Echo de l’Air & Space Conference<\/em> de l’Air Force Assciation (AFA), le lobby officiel de l’U.S. Air Force, relev\u00e9 le 26 septembre<\/a> dans Air Force Daily<\/em>, la Lettre d’Information de AFA. L’\u00e9cho est peut-\u00eatre plus innocent que ce que nous avions dit hier<\/a> de la Air & Space Conference<\/em>, mais il n’en est peut-\u00eatre pas moins significatif.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abWay of the Gun:<\/em><\/strong> Maj. Gen. Allen Peck, the lead on the Air Force’s updated irregular warfare doctrine, explained for attendees at AFA’s Air & Space Conference on Tuesday afternoon the impact of IW in today’s fight. Command and control, information operations, and non-kinetic (read, no bombs) plays heavily into a type of warfare that is quite different from a traditional fight, he said. One big differencean aircraft’s gun, not its bombs, are far more suited to IW. The gun is a very effective irregular war weapon, Peck said, noting that more than a quarter of air attacks downrange today are prosecuted with an aircraft’s gun. To illustrate the point, he displayed a video of Afghan insurgents on bicycles attempting to appear as civilians on a road to make their escape after they had killed a Canadian soldier. A quick flash of 174 rounds from an A-10s 30mm gun put an end to that. Tactical weapons can have strategic effects, Peck said, noting that gun rounds as opposed to Joint Direct Attack Munitions can be used in far more tight irregular situations. When bombs are used, they are usually smaller than 500 pounds or their fuses are changed to minimize the chance of unwanted collateral damage.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tAinsi, voici le constat fait apr\u00e8s six ans de guerre en Afghanistan, par le patron de IW (au fait, vous l’avez not\u00e9, on ne dit plus gu\u00e9rilla mais IW, pour Irregular Warfare<\/em>): \u00aban aircraft’s gun, not its bombs, are far more suited to IW. The gun is a very effective irregular war weapon, Peck said, noting that more than a quarter of air attacks downrange today are prosecuted with an aircraft’s gun.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tGrand enseignement, en v\u00e9rit\u00e9. Le canon (ou la mitrailleuse) fixe est beaucoup plus efficace dans l’action contre-gu\u00e9rilla que les armes guid\u00e9s hyper-pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, les bombes tr\u00e8s intelligentes et ainsi de suite. On voit mieux sur qui l’on tire et l’on tire mieux sur qui l’on voit (ce qui n’emp\u00eache pas l’USAF de faire du carpet shooting<\/em> avec la monstrueuse Gatling Gun<\/em> du A-10A: 174 obus de 30mm sur un peloton \u00e0 bicyclette en retraite de soi-disant talibans, chassez le naturel, il revient au galop). Bref, au bout de six ans les Am\u00e9ricains se sont aper\u00e7us de quelque chose et ont d\u00e9couvert qu’un attaque contre trois talibans se baladant dans une ruelle d’un village afghans se traite diff\u00e9remment d’une attaque par erreur de l’ambassade de Chine \u00e0 Belgrade, en pleine guerre du Kosovo.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 1er octobre 2007 \u00e0 13H25<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Echo de l’Air & Space Conference de l’Air Force Assciation (AFA), le lobby officiel de l’U.S. Air Force, relev\u00e9 le 26 septembre dans Air Force Daily, la Lettre d’Information de AFA. L’\u00e9cho est peut-\u00eatre plus innocent que ce que nous avions dit hier de la Air & Space Conference, mais il n’en est peut-\u00eatre pas… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5598,248,3236,7093,7095,7094],"class_list":["post-69278","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-a-10","tag-afa","tag-afghanistan","tag-canon","tag-cas","tag-gatling"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69278","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69278"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69278\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69278"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69278"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69278"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}