{"id":69329,"date":"2007-10-17T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-10-17T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/10\/17\/les-raisins-de-linconsequence\/"},"modified":"2007-10-17T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-10-17T00:00:00","slug":"les-raisins-de-linconsequence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/10\/17\/les-raisins-de-linconsequence\/","title":{"rendered":"Les raisins de l’incons\u00e9quence<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Les raisins de l’incons\u00e9quence<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

\t17 octobre 2007 Il y a des proximit\u00e9s entre deux affaires embarrassantes pour Washington, qui portent le germe de deux d\u00e9faites strat\u00e9giques graves de l’am\u00e9ricanisme, sans intervention particuli\u00e8re d’une puissance concurrente, ni m\u00eame r\u00e9ticence fondamentale des deux pays concern\u00e9s. Il s’agit de la Turquie et de l’Inde.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t On conna\u00eet l’affaire turque<\/a>, ses complications, ses diversit\u00e9s (une dimension r\u00e9gionale avec la tension \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re turco-irakienne, une dimension Turquie-USA avec le vote d’une commission de la Chambre des Repr\u00e9sentants reconnaissant le g\u00e9nocide arm\u00e9nien). C’est une affaire grave o\u00f9 chacun freine derri\u00e8re des apparences de matamore et o\u00f9 chacun doit pourtant tenir son r\u00f4le de matamore; chacun ne peut faire autrement que freiner mais chacun ne peut faire autrement que faire le matamore. Le Parlement turc donne sans doute aujourd’hui son aval \u00e0 une \u00e9ventuelle attaque contre les rebelles kurdes en Irak du Nord mais cela ne signifie pas que l’attaque aura lieu (Erdogan hier<\/a>: \u00abI sincerely wish that this motion will never be applied. Passage of this motion does not mean an immediate incursion will follow, but we will act at the right time and under the right conditions<\/em>\u00bb). M\u00eame les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux turcs, les plus fid\u00e8les relais de Washington \u00e0 Ankara, ne peuvent faire autrement que faire les matamores, comme l’exprimait, il y a deux jours<\/a>, le chef d’\u00e9tat-major des arm\u00e9es \u00e0 propos de l’attitude du Congr\u00e8s US sur la question arm\u00e9nienne:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abGeneral Yasar Buyukanit told Turkey’s Milliyet newspaper that a congressional committee’s approval of the measure had strained ties between the two countries. If this resolution passed in the committee passes the House as well, our military ties with the US will never be the same again, he told Milliyet.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Maintenant, il y a l’Inde. Il y a trois ans ans, Washington et l’Inde signaient un accord fondamental de coop\u00e9ration nucl\u00e9aire. L’Inde devait ainsi devenir, selon les termes US, une superpuissance<\/a>, du type clef en mains. Le gouvernement indien avait saisi l’aubaine, puisqu’aubaine croyait-on qu’il y avait. Il y eut des hauts et des bas. Aujourd’hui, nous sommes dans un tr\u00e8s bas, au point o\u00f9 les commentateurs craignent bien que l’accord doive \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme mort ou presque Selon Daryl Kimball, executive director de l’Arms Control Association de Washington: \u00abI would not say the deal is dead. It’s in the hospital in intensive care. The reason it’s in intensive care is that there is a tight timeline that the U.S. and India have to keep to follow through on all the steps.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe Washington Post<\/em> du 16 octobre<\/a> explique:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe main obstacle does not involve the specific terms of the agreement but rather India’s internal politics, including fears from leftist parties that India is moving too close to the United States, according to officials and experts familiar with the deal. Besieged over the past two months by growing opposition to nuclear energy cooperation with the United States, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh indicated over the weekend that he would rather save his coalition government than the nuclear pact.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbWhat we have done with the U.S., it is an honorable deal, it is good for India, and it is good for the world, Singh said Saturday. But we are in the realm of politics, and within our coalition, there are differing perceptions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbNeither government appeared eager to announce the setback to what had been billed as one of the Bush administration’s biggest foreign policy achievements. India’s only official pronouncement was tucked at the bottom of a seven-paragraph news release on the Indian Embassy Web site outlining a telephone conversation Monday between Singh and Bush.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe Prime Minister also explained to President Bush that certain difficulties have arisen with respect to the operationalisation of the India-U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreement, said the release, which focused largely on talks between the two leaders on trade issues and Burma.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe White House, for its part, did not announce that the conversation took place until asked about the Indian Embassy statement and then confirmed it in language almost identical to the Indian press release.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe reluctance to admit that the deal is faltering contrasts with the fanfare when it was announced in 2005. R. Nicholas Burns, undersecretary of state for political affairs, heralded the pact just three months ago as perhaps the single most important initiative that India and the United States have agreed to in the 60 years of our relationship.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbU.S. officials acknowledged deep disappointment with the abrupt decision, which they described as unexpected. Burns and other senior administration officials scrambled over the weekend to try to revive the deal. Officials said many Indian officials still want the pact to move forward.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n

Le syst\u00e8me de Washington D.C. est devenu provincial<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes deux cas sont d’une extr\u00eame importance strat\u00e9gique pour les USA, on le comprend. La Turquie joue un r\u00f4le pivot fondamental entre Moyen-Orient, Caucase et sous-continent indien. L’Inde est cette puissance montante qui peut, dans les id\u00e9es strat\u00e9giques US, former un contrepoids \u00e0 la Chine. Il n’y a l\u00e0 rien de particulier \u00e0 d\u00e9montrer; la simplicit\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique des deux cas est \u00e0 l’\u00e9gal de leur importance.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDans les deux cas \u00e9galement, Washington a d\u00e9ploy\u00e9 un dispositif important. La Turquie est depuis longtemps dans l’orbite de Washington et les liens sont solidement \u00e9tablis, du type classique: influence, corruption, ventes d’armements, liens serr\u00e9s avec les militaires. Cette situation a pass\u00e9 le test de l’arriv\u00e9e au pouvoir des islamistes mod\u00e9r\u00e9s. Les relations se sont tendues depuis la guerre en Irak, \u00e0 cause de circonstances \u00e9videntes (d\u00e9stabilisation de l’Irak, cr\u00e9ation de facto<\/em> d’un pays kurde dans l’Irak du Nord), autant qu’\u00e0 cause des pressions US pour obtenir un soutien strat\u00e9gique pour une aventure irakienne extraordinairement impopulaire. En 2000, 56% des Turcs avaient une opinion favorable des USA; 12% en 2005.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes liens US avec les militaires ont souffert particuli\u00e8rement, dans la mesure o\u00f9 ces liens \u00e9taient les plus serr\u00e9s et o\u00f9 les militaires sont particuli\u00e8rement sensibles aux questions de s\u00e9curit\u00e9. La tension r\u00e9cente sur la fronti\u00e8re avec l’Irak kurde s’est trouv\u00e9e brusquement dramatis\u00e9e par l’affaire arm\u00e9nienne. A cause de l’affaire arm\u00e9nienne, la sc\u00e8ne s’est brusquement transport\u00e9e des confins turco-irakiens aux salles lambriss\u00e9es du Congr\u00e8s des USA en m\u00eame temps que s’accroissaient d\u00e9sordre et confusion.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPour l’Inde, la situation est nouvelle. Pourtant, l’investissement de cet immense pays par l’influence am\u00e9ricaniste s’est d\u00e9roul\u00e9 dans des conditions qui refl\u00e8tent aussi bien la situation \u00e0 Washington que dans le cas de la Turquie. L’affaire est bien r\u00e9sum\u00e9e par un article de Zia Mia, physicien \u00e0 l’universit\u00e9 de Princeton, sur atimes.com<\/em> le 12 octobre<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe clearest exposition of what the United States wants in exchange<\/em> [of the treaty] came in testimony to Congress in support of the US-India nuclear deal by Ashton Carter, who served as assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, and in a 2006 article, America’s New Strategic Partner?’ in the journal Foreign Affairs. He argued that Washington needed India’s help against Iranian nukes, in future conflicts with Pakistan, and as a counterweight to China. He noted there were more direct benefits, which include the intensification of military-to-military contacts and the cooperation of India in disaster-relief efforts, humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping missions, and post-conflict reconstruction efforts, and operations not mandated by or commanded by the United Nations, operations in which India has historically refused to participate.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAnd finally, Carter offered the real kicker, US military forces may also seek access to strategic locations through Indian territory and perhaps basing rights there. Ultimately, India could even provide US forces with over-the-horizon’ bases for contingencies in the Middle East.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbCarter recognized that there are other interests too, which others might put higher on the list. He acknowledged that on the economic front, as India expands its civilian nuclear capacity and modernizes its military, the United States stands to gain preferential treatment for US industries.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe process of putting pressure on India to deliver has already begun. In May 2007, key members of the US Congress wrote a letter to the Indian prime minister warning that they were deeply concerned by India’s relationship with Iran, and that if India did not address this then there was the potential to seriously harm prospects for the establishment of the global partnership between the United States and India. In short, India was being told to choose: Iran or the United States and the nuclear deal.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbHowever, the past few weeks have seen a growing crisis in India over the nuclear deal and how close India should get to the United States. India’s communist parties, which are part of the Congress Party-led coalition government, have demanded a halt to the US-India nuclear deal to give the country time to work out its implications for Indian foreign policy. Their fear is that the deal will give the US influence over Indian decision-making. They have threatened to bring down India’s government.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIndia’s progressive social movements have also opposed the nuclear deal. They worry that directly or indirectly, the United States will also enter the Indian sub-continent, to manage intra-regional, inter-country relations. They see it as not just anti-democratic but against peace, and against environmentally sustainable energy generation and self-reliant economic development. These basic concerns about democracy, peace, sustainability, and independence, are what will put India at odds with US policy, no matter how many weapons it offers to sell.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes deux \u00e9pisodes nous indiquent les limites path\u00e9tiques du syst\u00e8me washingtonien, de ce faux-empire incons\u00e9quent. Elles mesurent son irr\u00e9pressible inclination \u00e0 provoquer des \u00e9v\u00e9nements contraires \u00e0 sa cause, inclination involontaire bien entendu, toute enti\u00e8re due \u00e0 son activit\u00e9 m\u00e9caniste, gouvern\u00e9e par une vision du monde ferm\u00e9e, unilat\u00e9raliste, r\u00e9duite \u00e0 Washington D.C et par la seule perception de ses int\u00e9r\u00eats imm\u00e9diats dans le cadre restreint de ses propres agitations et du rapport des forces \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur de lui-m\u00eame.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Incons\u00e9quence nationaliste. Les int\u00e9r\u00eats US sont r\u00e9alis\u00e9s et expos\u00e9s sans le moindre souci des int\u00e9r\u00eats de l’alli\u00e9, de sa sensibilit\u00e9, des r\u00e9actions publiques chez cet alli\u00e9, etc., au risque de compromettre l’alli\u00e9 et de le mettre dans l’obligation d’afficher une position hostile malgr\u00e9 ses intentions arrangeantes. Pire, ces int\u00e9r\u00eats sont expos\u00e9s publiquement sans le moindre souci de la nuance, d’une fa\u00e7on parfaitement unilat\u00e9raliste, pour satisfaire les exigences de forces divergentes \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur du syst\u00e8me et obtenir leur soutien. Les explications de Ashton Carter, parmi d’autres qui suivirent et r\u00e9affirm\u00e8rent la position US dans le cas indien, ne laissent aucun doute sur les intentions US. Elles ont fourni r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement aux adversaires du trait\u00e9 en Inde des arguments contre ce trait\u00e9, notamment au nom de l’argument fondamental de la souverainet\u00e9 nationale. Les exigences du Congr\u00e8s, sous forme d’une ing\u00e9rence dans la politique indienne vis-\u00e0-vis de l’Iran, ont poursuivi, renforc\u00e9 et irr\u00e9sistiblement confirm\u00e9 l’argument des adversaires du trait\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Incons\u00e9quence du syst\u00e8me v\u00e9nal de Washington (lobby<\/em>, corruption des parlementaires, apparat moralisateur, etc.). L’aventure du dossier arm\u00e9nien montre l’absence compl\u00e8te de prise en compte d’une situation dans toute sa diversit\u00e9. Il s’agit d’une bataille de lobbying<\/em>, une circonstance typique d’un syst\u00e8me conduit par ses seules circonstances propres et r\u00e9duites aux p\u00e9rip\u00e9ties washingtoniennes. Les dimensions politiques et morales ne sont consid\u00e9r\u00e9es qu’en fonction des caract\u00e9ristiques de la sc\u00e8ne washingtonienne et soumettent l’alli\u00e9, notamment les relais d’influence US chez cet alli\u00e9, \u00e0 des tensions constantes et \u00e0 des manuvres n\u00e9gatives. Les relais d’influence sont soumis \u00e0 la constante menace de voir leurs arguments trahis par ceux-l\u00e0 m\u00eame qui pr\u00e9tendent les soutenir.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa force d’un r\u00e9seau d’alliance et d’influence repose sur la capacit\u00e9 de la puissance qui l’entretient \u00e0 manifester pour ses alli\u00e9s au moins l’apparence d’une communaut\u00e9 d’int\u00e9r\u00eat et d’attention. Le syst\u00e8me am\u00e9ricaniste savait fort bien faire cela du temps de sa splendeur, pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment durant la Guerre froide. Aujourd’hui, il a perdu cette capacit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe syst\u00e8me de l’am\u00e9ricanisme est devenu compl\u00e8tement provincial, simplement r\u00e9duit aux limites du District of Columbia (Washington D.C.). Il ne peut plus \u00e9voluer qu’en fonction de lui-m\u00eame, repli\u00e9 sur ses propres pr\u00e9occupations et ses seules querelles internes. Il passe son temps \u00e0 provoquer indirectement des querelles externes d’autant plus \u00e9puisantes qu’elles sont accessoires, et ensuite \u00e0 tenter d’en limiter les effets. Cela sera \u00e9videmment le cas de la Turquie et de l’Inde. Ni la Turquie ni l’Inde ne sont encore perdues mais les \u00e9puisantes batailles \u00e0 venir pour tenter d’\u00e9viter la rupture des liens de vassalisation, \u00e9tablis ou \u00e0 \u00e9tablir, ne feront qu’accentuer la rancur et la m\u00e9sentente entre les partenaires. La situation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale \u00e0 Washington continuera \u00e0 s’effriter et \u00e0 se diluer hors du contr\u00f4le de quiconque, sans autorit\u00e9 centrale.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Les raisins de l’incons\u00e9quence 17 octobre 2007 Il y a des proximit\u00e9s entre deux affaires embarrassantes pour Washington, qui portent le germe de deux d\u00e9faites strat\u00e9giques graves de l’am\u00e9ricanisme, sans intervention particuli\u00e8re d’une puissance concurrente, ni m\u00eame r\u00e9ticence fondamentale des deux pays concern\u00e9s. Il s’agit de la Turquie et de l’Inde. On conna\u00eet l’affaire turque,… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[2996,7131,3378,4495,2613,3248],"class_list":["post-69329","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-alliance","tag-inconsequence","tag-inde","tag-traite","tag-turquie","tag-washington"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69329","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69329"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69329\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69329"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69329"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69329"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}