{"id":69225,"date":"2007-09-16T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-09-16T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/09\/16\/les-desordres-de-ce-b-52-la\/"},"modified":"2007-09-16T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-09-16T00:00:00","slug":"les-desordres-de-ce-b-52-la","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/09\/16\/les-desordres-de-ce-b-52-la\/","title":{"rendered":"Les d\u00e9sordres de ce B-52-l\u00e0<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Les d\u00e9sordres de ce B-52-l\u00e0<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

\t16 septembre 2007 Nous n’y avions pas pens\u00e9 ; WSWS.org<\/em>, ce site consciencieux et s\u00e9rieux, y a pens\u00e9 pour nous, dans un texte mis en ligne le 14 septembre<\/a>. Ils ont fait un excellent suivi de l’affaire du B-52<\/a> de Minot AFB avec ses ACM<\/a> \u00e0 t\u00eates nucl\u00e9aires et ont constat\u00e9 plusieurs choses int\u00e9ressantes :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Les parlementaires, tr\u00e8s excit\u00e9s, scandalis\u00e9s par l’affaire lorsqu’elle s’est produite, ont compl\u00e8tement laiss\u00e9 tomber. C’est le cas de Ike Skelton, d\u00e9mocrate, pr\u00e9sident de la Commission des forces arm\u00e9es, qui s’\u00e9tait avou\u00e9 tr\u00e8s troubl\u00e9; le 5 septembre : \u00abThere is no more serious issue than the security and proper handling of nuclear weapons. This committee will continue to pursue answers on this classified matter to ensure that the Air Force and the Department of Defense address this particular incident and strengthen controls more generally.<\/em>\u00bb Le 13 septembre, coup de fil de WSWS.org<\/em> \u00e0 la Commission, r\u00e9ponse d’une porte-parole de la Commission : \u00ab No hearings have been scheduled on the nuclear flight, no decisions about that have been made. We’ve been pretty busy the past week.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t La presse MSM a \u00e9t\u00e9 particuli\u00e8rement discr\u00e8te, op\u00e9rant une remarquable op\u00e9ration d’auto-censure pour une affaire dont nul ne douta tr\u00e8s rapidement, comme par intuition dirons-nous, qu’elle n’avait gu\u00e8re d’importance. WSWS.org<\/em> donne d’int\u00e9ressantes et convaincantes consid\u00e9rations sur le cas.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Un troisi\u00e8me aspect du texte WSWS.org<\/em> concerne un autre site, celui de Military Times<\/em> qui est le premier \u00e0 avoir diffus\u00e9 la nouvelle. WSWS.org<\/em> fait une excellente synth\u00e8se des r\u00e9actions innombrables (450) de lecteurs, la plupart eux-m\u00eames des militaires dont des pilotes ou anciens pilotes de B-52. C\u00e9dant \u00e0 notre appr\u00e9ciation \u00e9logieuse \u00e0 propos de ce travail de synth\u00e8se de WSWS.org<\/em>, nous lui empruntons un important extrait (sur le site Military Times<\/em>, on trouve effectivement les r\u00e9actions<\/a> des lecteurs de l’article).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abOne place where the event has been given extensive attention is on the readers’ forum page of the Military Times web site, which headlines the section Mistake or message. Some 500 items have been posted, in many cases by people identifying themselves as former Air Force personnel who were involved in the US nuclear strike force. A substantial share of these postings sharply question the official story floated by the Pentagon.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbFormer B-52 chief: What the hell happened here?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOne correspondent, identifying himself as a retired B-52 crew chief, described the official account as unbelievable.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbHe wrote: Back in 1979 we had to sign for nuclear weapons verifying serial numbers, the security folks posted two man guards at the aircraft, the cops enforced two man maintenance crews access to the aircraft, the 781s are annotated, maintenance job control was informed, the wing command post was informed, weapons were moved in an armed convoy, etc. How were the weapons removed from storage? Who was guarding the weapons, military troopers or contractors? How were they transported to the aircraft? How were the aircraft forms updated? How was the chain of custody broken? Did the flight crew and munitions maintenance OICs [officers in charge] verify weapons status? What the hell happened here?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbSomeone self-described as a former cruise missile troop writes, I do not see how this could have happened. If the missile shop’ failed to download the heads before taking them to the flightline, the crew loading them on the plane has a checklist asking them to verify no warheads installed,’ as do the pilots….<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAnother correspondent questions claims that the weapons were merely being moved from one base to be decommissioned (destroyed): When I was in the Air Force and worked on these types of missiles we never would have sent these missiles out on a B-52 for decommissioning. These missiles would have had their warheads removed and boxed for shipping and the missile body itself would have been boxed up and both items would have been shipped out [on a] C-5. This was the only way we…could have shipped them out, not on or in a B-52. This could not have happened, we are not being told the whole story, there has to be more to it!`<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAnother posting reads: I think everyone here is making an assumption that they didn’t know. This is an absurd assumption. As soon as those ACMs [advanced cruise missiles] hit the hard-mounts, the talkback between the computers instantly enabled. The crew knew they were carrying nukes long before they finished the checklist for takeoff.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbA correspondent who writes that he was an Air Force officer in the late 1970s describes the intricate procedures that are carried out before a nuclear weapon leaves the site where it was stored:<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbA nuclear weapon can only be removed from an igloo upon written orders originating with a very limited number of senior base command officers and signed by at lease three other senior officers. Even then, the senior OIC of the arsenal site along with at least one junior officer will only order a weapon be retrieved and prepared for transfer after they both have verbally confirmed their written orders to do so with the base commander or his deputy. This is done using special limited access and encrypted telephone lines or in person, and verification is accomplished only after each party has correctly read a unique sequence of letters and numbers printed on their orders. A senior OIC along with at least one junior munitions officer will arrive at the arsenal site at the time designated in their orders to transport the weapon. They will have already verified their written orders with a very senior base command officer. Each pair of munitions officers can only sign and be responsible for a single weapon at a time, and they must be accompanied by a special highly trained munitions crew and by a squad of heavily armed security police officers. After the two arsenal site officers and the two munitions officers have each visually verified the serial number of the weapon being transferred matches the serial number typed on both sets of their orders, all four must sign both sets of orders indicating the transfer has been verified and completed. A maximum of four nuclear weapons can be transferred to the flight line in each convoy, but each weapon must have their own team of officers with verified orders, munitions specialist, and a security detail. Also, the printed orders for the OIC of each munitions team indicate exactly which aircraft will receive that weapon and exactly where every weapon is to be mounted. Everyone involved is trained to repeatedly triple check everything for accuracy.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbHe goes on to detail similar procedures for the flight crew, which he notes can easily and clearly view a weapons display that electronically verifies every weapon system installed on their aircraft. That display also clearly identifies every weapon as being a practice, conventional or nuclear weapon.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe former officer concludes: Therefore the only conclusion I can come up with is that this event must have been concocted by someone to appear as an accident. And, because nuclear weapons were said to be involved, orders approving such an event most certainly came from the White House.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n

Le d\u00e9sordre de l’hyperpuissance<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tA moins de d\u00e9celer un complot des anciens pilotes de B-52, la litt\u00e9rature ci-dessus est convaincante. Les proc\u00e9dures bureaucratiques pour la mise en place d’une arme nucl\u00e9aire \u00e0 bord d’une plate-forme strat\u00e9gique de combat sont horriblement complexes. Le hasard d’une erreur aurait bien du mal \u00e0 s’y frayer un chemin. Tout cela renforce la suspicion \u00e0 propos de ce vol de B-52, par rapport aux explications donn\u00e9es. Par ailleurs, le fait que l’explication officielle d’une erreur qui a soulev\u00e9 initialement des r\u00e9actions furieuses de parlementaires soit aujourd’hui ent\u00e9rin\u00e9 de facto<\/em> comme un fait banal qu’il faut vite oublier, puisque personne n’y revient sans autre inqui\u00e9tude, est \u00e9galement pr\u00e9occupant ; puisque l’erreur est possible dans ce cas, et consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme banale par l’absence de r\u00e9actions \u00e0 terme, pourquoi pas erreur dans l’armement d’une arme nucl\u00e9aire, erreur dans le tir et tir r\u00e9el, et ainsi de suite ?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous ne privil\u00e9gions pas la th\u00e9orie du complot, ce n’est pas une th\u00e9orie, c’est un fait, les complots ont toujours pullul\u00e9, ni celle de l’erreur, mais celle du d\u00e9sordre. Cette affaire du B-52 on the road<\/em> de Minot AFB \u00e0 Barksdale AFB est pur d\u00e9sordre de tous les c\u00f4t\u00e9s<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t S’il y a eu erreur (soyons bons princes) Qu’une erreur se produise dans de telles conditions de contr\u00f4le bureaucratique et op\u00e9rationnelle implique un peu ordinaire effondrement de la vigilance et de la discipline, l’irrespect des proc\u00e9dures, l’inattention chronique, la r\u00eaverie syst\u00e9matique du personnel et ainsi de suite.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t S’il n’y a pas eu erreur mais complot, manigances, manuvres, etc., que la chose ait pu avoir lieu dans un tel environnement de proc\u00e9dures strictes, de contr\u00f4les et de coordination, cela conduit \u00e9galement au diagnostic du d\u00e9sordre. Ce diagnostic est compl\u00e9t\u00e9 par les fuites qui ont abouti \u00e0 la mise \u00e0 jour de l’affaire et qui viennent d’officiers de la base de Barksdale, qui montrent \u00e9galement un climat psychologique fait de soup\u00e7on, de m\u00e9pris de la hi\u00e9rarchie, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Qu’il y ait eut erreur ou complot, la r\u00e9action de la presse et surtout du Congr\u00e8s (Skelton et la Commission des forces arm\u00e9es) implique \u00e9galement un tr\u00e8s grand d\u00e9sordre. Les exclamations du pr\u00e9sident de la Commission des forces arm\u00e9es le jour m\u00eame (5 septembre) de l’annonce du vol, suivies de son indiff\u00e9rence pour le cas, montrent \u00e9galement soit de l’irresponsabilit\u00e9 s’il s’agit d’une erreur (par le contraste entre les deux attitudes), soit de l’impr\u00e9voyance s’il s’agit d’autre chose (si l’establishment<\/em> voulait \u00e9touffer cette affaire, il fallait une meilleure coordination pour \u00e9viter le contraste entre les deux attitudes que nous mentionnons). La presse suit \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s la m\u00eame voie de l’improvisation en ne faisant aucune place d\u00e8s l’origine \u00e0 une affaire consid\u00e9r\u00e9e pourtant comme si grave, le premier jour, par un parlementaire du poids de Skelton. Elle accr\u00e9dite \u00e9videmment la th\u00e8se par ailleurs \u00e9vidente de l’auto-censure ; cette mise en lumi\u00e8re d’un tel comportement, qui contribue \u00e0 l’\u00e9rosion du mythe d\u00e9j\u00e0 en cours de d\u00e9composition mais pourtant si important de la libert\u00e9 de la presse US, est \u00e9galement un facteur de d\u00e9sordre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tToute cette affaire, quelle qu’en soit l’origine, entra\u00eene un processus de d\u00e9construction de l’univers virtualiste dans lequel est aujourd’hui fortement imbriqu\u00e9 le syst\u00e8me de l’am\u00e9ricanisme. Le syst\u00e8me est actuellement coinc\u00e9 entre plusieurs n\u00e9cessit\u00e9s et r\u00e9alit\u00e9s :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t La n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de la coh\u00e9sion et de la responsabilit\u00e9 dans l’exercice de l’apparence de la libert\u00e9 de l’information (de la presse, du syst\u00e8me l\u00e9gislatif, etc.). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t La n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de la fermet\u00e9 dans l’affirmation du contr\u00f4le de l’appareil militaro-politique, avec notamment une judicieuse et \u00e9quitable r\u00e9partition des responsabilit\u00e9s de chacun pour contr\u00f4ler la puissance US. Il est imp\u00e9ratif que n’apparaisse pas en pleine lumi\u00e8re l’\u00e9clatement effectif du gouvernement et des centres de pouvoir, et c’est le contraire qui est apparu ici, o\u00f9 les partisans de la th\u00e8se du complot ont unanimement fait l’hypoth\u00e8se de l’action secr\u00e8te de la faction Cheney, impliquant comme allant de soi que le gouvernement soit fait de factions agissant d’une mani\u00e8re extraordinairement ill\u00e9gale (l’ill\u00e9galit\u00e9 est supportable quand elle est habile et maquill\u00e9e en activit\u00e9s ordinaires).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t La n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de la vertu du syst\u00e8me dans un cadre qui doit para\u00eetre d\u00e9mocratique, c’est-\u00e0-dire la tenue \u00e0 distance, par dissimulation bien coordonn\u00e9e, de tout soup\u00e7on de s\u00e9dition, de manuvres ill\u00e9gales et dangereuses, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn voit qu’aucune de ces conditions n’est remplie. L’image du syst\u00e8me am\u00e9ricaniste s’est donc ab\u00eem\u00e9e, \u00e0 l’occasion de cet \u00e9pisode, dans le d\u00e9sordre le plus complet. Cela s’est produit \u00e0 propos du domaine de la puissance le plus dangereux qui soit: le contr\u00f4le des armes nucl\u00e9aires, avec l’absence de mesures publiquement proclam\u00e9es pour r\u00e9tablir ce contr\u00f4le. Ce sont des signes tr\u00e8s significatifs de l’\u00e9tat difficile dans lequel se trouve le r\u00e9gime. Disons, un accident de parcours, mais le parcours est de plus en plus chaotique et pas rassurant du tout.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Les d\u00e9sordres de ce B-52-l\u00e0 16 septembre 2007 Nous n’y avions pas pens\u00e9 ; WSWS.org, ce site consciencieux et s\u00e9rieux, y a pens\u00e9 pour nous, dans un texte mis en ligne le 14 septembre. Ils ont fait un excellent suivi de l’affaire du B-52 de Minot AFB avec ses ACM \u00e0 t\u00eates nucl\u00e9aires et ont… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3459,1294,2795,7038,7014,7037],"class_list":["post-69225","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-b-52","tag-cheney","tag-erreur","tag-manigances","tag-minot","tag-ncleaire"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69225","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69225"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69225\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69225"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69225"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69225"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}