aujourd’hui<\/a>:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abThe concern is that once one or two members of the region jump ship, it could set off a broader scramble. None of them want to be the last one left holding a devalued asset. Vietnam’s central bank said this week that it would move gradually to a floating currency.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00bbVietnam is a relatively small country but it is symptomatic of Asia. The entire region is seeing inflation move up as a result of mercantilist policies of holding down their currencies with dirty floats’, which are designed to help their export sectors. They need to change monetary policy, said<\/em> [Hans Redeker, currency chief at BNP Paribas].<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThere have been reports that China is already pulling out of US bonds to fund its new sovereign wealth fund. Foreign central banks slashed holdings by $32bn in the last two weeks of August. We will not know which country was responsible the Treasury’s TIC data is released in November.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbJapan also has colossal reserves, now near $914bn, but it is does not face the same inflationary threat as the rest of Asia, and is in any case an intimate military ally of the United States. It is likely to coordinate its dollar policy very closely with Washington for geo-strategic reasons.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Une autre alerte pour le dollar, un autre avertissement, vient du Qatar. Ce pays du Golfe vient d’annoncer qu’il r\u00e9duisait ses investissements en dollars dans les fonds souverains ($50 milliards) de 99% \u00e0 40%, la diff\u00e9rence \u00e9tant redirig\u00e9e vers la Chine , le Japon et le reste de l’Asie.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abThe move is intended to increase long-term returns for future generations, but it can easily be seen as a vote of no confidence in US economic management.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe drastic shift by the Qatar Investment Authority is a warning that petro-dollar powers with some $3,500bn under management may pull the plug on the heavily endebted US economy which needs to suck in the majority of the world’s savings just to stay afloat.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Simultan\u00e9ment l’Iran annonce qu’il n’acceptera plus de paiement en dollars pour son p\u00e9trole . (Ce pays re\u00e7oit actuellement 15% du paiement de son p\u00e9trole en dollars, 65% en euros et 20% en yens.) Selon Evans-Pritchard :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abThe demarche is largely political, since oil is a fungible commodity and the currency markets are highly liquid.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbHowever, if a number of OPEC suppliers began demand long-term futures contracts in euros instead of dollars, this would have an impact over time.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tL’\u00e9volution de la crise financi\u00e8re et de la crise du dollar s’apparente plus \u00e0 une \u00e9rosion qu’\u00e0 une explosion et \u00e0 un effondrement ; ou bien est-ce que l’\u00e9rosion pr\u00e9pare un \u00e9ventuel effondrement en cas d’\u00e9v\u00e9nement brutal, mais m\u00eame dans ce cas le principal \u00e9v\u00e9nement est bien l’\u00e9rosion. Il s’agit de la perte de confiance continuelle dans la puissance am\u00e9ricaniste, que ce soit l’\u00e9conomie, la puissance politico-militaire, la puissance d’influence, etc. La crise du dollar n’est pas une crise seulement mon\u00e9taire et financi\u00e8re. Pour le fond des choses, cette crise fait partie d’un ensemble, une vaste crise politique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale du syst\u00e8me am\u00e9ricaniste. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 4 octobre 2007 \u00e0 14H21<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
On pourrait y voir un curieux raccourci de l’Histoire et c’est en tout cas un pas suppl\u00e9mentaire dans l’affaiblissement des fondements de la monnaie am\u00e9ricaniste: la Banque du Vietnam abandonne sa politique de rachat de dollars pour soutenir la monnaie nationale. Cette politique est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme une cause de la surchauffe de l’\u00e9conomie, avec une… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3977,3228,3396,4859,1010],"class_list":["post-69288","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-chine","tag-crise","tag-dollar","tag-qatar","tag-vietnam"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69288","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69288"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69288\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69288"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69288"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69288"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}