Mr Brown made clear to Mr Bush that he would not support a campaign to destroy Iran’s nuclear programme and bring about regime change in Teheran.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t En cons\u00e9quence, le soutien britannique serait seulement op\u00e9rationnel et n’aurait pas de dimension politique. (Les US auraient besoin de l’aide de certains \u00e9l\u00e9ments britanniques, notamment leurs capacit\u00e9s anti-mines dans le Golfe.) Il s’agirait d’une op\u00e9ration qui devrait \u00eatre d\u00e9crite comme une op\u00e9ration contre-terroriste, tr\u00e8s localis\u00e9e, tr\u00e8s limit\u00e9e, l\u00e9e \u00e0 des attaques claires et document\u00e9e des Iraniens contre des forces UK et US en Irak. \u00abAfter talks with President George W Bush in July, Mr Brown left US officials with the belief that Britain was \u00a0\u00bbon board\u00a0\u00bb for a military response but only if Iran was proved to be behind a big militant attack or another stunt similar to the kidnapping in March of British sailors.<\/em> [] Vincent Cannistraro, a former White House intelligence chief in close contact with senior Pentagon officials, said: The British understand there’s a possible need to strike not strategic bombing of nuclear sites but facilities in Iran in support of Iraqi elements. This understanding was reached shortly after Brown took office.<\/em>\u00bb \u00ab[Cannistrato] said: The British Government is in accord with plans to launch limited strikes on facilities inside Iran, on the basis of counter-terrorism.\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Il n’emp\u00eache que la situation serait encore risqu\u00e9e, notamment \u00e0 cause de l’utilisation que la faction Cheney pourrait faire de cette attaque. \u00abSome British military and intelligence figures fear that any endorsement of US plans, however hypothetical, will only embolden the White House faction, led by Vice-President Dick Cheney, which wants major bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities.<\/em>\u00bb La situation serait alors diff\u00e9rente, dans l’esprit, de ce qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 jusqu’alors. Les Britanniques refuseraient l’id\u00e9e qu’une telle attaque tactique limit\u00e9e ne serve qu’\u00e0 donner un pr\u00e9texte, apr\u00e8s une riposte irakienne, \u00e0 une attaque strat\u00e9gique massive come l’Iran.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Brzezinki a r\u00e9sum\u00e9 la nouvelle situation, en soulignant implicitement la position en pleine d\u00e9gradation des USA, passant d’un r\u00f4le offensif ambitieux \u00e0 une position d\u00e9fensive tactique limit\u00e9e, et plut\u00f4t li\u00e9e \u00e0 la situation infernale en Irak: \u00abZbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser to former President Carter, said last week the Bush plan was to depict any air strike on Iran as responding to what is an intolerable situation. This time, unlike the attack in Iraq, we’re going to play the victim.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 8 octobre 2007 \u00e0 16H26<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Deux articles successifs du Telegraph (Daily et Sunday) pr\u00e9sentent une position secr\u00e8te de Gordon Brown vis-\u00e0-vis d’une possible attaque de l’Iran par les USA. Les articles sont d’hier et d’aujourd’hui. Quoiqu’ils soient pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s tous deux, par leurs titres, comme un soutien actif de Brown \u00e0 la politique de GW Bush, ils apparaissent surtout comme une… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2870,4038,2773,5600],"class_list":["post-69300","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-attaque","tag-brown","tag-iran","tag-tactique"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69300","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69300"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69300\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69300"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69300"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69300"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}