{"id":69248,"date":"2007-09-22T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-09-22T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/09\/22\/la-garde-revolutionnaire-iranienne-veut-elle-la-guerre-et-la-bombe-nest-elle-quun-appat\/"},"modified":"2007-09-22T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-09-22T00:00:00","slug":"la-garde-revolutionnaire-iranienne-veut-elle-la-guerre-et-la-bombe-nest-elle-quun-appat","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/09\/22\/la-garde-revolutionnaire-iranienne-veut-elle-la-guerre-et-la-bombe-nest-elle-quun-appat\/","title":{"rendered":"La Garde R\u00e9volutionnaire iranienne veut-elle la guerre et la bombe n&rsquo;est-elle qu&rsquo;un app\u00e2t?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>La crise iranienne d\u00e9pend de nombre de facteurs et pr\u00e9sente une situation d&rsquo;une tr\u00e8s grande complexit\u00e9. Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une observation de bon sens  qui doit rester constamment \u00e0 l&rsquo;esprit face aux tentations de manich\u00e9isme. Parmi les facteurs incertains les plus ignor\u00e9s de la crise, il y a l&rsquo;attitude de certains groupes en Iran. William Pfaff nous fournit un \u00e9l\u00e9ment important, avec, mis en ligne le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.williampfaff.com\/modules\/news\/article.php?storyid=254\" class=\"gen\">20 septembre<\/a>, un article \u00e0 partir de sources int\u00e9rieures \u00e0 l&rsquo;Iran qui abordent le cas de la Garde R\u00e9volutionnaire (ICRG). Le s\u00e9rieux du travail de William Pfaff et la qualit\u00e9 habituelle de ses sources nous conduisent \u00e0 nous int\u00e9resser \u00e0 ce qu&rsquo;il sugg\u00e8re.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLa th\u00e8se d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e est que l&rsquo;ICRG d\u00e9sire une attaque des USA ou\/et d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl  ou d&rsquo;un autre d&rsquo;ailleurs: William Pfaff, qui ne manque pas d&rsquo;un humour un peu m\u00e9prisant, laisse apr\u00e8s tout la porte ouverte \u00e0 la logique mise en branle par la triste performance fran\u00e7aise: \u00ab<em>leading figures in the Revolutionary Guard believe that an attack on their country by America or Israel (<\/em><strong><em>or France<\/em><\/strong><em>  since the Sarkozy government in France seems sympathetic to extreme measures against Iran)<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOn comprend ainsi, selon la th\u00e8se expos\u00e9e, que la question de l&rsquo;arme nucl\u00e9aire n&rsquo;est finalement, dans le chef de ces groupes, qu&rsquo;un pr\u00e9texte pour conduire \u00e0 l&rsquo;affrontement. Il est vrai que cette arme n&rsquo;est pas quelque chose d&rsquo;utilisable mais qu&rsquo;elle est un syst\u00e8me par essence souverain et garant d&rsquo;un Etat structur\u00e9, quelque chose qui tend \u00e0 garantir la protection d&rsquo;une nation mais aussi \u00e0 la dissuader de tenter des aventures, quelque chose qui impose une certaine sagesse strat\u00e9gique. C&rsquo;est l\u00e0 tout le principe de la dissuasion que la plupart des Occidentaux, touch\u00e9s par l&rsquo;hyst\u00e9rie collective caract\u00e9ris\u00e9e par Bush et ses <em>neocons<\/em>, ont oubli\u00e9 au profit des th\u00e8ses de la guerre pr\u00e9ventive (<em>dito<\/em> guerre d&rsquo;ing\u00e9rence, selon l&rsquo;in\u00e9narrable ministre fran\u00e7ais des affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tSi la bombe, ou la pseudo-bombe, ou la menace de bombe iranienne n&rsquo;est qu&rsquo;un leurre, ou mieux dit un app\u00e2t,  voici alors l&rsquo;essentiel de la manuvre :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Sources inside Iran, opposed to the present mullahs&rsquo; government, but loyal to the Islamic republic, have described to this writer why leading figures in the Revolutionary Guard believe that an attack on their country by America or Israel (or France \u00ac since the Sarkozy government in France seems sympathetic to extreme measures against Iran) would actually produce in political but also military terms a great victory for Iran and the Islamic cause, as well as serving the Revolutionary Guard&rsquo;s own organizational and political interests.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>They see Bush administration hawks, Washington&rsquo;s neo-conservatives, and Israel&rsquo;s lobbyists for an attack on Iran, as objectively their allies in promoting a defeat for the United States and decisive blow to the international standing and strategy of the United States.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>They believe they can apply to U.S. Naval forces measures of asymmetric warfare, using advanced technology, just as Lebanon&rsquo;s Hezbollah did last year in resisting Israel&rsquo;s ground intervention in Lebanon and destroying Israeli armor.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Similar methods, applied by the insurgents in Iraq, have taken a severe toll in American vehicles, armor and troops.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>These Iranian officers think they can successfully attack American naval and air bases with rockets and commando interventions, and sink American warships with attacks by swarming fleets of speedboats and civilian vessels armed with anti-ship and armor-piercing weapons, blinding, overloading or crashing ships&rsquo; radar defenses and countermeasures by the sheer mass of the attacks.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>They also believe that after their successful eight-year war with Iraq, they have become masters of entrenchment, subterranean defensive measures, dissimulation and camouflage, military dispersal, misdirection and misinformation, so that even the two thousand U.S. air and missile attacks spoken of in some Washington reports would not be able to find and destroy the essential components of Iran&rsquo;s nuclear research and manufacturing capabilities.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLa prudence doit temp\u00e9rer le jugement de cette sorte d&rsquo;hypoth\u00e8se mais la raison nous conduit \u00e0 penser que ce genre de calculs n&rsquo;est pas infond\u00e9. En six ans, l&rsquo;Occident, sa puissance et ses certitudes, ont subi trois retentissantes d\u00e9faites en termes de G4G (l&rsquo;Irak, l&rsquo;Afghanistan et Isra\u00ebl face au Hezbollah). Rien, vraiment rien ne montre que les Occidentaux aient tir\u00e9 la moindre parcelle d&rsquo;enseignement de ces d\u00e9faites, au contraire tout montre qu&rsquo;ils en rajoutent dans le sens de l&rsquo;erreur originelle. La conclusion de Pfaff est tout \u00e0 fait acceptable comme le moins que l&rsquo;on doive garder de cette th\u00e8se: \u00ab<em>It may be that the calculations of these Revolutionary Guard officers concerning war with the United States are wrong. But they suggest that starting a war against Iran today carries risks less easily predicted than the present discussion complacently assumes.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 22 septembre 2007 \u00e0 09H12<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>La crise iranienne d\u00e9pend de nombre de facteurs et pr\u00e9sente une situation d&rsquo;une tr\u00e8s grande complexit\u00e9. Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une observation de bon sens qui doit rester constamment \u00e0 l&rsquo;esprit face aux tentations de manich\u00e9isme. Parmi les facteurs incertains les plus ignor\u00e9s de la crise, il y a l&rsquo;attitude de certains groupes en Iran. William Pfaff&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3409,2936,7063,2773,1131,5213],"class_list":["post-69248","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bombe","tag-garde","tag-icrg","tag-iran","tag-pfaff","tag-revolutionnaire"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69248","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69248"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69248\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69248"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69248"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69248"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}