{"id":69325,"date":"2007-10-16T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-10-16T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/10\/16\/ca-grogne-dans-les-rangs-et-lon-parle-de-coup-detat-a-fort-leavenworth\/"},"modified":"2007-10-16T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-10-16T00:00:00","slug":"ca-grogne-dans-les-rangs-et-lon-parle-de-coup-detat-a-fort-leavenworth","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/10\/16\/ca-grogne-dans-les-rangs-et-lon-parle-de-coup-detat-a-fort-leavenworth\/","title":{"rendered":"\u00c7a grogne dans les rangs et l’on parle de coup d’Etat \u00e0 Fort Leavenworth"},"content":{"rendered":"

Le malaise des militaires US est aujourd’hui une rubrique majeure de la crise g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de l’am\u00e9ricanisme. On ne s’en cache plus et le virus touche d\u00e9sormais les rangs interm\u00e9diaires du corps des officiers de l’U.S. Army. Ainsi en appara\u00eet-il \u00e0 la lecture d’un excellent article du New York Times<\/em> du 14 octobre<\/a>. Il s’agit d’une visite \u00e0 Fort Leavenworth, o\u00f9 se trouve l’Ecole du Corps des Officiers de l’U.S. Army.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSi tout est int\u00e9ressant dans cet article, on s’arr\u00eatera surtout \u00e0 ce fait prodigieux pour qui conna\u00eet l’\u00e9tat d’esprit formaliste de l’arm\u00e9e US d’une discussion \u00e0 propos de la possibilit\u00e9 pour les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux de bloquer un conflit d\u00e9cid\u00e9 par les dirigeants politiques. Faut-il ou non s’\u00e9lever contre une d\u00e9cision du pouvoir politique? Faut-il ou non envisager une possibilit\u00e9 qui ressemble diablement \u00e0 un coup d’Etat? On discute, on discute On parle ici de la guerre en Irak mais on pourrait parler de celle qu’on pr\u00e9parerait \u00e9ventuellement contre l’Iran.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abCol. Gregory Fontenot, a Leavenworth instructor, said it was typical of young officers to feel that the senior commanders had not spoken up for their interests, and that he had felt the same way when he was their age. But Colonel Fontenot, who commanded a battalion in the Persian Gulf war and a brigade in Bosnia and has since retired, said he questioned whether Americans really wanted a four-star general to stand up publicly and say no to the president of a nation where civilians control the armed forces.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbFor the sake of argument, a question was posed: If enough four-star generals had done that, would it have stopped the war?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbYeah, we’d call it a coup d’etat, Colonel Fontenot said. Do you want to have a coup d’etat? You kind of have to decide what you want. Do you like the Constitution, or are you so upset about the Iraq war that you’re willing to dismiss the Constitution in just this one instance and hopefully things will be O.K.? I don’t think so.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbSome of the young officers were unimpressed by retired officers who spoke up against Mr. Rumsfeld in April 2006. The retired generals had little to lose, they argued, and their words would have mattered more had they been on active duty. Why didn’t you do that while you were still in uniform? Maj. James Hardaway, 36, asked.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbYet, Major Hardaway said, General Shinseki had shown there was a great cost, at least under Mr. Rumsfeld. Evidence shows that when you do do that in uniform, bad things can happen, he said. So, it’s sort of a dichotomy of, should I do the right thing, even if I get punished?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAnother major said that young officers were engaged in their own revisionist history, and that many had believed the war could be won with Mr. Rumsfeld’s initial invasion force of about 170,000. Everybody now claims, oh, I knew we were going to be there for five years and it was going to take 400,000 people, said Maj. Patrick Proctor, 36. Nobody wants to be the guy who said, Yeah, I thought we could do it.’ But a lot of us did.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbOne question that silenced many of the officers was a simple one: Should the war have been fought?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbI honestly don’t know how I feel about that, Major Powell said in a telephone conversation after the discussions at Leavenworth.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNon pas que nous croyions une seconde \u00e0 la possibilit\u00e9 r\u00e9elle d’un coup d’Etat. Nous partageons cette opinion<\/a> de l’impossibilit\u00e9 d’un tel acte aux USA, ou plut\u00f4t du fait que les structures font qu’une volont\u00e9 vers un acte de cette sorte se traduit par autre chose qu’un coup d’Etat au sens classique. Mais l’on comprend que l’esprit est le m\u00eame: le sens que le pouvoir civil n’a plus aucune l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 et, par cons\u00e9quent, que son autorit\u00e9 est r\u00e9duite \u00e0 rien. Le d\u00e9sordre r\u00e8gne<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCes conversations de Fort Leavenworth ne font que confirmer et amplifier la perception d’une situation de ce complet d\u00e9sordre r\u00e9gnant dans la direction et dans les \u00e9lites des USA. Il est particuli\u00e8rement frappant que l’on trouve cette confirmation qu’il r\u00e8gne dans les rangs les plus anonymes de l’institution repr\u00e9sentant, par la volont\u00e9 du pouvoir civil, le cur de la puissance US dans le monde, et que l’on d\u00e9couvre que ces anonymes ne craignent pas d’en parler \u00e0 haute voix, et autrement que dans le mode anonyme.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 16 octobre 2007 \u00e0 07H02<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Le malaise des militaires US est aujourd’hui une rubrique majeure de la crise g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de l’am\u00e9ricanisme. On ne s’en cache plus et le virus touche d\u00e9sormais les rangs interm\u00e9diaires du corps des officiers de l’U.S. Army. Ainsi en appara\u00eet-il \u00e0 la lecture d’un excellent article du New York Times du 14 octobre. Il s’agit d’une… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3289,2625,3889,5160,857,7128,7129,2671],"class_list":["post-69325","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-army","tag-coup","tag-detat","tag-generaux","tag-irak","tag-leavenworth","tag-officiers","tag-us"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69325","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69325"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69325\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69325"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69325"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69325"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}