Le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Sanchez commanda en Irak de la mi-2003 \u00e0 la mi-2004. Son changement d’affectation (il devint commandant du V Corps, U.S. Army, en Allemagne) fut accompagn\u00e9 de certaines rumeurs selon lesquelles on pr\u00e9f\u00e9rait \u00e9carter le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral assurant le commandement en Irak au moment du scandale des tortures d’Abou Ghraib. Sanchez a toujours affirm\u00e9 qu’il n’\u00e9tait pas au courant de ces pratiques, sinon d’une mani\u00e8re formelle et sans r\u00e9elle documentation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tSanchez a quitt\u00e9 l’U.S. Army d\u00e9but 2006, apr\u00e8s avoir refus\u00e9<\/a> une quatri\u00e8me \u00e9toile, ou bien est-ce qu’on a pr\u00e9f\u00e9r\u00e9 ne pas lui offrir cette quatri\u00e8me \u00e9toile. Dans les deux cas, la raison avanc\u00e9e, soit du c\u00f4t\u00e9 de Sanchez, soit du c\u00f4t\u00e9 de Rumsfeld, \u00e9tait la crainte des remous soulev\u00e9s par une audition de confirmation de sa nomination au Congr\u00e8s, o\u00f9 il aurait \u00e9t\u00e9 question d’Abou Ghraib. Depuis, Sanchez est devenu un critique virulent du gouvernement et de sa politique irakienne. Il a mis en cause<\/a> la direction politique des USA. Le 12 octobre, comme nous le rapporte ce jour<\/a> le New York Times<\/em>, il met en cause l’\u00e9volution de la situation en Irak et toute la conduite de la guerre depuis l’\u00e9t\u00e9 2003.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abIn a sweeping indictment of the four-year effort in Iraq, the former top commander of American forces there called the Bush administration’s handling of the war incompetent and said the result was a nightmare with no end in sight.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbLt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, who retired in 2006 after being replaced in Iraq after the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal, blamed the Bush administration for a catastrophically flawed, unrealistically optimistic war plan and denounced the current addition of American forces as a desperate move that would not achieve long-term stability.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAfter more than four years of fighting, America continues its desperate struggle in Iraq without any concerted effort to devise a strategy that will achieve victory in that war-torn country or in the greater conflict against extremism, General Sanchez said at a gathering of military reporters and editors in Arlington, Va.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbGeneral Sanchez said he was convinced that the American effort in Iraq was failing the day after he took command, in June 2003. Asked why he waited until nearly a year after his retirement to voice his concerns publicly, he responded that it was not the place of active-duty officers to challenge lawful orders from the civilian authorities.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLes critiques de Sanchez sont extr\u00eamement fortes et radicales. Elles sont inhabituelles dans la mesures o\u00f9 elles ne font aucun distinguo et impliquent touds les acteurs du drame irakien c\u00f4t\u00e9 US, sur toute la dur\u00e9e de la crise. Ces critiques ont suscit\u00e9 des r\u00e9actions d\u00e9favorables. Un exemple significatif est celui de Michael O’Hanlon, qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 l’un des principaux promoteurs<\/a> de l’actuelle offensive \u00e9videmment victorieuse<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMichael E. O’Hanlon, a military analyst at the Brookings Institution, criticized General Sanchez for implying in his speech that the current military strategy of relying on additional troops and on protecting the Iraqi people is little different than the strategy employed when he was in command.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbNoting that calls by members of Congress for troops were rebuffed by the Bush administration in 2003, Mr. O’Hanlon said, Sanchez was one of the top military people who condoned that, if not directly, then by his silence.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’attitude du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Sanchez est, plus qu’aucune autre, une indication convaincante du d\u00e9sordre existant aujourd’hui \u00e0 Washington. Il n’y a plus aucun devoir de r\u00e9serve chez les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux de la guerre alors que la guerre est toujours en cours. Cela implique une rupture significative du lien de solidarit\u00e9 \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur de l’establishment<\/em> et correspond au caract\u00e8re d’irresponsabilit\u00e9 et \u00e0 l’absence de r\u00e9elle autorit\u00e9 actuellement \u00e0 Washington. Chacun tire son \u00e9pingle du jeu selon ses int\u00e9r\u00eats et ses sentiments sur la guerre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl est normal et logique que Sanchez soit lui-m\u00eame l’objet de critiques pour ses d\u00e9clarations, par rapport \u00e0 ce que fut son r\u00f4le en Irak en 2003-2004. En \u00e9cartant toute exploitation pol\u00e9mique, on doit accueillir ce qu’il nous dit comme une image assez juste du conflit en Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 13 octobre 2007 \u00e0 12H03<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Sanchez commanda en Irak de la mi-2003 \u00e0 la mi-2004. Son changement d’affectation (il devint commandant du V Corps, U.S. Army, en Allemagne) fut accompagn\u00e9 de certaines rumeurs selon lesquelles on pr\u00e9f\u00e9rait \u00e9carter le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral assurant le commandement en Irak au moment du scandale des tortures d’Abou Ghraib. Sanchez a toujours affirm\u00e9 qu’il… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[857,6923,4120],"class_list":["post-69316","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-irak","tag-ohanlon","tag-sanchez"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69316","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69316"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69316\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69316"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69316"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69316"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}