the US military only as secondary target.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe mass of the insurgents belong to groups that are nationalist and Islamic militants who have primarily fought the US occupation. They were never likely to sit back while the US declared victory in their main bastion in Anbar province.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThere is no doubt that Abu Risha fulfilled a need and spoke for many Sunni who were hostile to and frightened by al-Qa’ida. Their hatred sprung less from the attacks on the Shia than al-Qa’ida setting up an umbrella organisation called the Islamic State of Iraq last year that sought to enforce total control in Sunni areas.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIt tried to draft one young man from every Sunni family into its ranks, sought protection money and would kill Sunni who held insignificant government jobs collecting the garbage or driving trucks for the agriculture ministry as traitors.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe importance of the assassination of Abu Risha is that it once again underlines the difference between the bloody reality of Iraq as it is and the way it is presented by the US administration. He is one of a string of Iraqi leaders who have been killed in Iraq since the invasion of 2003 because they were seen as being too close to the US. These include the Shia religious leader Sayid Majid al-Khoei, murdered in Najaf in April 2003, and Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, the head of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, killed by a suicide bomber the same year.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIn practice the surge has by itself has done little to improve security, according to Iraqis, a majority of whom say security has got worse. The number of Iraqis fleeing their homes has actually gone up from 50,000 to 60,000 in recent months, according to the UN High Commission for Refugees. Baghdad has become a largely Shia city with the Sunni pressed into smaller and smaller enclaves.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbCultivating an alliance with the Sunni tribes had been a long-term US policy since 2004 but finally caught fire because of al-Qa’ida overplayed their hand last year. It has the disadvantage that the US has, in effect, created a new Sunni tribal militia which takes orders from the US military and is well paid by it and does not owe allegiance to the Shia-Kurdish government in Baghdad. This is despite the fact that the US has denounced militias in Iraq and demanded they be dissolved.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe US success in Anbar was real but it was also overblown because the wholly Sunni province is not typical of the rest of Iraq. The strategy advocated by Washington exaggerated the importance of al-Qa’ida and seldom spoke of the other powerful groups who had not been driven out of Anbar.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tUn autre enseignement de cet assassinat, particuli\u00e8rement important, a sans doute finalement \u00e0 voir avec la politique absurde par aveuglement et incompr\u00e9hension de Washington, m\u00eame lorsqu’il s’agit d’exploiter des succ\u00e8s locaux r\u00e9els. Cockburn observe, fort justement de notre point de vue, que c’est sans doute l’exploitation publicitaire par les USA de l’alliance de Abu Risha avec les USA qui a co\u00fbt\u00e9 sa vie au chef sunnite; il s’agit notamment de la visite de Bush, la semaine derni\u00e8re, avec le pr\u00e9sident s’affichant complaisamment avec Abu Risha. Il n’y aurait rien de bien nouveau. Pour Washington, seule compte la politique washingtonienne, et tous les \u00e9v\u00e9nements ext\u00e9rieurs sont exploit\u00e9s publicitairemet dans ce sens, sans attention pour les effets sur place. (A supposer, hypoth\u00e8se probl\u00e9matique, que le gouvernement US soit capable de comprendre ce qui peut arriver \u00e0 son alli\u00e9 en raison du soutien US ; cela impliquerait la pens\u00e9e incroyable pour ce m\u00eame gouvernement US que l’alliance US peut \u00eatre, quelque part dans le monde, et peut-\u00eatre m\u00eame ailleurs, \u00e0 un moment, un handicap pour celui qui la souscrit.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abBut President Bush’s highly publicised visit to Anbar may well have been Abu Risha’s death knell. There are many Sunni who loathe al-Qa’ida, but very few who approve of the US occupation. By giving the impression that Abu Risha was one of America’s most important friends, Mr Bush ensured that some of the most dangerous men in the world would try to kill him.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 14 septembre 2007 \u00e0 05H17<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
A l’heure o\u00f9 le pr\u00e9sident US pr\u00e9sentait \u00e0 la TV ses plans pour l’engagement US en Irak, pers\u00e9v\u00e9rer et pers\u00e9v\u00e9rer encore puisque le surge est un succ\u00e8s, son principal et nouvel alli\u00e9 sunnite dans la province d’Anbar \u00e9tait assassin\u00e9. Abdul-Sattar Abu Risha \u00e9tait l’homme qui avait d\u00e9cid\u00e9 de s’allier, sans doute temporairement, aux USA contre… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[7027,3936,7029,857,4242,7028,4257],"class_list":["post-69219","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-abu","tag-al","tag-assassinat","tag-irak","tag-qaida","tag-risha","tag-sunnite"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69219","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69219"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69219\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69219"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69219"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69219"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}