{"id":69230,"date":"2007-09-17T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-09-17T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/09\/17\/notre-attak-of-the-week-celle-du-sunday-telegraph\/"},"modified":"2007-09-17T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-09-17T00:00:00","slug":"notre-attak-of-the-week-celle-du-sunday-telegraph","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/09\/17\/notre-attak-of-the-week-celle-du-sunday-telegraph\/","title":{"rendered":"Notre \u201cattak of the week<\/em>\u201d, \u2014 celle du Sunday Telegraph<\/em>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Effectivement, chaque semaine au moins<\/strong>, en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral le week-end, nous nous devons d’avoir notre projet d’attaque contre l’Iran, d\u00e9taill\u00e9, minutieux, bien l\u00e9ch\u00e9. Effectivement, les plans deviennent de plus en plus d\u00e9taill\u00e9, minutieux, etc., comme on peut le lire dans le Sunday Telegraph<\/em> du 16 septembre<\/a>, o\u00f9 l’on apprend, \u00f4 surprise mais sans surprise excessive, que \u00abBush <\/em>[is] setting America up for war with Iran<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSuivent diverses informations, des effets d’atmosph\u00e8re, des d\u00e9cisions sur le nombre d’objectifs en Iran (2.000), sur le timing<\/em> de la chose. Le plan est si d\u00e9taill\u00e9 qu’il concerne m\u00eame les Iraniens, puisqu’on annonce leur riposte \u00e0 une premi\u00e8re attaque assez anodine, riposte suivie d’une contre-riposte US, d\u00e9vastatrice. Il semblerait logique que le plan soit communiqu\u00e9 aux Iraniens, pour qu’ils sachent ce qu’ils auront \u00e0 faire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tTr\u00eave de sarcasmes, voici la preuve, extraite du Sundy Telegraph<\/em>, que nous pouvons nous passer du pi\u00e8tre faux-expert Debat<\/a>:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abIn a chilling scenario of how war might come, a senior intelligence officer warned that public denunciation of Iranian meddling in Iraq arming and training militants would lead to cross border raids on Iranian training camps and bomb factories.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbA prime target would be the Fajr base run by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Quds Force in southern Iran, where Western intelligence agencies say armour-piercing projectiles used against British and US troops are manufactured.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbUnder the theory which is gaining credence in Washington security circles US action would provoke a major Iranian response, perhaps in the form of moves to cut off Gulf oil supplies, providing a trigger for air strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities and even its armed forces.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbSenior officials believe Mr Bush’s inner circle has decided he does not want to leave office without first ensuring that Iran is not capable of developing a nuclear weapon.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe intelligence source said: No one outside that tight circle knows what is going to happen. But he said that within the CIA many if not most officials believe that diplomacy is failing and that top Pentagon brass believes the same.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbHe said: A strike will probably follow a gradual escalation. Over the next few weeks and months the US will build tensions and evidence around Iranian activities in Iraq.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous apprenons \u00e9galement que, dans ce petit cercle d’initi\u00e9s, Cheney est toujours The Man<\/em>, cela se voit au body language<\/em> (?), et Condi n’est pas si colombe que \u00e7a. (Toujours selon un officiel extr\u00eamement tr\u00e8s bien haut plac\u00e9 : \u00abWhen you go down there and see the body language, you can see that Cheney is still The Man. Condi pushed for diplomacy but she is no dove. If it becomes necessary she will be on board. Both of them are very close to the president, and where they differ they are working together to find a way to present a position they can both live with.<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Finalement, nous l’avouons, ce n’est rien de tout cela qui a retenu vraiment notre attention. Il s’agit plut\u00f4t d’un sch\u00e9ma, que nous ne pouvons reproduire vu la faiblesse de nos moyens. Ce sch\u00e9ma, sans rapport direct avec le texte, est l\u00e0 pour dramatiser l’effet de la chose, concr\u00e9tiser la menace de la guerre, etc. Le titre du sch\u00e9ma est \u00abThe U.S. Build-Up in the Gulf<\/em>\u00bb, soit la concentration navale US dans la zone du Golfe Persique autour de l’Iran. Suivent des silhouettes de navires de combat (US), identifi\u00e9es par leurs noms et leurs classes. Le r\u00e9sultat est \u00e9tonnant par rapport \u00e0 la pr\u00e9tention de l’illustration: un groupe de porte-avions et un groupe amphibie.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Le groupe de porte-avions comprend le USS Enterprise<\/em>, 5 grandes unit\u00e9s de surface, un ravitailleur et un sous-marin d’attaque.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Le groupe amphibie comprend un Amphibious Assault Ship<\/em>, le USS Kearsage<\/em> avec des avions ADAC\/V AV-8B Harrier<\/em> et des h\u00e9licopt\u00e8res, 3 grands navires de surface, 2 navires de surface sp\u00e9cialis\u00e9s (amphibies) et un sous-marin d’attaque.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl s’agit d’une dotation minimale de ce d\u00e9tachement de la V\u00e8me Flotte, et une dotaton qui para\u00eet bien insuffisante pour l’hypoth\u00e8se d’une \u00e9ventuelle attaque de l’Iran. (Le groupe amphibie, comme son nom l’indique, n’a aucune capacit\u00e9 d’attaque a\u00e9rienne. Sa composante a\u00e9rienne ne couvre que deux missions: la d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne rapproch\u00e9e et l’appui tactique rapproch\u00e9 d’\u00e9l\u00e9ments de combat \u00e9ventuellement d\u00e9pos\u00e9s \u00e0 terre.) Le sch\u00e9ma confirme<\/a> implicitement la r\u00e9duction surprenante des capacit\u00e9s navales \u00e0 un groupe de porte-avions alors que, jusqu’en juillet, les sp\u00e9culations li\u00e9es \u00e0 une possibilit\u00e9\/une probabilit\u00e9 d’attaque portaient sur trois groupes de porte-avions.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tTout cela n’interf\u00e8re pas n\u00e9cessairement sur les intentions d’attaque des uns et des autres. Il sugg\u00e8re par contre qu’existe bien ce d\u00e9sordre qu’on d\u00e9crit souvent au sein de l’administration. Il confirme que la derni\u00e8re remarque paradoxale de l’Alexis Debat, alors qu’il \u00e9tait encore<\/a> expert, n’\u00e9tait pas si b\u00eate : \u00abBut Debat believes the Pentagon’s plans for military action involve the use of so much force that they are unlikely to be used and would seriously stretch resources in Afghanistan and Iraq.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 17 septembre 2007 \u00e0 10H25<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Effectivement, chaque semaine au moins, en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral le week-end, nous nous devons d’avoir notre projet d’attaque contre l’Iran, d\u00e9taill\u00e9, minutieux, bien l\u00e9ch\u00e9. Effectivement, les plans deviennent de plus en plus d\u00e9taill\u00e9, minutieux, etc., comme on peut le lire dans le Sunday Telegraph du 16 septembre, o\u00f9 l’on apprend, \u00f4 surprise mais sans surprise excessive, que… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2870,6644,3723,2773,3319,4199,2671],"class_list":["post-69230","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-attaque","tag-debat","tag-golfe","tag-iran","tag-navy","tag-telegraph","tag-us"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69230","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69230"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69230\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69230"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69230"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69230"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}