AW&ST<\/em> est encore plus inquiet pour LM, qui agit sous la contrainte des \u00e9conomies forc\u00e9es et pr\u00e9sente ainsi une situation o\u00f9 les pressions se combinent de plusieurs c\u00f4t\u00e9s \u00e0 la fois pour resserrer jusqu’\u00e0 les r\u00e9duire \u00e0 peu de choses les moyens et les capacit\u00e9s de contr\u00f4ler le programme. Le danger est r\u00e9el et il menace l’\u00e9quilibre fondamental du programme. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abin Boeing’s compression of the test and certification schedules for its 787, an aircraft whose novel design suggests a more complex and longer proving program may be prudent, rather than what Boeing is targeting, the shortest in history. Lockheed Martin also is proposing to compress the test program for its F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, but for another reasoninstead of minimizing schedule slippage, the company is trying to deal with cost overruns.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbRegardless of motives, there is risk in each of these paths. Each company has much to lose and, in Boeing’s case at least, the prospective gains don’t seem commensurate. Both companies need to be watched closely by their customers: the airlines that will receive the first 787s and the 10 nations, mainly the U.S., that have signed up to buy at least 3,000 F-35s. At stake are not just huge investments and years of work, but also lives.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00bbLockheed Martin, too, has a rationale for its proposed F-35 test schedule. It is trying to make up for a shortfall of about $600 million in program reserve funds, and the biggest cost-saver in its recovery plan is cutting two of the 21 ground- and flight-test aircraft from the program. The company intends to streamline flight tests, increasing the number of test points to be achieved in each sortie. And it believes that lessons it learned in its F-22 Raptor program, particularly the need for robust software testing and software’s potential to disrupt flight tests, will serve the F-35 well.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe common factor in these improvisations is the same as Samuel Johnson’s definition of a second marriage the triumph of hope over experience. Boeing and Lockheed Martin hope they have done their work right so far no mistakes, no wrinkles, no glitches despite experience that shows that often this isn’t so. The term unknown unknowns, restored to wide circulation in recent years by former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, goes back as far as aerospace itself. It refers to problems that are unfathomable as well as just plain unexpected. The unknown unknown is not something you thought you had gotten right but didn’t. Rather, it is something you didn’t even know you had to get right.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbWhat will be the 787’s unknown unknowns? The F-35’s? There’s no telling. They’re unknown.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00bbBoeing has less to lose here<\/em> [] The F-35 program may be more problematic. The Air Force, the Defense Dept. and the nine other nations that have committed to the aircraft are all worried about how much it will cost, and they’re unlikely to forgive further cost overruns or big surprises in testing.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbWhen Air Force Gen. Sam Phillips led development of U.S. ICBMs in the 1960s, he used to say that a smooth, problem-free test program showed that you probably weren’t trying to accomplish enough. That’s debatable, but experience has shown that a test program even in this age of computer-aided design continues to serve a critical role in the development of new aircraft. It is no place to cut corners, tempting as it may be, for the sake of schedule.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 8 octobre 2007 \u00e0 13H06<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Qui ne conna\u00eet, chez les sp\u00e9cialistes du domaine, le s\u00e9rieux et la comp\u00e9tence de Aviation Week & Space Technology (AW&ST), bible des affaires a\u00e9rospatiales, selon l’expression consacr\u00e9e? Lorsque AW&ST prend sa plus belle plume pour appuyer un article d’un \u00e9ditorial et sermonner un ou plusieurs des grands industriels US de l’industrie de l’armement, c’est qu’il… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[7111,3192,250,3501,3502,7112],"class_list":["post-69302","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-7111","tag-boeing","tag-jsf","tag-lockheed","tag-martin","tag-risques"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69302","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69302"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69302\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69302"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69302"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69302"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}