{"id":69332,"date":"2007-10-18T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-10-18T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/10\/18\/gates-et-sa-forte-difference\/"},"modified":"2007-10-18T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-10-18T00:00:00","slug":"gates-et-sa-forte-difference","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/10\/18\/gates-et-sa-forte-difference\/","title":{"rendered":"Gates et sa forte diff\u00e9rence"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Plus que jamais, le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Robert Gates appara\u00eet comme la force principale de mod\u00e9ration au sein de l&rsquo;administration GW. Jim Lobe rapporte et commente, le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.ips.org\/blog\/jimlobe\/?p=73\" class=\"gen\">17 octobre<\/a>, la performance de Robert Gates devant le JINSA (Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs), l&rsquo;organisation juive US la plus proche des n\u00e9o-conservateurs, qualifi\u00e9e justement par Lobe de <em>ultra-hawkish<\/em>. Gates \u00e9tait invit\u00e9 par le JINSA et a parl\u00e9 de la situation au Moyen-Orient, particuli\u00e8rement de l&rsquo;Iran.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLobe analyse le discours en fonction de l&rsquo;audience et trouve toutes les raisons de confirmer l&rsquo;approche mod\u00e9r\u00e9e de Gates sur ces questions. L&rsquo;analyse est pr\u00e9cise, assez fine, r\u00e9pondant \u00e0 une intervention qui a s\u00fbrement \u00e9t\u00e9 tr\u00e8s pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment calcul\u00e9e. Par exemple, Lobe note que Gates mentionne [the] <em>Iran strident posturing<\/em> par rapport \u00e0 la situation en Irak, et non des accusations comme l&rsquo;intervention de l&rsquo;Iran ou les violences de l&rsquo;Iran, qui sont les accusations standard de l&rsquo;administration et, plus encore, de l&rsquo;institut JINSA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tUn passage cons\u00e9quent de l&rsquo;analyse de Lobe:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>In his four-page acceptance speech, Gates did indeed attack Iran, calling its government an ambitious and fanatical theocracy, noting that, in 28 years, he had failed to find the elusive Iranian moderate, and warning his audience that, We should have no illusions about the nature of this regime or its leaders  about their designs for their nuclear program, their willingness to live up to their rhetoric, their intentions for Iraq, or their ambitions in the Gulf. But he devotes only one paragraph to how Washington should deal with Tehran, and, as you can see below, his all-options-on-the-table language appears almost as a throw-away line:<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>This Administration is keenly aware of the threats posed by Iran. It is also keenly aware of the challenges we and our allies face with a regime that seems increasingly willing to act contrary to its own national interests. With a government of this nature, only a united front of nations will be able to exert enough pressure to make Iran abandon its nuclear aspirations  a source of anxiety and instability in the region. Our allies must work together on robust, far-reaching, and strongly enforced economic sanctions. We must exert pressure in the diplomatic and political arenas as well. And, as the President has said, with this regime, we must also keep all options on the table.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Having said that, however, he immediately changes gears by explicitly distinguishing  through the use of the word but between Iran and the threat posed by Sunni extremists (no doubt inflicting intense irritation on Ledeen who asserted through a press release on his new book, The Iranian Time Bomb, put out by his American Enterprise Institute (AEI) Tuesday, that it is difficult today not to conclude that Iran was involved in the 9\/11 attacks.) Here&rsquo;s how Gates changes the subject:<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>But, obviously, instability in the region is not just driven by state actors. The recent history of the Middle East has demonstrated the lethality and persistence of armed militias and movements that have no allegiance to any government, only to death and destruction and chaos. Where extremists have seized and controlled territory  in western Iraq or eastern Afghanistan, for example  the result has been misery, and poverty, and fear. The future they promise is a joyless existence  personified not by piety or virtue, but by the executioner and the suicide bomber. Symbolized by men kneeling not in prayer before their god, but kneeling and waiting for the executioner&rsquo;s sword.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>From there, Gates goes on to argue that the principal danger resulting from a premature U.S. withdrawal from Iraq lies with an emboldened al Qaeda and other Sunni extremists, omitting, quite significantly in my view, any mention at all of Iran in this context. That would surely dramatically embolden an entire generation of Islamic extremists, and encourage countless others to join their ranks and wage war on our allies and our interests in the region, in Europe, and ultimately here at home, he asserted.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLobe parle d&rsquo;un <em>acceptance speech<\/em> de Gates parce que le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense recevait la distinction annuelle du JINSA (le <em>Henry M. Jackson Distinguished Service Award<\/em>, du nom du s\u00e9nateur d\u00e9mocrate pro-isra\u00e9lien des ann\u00e9es 1960-1970, reconnu comme un des parrains historiques des n\u00e9o-conservateurs). Cette distinction donn\u00e9e \u00e0 Gates \u00e9tait surtout consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme un test et, \u00e9ventuellement, un pi\u00e8ge qui lui \u00e9tait tendu, pour le forcer \u00e0 s&rsquo;engager d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on plus affirm\u00e9e dans une voie extr\u00e9miste anti-iranienne. D&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, une intervention devant le JINSA implique de la part de l&rsquo;orateur un engagement extr\u00e9miste, m\u00eame si cet engagement n&rsquo;est pas le sien habituellement, par crainte d&rsquo;une mise \u00e0 l&rsquo;index terroriste de cette organisation. Gates n&rsquo;a pas c\u00e9d\u00e9 \u00e0 cette menace, ce qui para\u00eet indiquer, outre le fait de sa propre conviction, une certaine solidit\u00e9 de la fraction mod\u00e9r\u00e9e qu&rsquo;il repr\u00e9sente \u00e0 l&rsquo;int\u00e9rieur de l&rsquo;administration. On peut peut-\u00eatre y trouver la confirmation que cette fraction s&rsquo;appuie sur une partie importante de la puissante hi\u00e9rarchie militaire US, assez indiff\u00e9rente aux pressions du type JINSA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 18 octobre 2007 \u00e0 10H28<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Plus que jamais, le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Robert Gates appara\u00eet comme la force principale de mod\u00e9ration au sein de l&rsquo;administration GW. Jim Lobe rapporte et commente, le 17 octobre, la performance de Robert Gates devant le JINSA (Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs), l&rsquo;organisation juive US la plus proche des n\u00e9o-conservateurs, qualifi\u00e9e justement par&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3984,2773,7134,1094],"class_list":["post-69332","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-gates","tag-iran","tag-jinsa","tag-lobe"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69332","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69332"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69332\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69332"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69332"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69332"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}