neocons<\/em> sont plus que jamais sollicit\u00e9s, comme \u00e0 une r\u00e9cente r\u00e9ception o\u00f9 l’on pr\u00e9sentait un documentaire sur le sort pitoyable de dix soldats US bless\u00e9s en Irak et o\u00f9 Paul Wolfowitz re\u00e7ut un traitement fastueux. Nul ne pr\u00eata attention \u00e0 la possibilit\u00e9 que cet homme p\u00fbt \u00eatre tenu responsable du sort malheureux de ces dix hommes<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tVlahos poursuit :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abThe continued deference to former administration officials extends to the very lifeblood of the city right nowthe presidential election, where neoconservative war boosters still enjoy A-list invites, give and get tons of money, and have the ear of top-tier GOP candidates. Meanwhile, old and new Democratic hawks have largely pushed anti-war liberals to the margins of the establishment, creating think tanks with muscular names and erudite journals to catapult their colleagues into top-level jobs in a new Democratic administration.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbDespite the declining appetite for war among regular Americans, the message is clear: when it comes to shaping future foreign policy for either party, hawks and internationalists are in, doves and realists are out.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbMy view is, if you want a shift in strategy, you aren’t going to get it from these people, who are just hungry for a job in the next administration, observed one Beltway policy wonk. Any conceivable Democratic White House, he noted, would smell a lot like the status quo. Reappearing would be a phalanx of Clinton I protagonists with names like Albright, Holbrooke, Lake, and Berger, followed by a lesser-known generation of liberal interventionists like Peter Beinart, Lee Feinstein, Martin Indyk, and Anne-Marie Slaughter.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThey inhabit a growing galaxy of politically ambitious Democrats, most of whom have been careful to criticize President Bush’s war in Iraq on mostly tactical points, for hubris and unilateralism, but not his doctrine of regional democratization and preemptive intervention.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIt is not so far from their own humble beginnings, after all. Most of the Democratic policy advisers today cut their teeth in the Clinton administration, where they oversaw a disastrous military-humanitarian mission in Somalia, approved strategic strikes and sanctions on Iraq, believed Saddam Hussein was amassing weapons of mass destruction, and ultimately supported his ouster.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbBut it was in the 1994 NATO bombing of Serbia and the subsequent Dayton Peace Accords that Team Clinton found its foreign-policy mojo.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbRichard Holbrooke, today a key adviser to Hillary Clinton , has called the Balkans a huge show of strength and moral authority. There will be other Bosnias in our lives, the former assistant secretary of state declared in his 1998 memoir, To End a War, about the peace accords he helped broker, areas where early outside involvement can be decisive and American leadership will be required. The world will look to Washington for more than rhetoric the next time we face a challenge to peace.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tCette r\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 Holbrooke, aux Balkans, aux ann\u00e9es 1990 et aux Clinton est bienvenue. Le climat guerrier \u00e0 Washington n’est pas une exclusivit\u00e9 conservatrice, tant s’en faut. Nous dirions m\u00eame qu’il est n\u00e9 essentiellement d’une id\u00e9e lib\u00e9rale (d\u00e9mocrate), du n\u00e9o-wilsonisme clintonien appliqu\u00e9 dans les Balkans dans les ann\u00e9es 1990, et qu’en cette occurrence ce sont les r\u00e9publicains qui ont \u00e9volu\u00e9 vers la gauche plut\u00f4t qu’ils n’ont r\u00e9affirm\u00e9 la droite et l’extr\u00eame-droite. Les n\u00e9o-conservateurs ont leur origine \u00e0 gauche et l’interventionnisme US se conjugue avec l’internationalisme d’essence lib\u00e9rale (m\u00eame s’il est unilat\u00e9raliste, l’internationalisme interventionniste implique la guerre ext\u00e9rieure). La droite conservatrice US est plut\u00f4t isolationniste et, pour l’instant r\u00e9duite \u00e0 une peau de chagrin dans l’establishment<\/em> de Washington.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tEt ce sentiment belliciste est d’une force extraordinaire. Il r\u00e9siste \u00e0 tout, y compris et surtout \u00e0 l’\u00e9chec, au contraire, comme si l’\u00e9chec constituait la v\u00e9ritable sanction d’excellence de la politique appliqu\u00e9e. \u00abIn Washington, nothing succeeds more than failure, declares Ted Carpenter, defense policy expert for the CATO Institute. How else do you explain it?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 10 octobre 2007 \u00e0 13H56<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Pour ceux qui attendent le d\u00e9part de GW, qui se fait de plus en plus discret en ce moment, comme s’il s’effa\u00e7ait; pour ceux-l\u00e0 qui croient que ce d\u00e9part ram\u00e8nera l’Am\u00e9rique sur la voie de la sagesse et de la paix, voici un texte \u00e9difiant. Il est du journaliste Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, dans The American… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3488,7118,5167,1104,5769,3248],"class_list":["post-69309","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-hawk","tag-internationalisme","tag-neo-wilsonisme","tag-neocons","tag-pro-guerre","tag-washington"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69309","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69309"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69309\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69309"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69309"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69309"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}