left Downing Street with a nagging fear that Blair did not understand what was really going to be needed to deliver a stable or reconstructed Iraq: I knew, liked and respected Blair from our earlier operations in the Balkans. But he didn’t seem to have the instinct for or understand the scope and complexity of what was going to be needed in the aftermath of an invasion. I don’t think he understood what the possible consequences could be<\/em>\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tTout, absolument tout est confirm\u00e9 dans le sens du pire, une fois de plus, et toujours de fa\u00e7on plus document\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t L’extraordinaire lourdeur et la paralysie r\u00e9glement\u00e9e de la bureaucratie plong\u00e9e dans ses querelles d’influence. Arriv\u00e9 en f\u00e9vrier 2003 \u00e0 Washington, de toute urgence, pour travailler avec le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Garner qui va prendre en charge l’Irak apr\u00e8s la victoire, \u00ab[i]t took him more than two weeks just to get the necessary clearance to go in and out of the Pentagon without having to be escorted constantly around the building<\/em>\u00bb. En mars 2003, \u00e0 quelques jours du d\u00e9clenchement de la guerre, Garner \u00abdidn’t have a piece of paper that made it clear he was in charge. The military never saw him as the boss, in fact they didn’t know what to make of him. It was unclear what his position was, so he never had the authority to say to the head of the US forces that he was in charge.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t La r\u00e9alit\u00e9, \u00e0 Washington, c’est simple, on la conna\u00eet, absolument le virtualisme, de A jusqu’\u00e0 Z. \u00abWhat frightened<\/em> [Cross] was the Washington neoconservatives’ certainty that once the Americans and British arrived, Iraqi oil revenue would rebuild the country: Too many people lost themselves in the luxury of political theory and forgot or chose to ignore the practical realities of what was actually going to happen on the ground, and that was at the heart of the planning blight.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe cabal in Washington convinced themselves that they didn’t need a plan because everything would be fine once Saddam Hussein was toppled . . . There were few dissenting voices; you either agreed with their paradigm or you were frozen out.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbHe added: What they didn’t seem to understand was that you cannot bring true democracy to these fragile places in less than a generation or two.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAs for Britain, it was apparent that Whitehall had got itself locked into the US way of thinking, not realising just how little America understood of the issues. When we got to Iraq and things started to go wrong there was just this stunned silence. There was no reserve to fill the vacuum, no ability to rethink the issues.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tQue s’est-il pass\u00e9 sinon le pire qui \u00e9tait possible dans cette aventure? L’Irak s’impose de plus en plus dans l’Histoire comme le sommet de la folie anglo-saxonne, suscit\u00e9e autant par l’usage d\u00e9mentiel de la communication pour r\u00e9aliser la cr\u00e9ation d’un univers fictif que par la paralysie des structures bureaucratiques de la civilisation anglo-saxonne. L’affaire irakienne d\u00e9passe largement l’histoire militaire pour devenir un cas exemplaire de la d\u00e9cadence de la civilisation occidentale et de la modernit\u00e9 sous l’inspiration anglo-saxonne conduite par une psychologie pervertie par une vanit\u00e9 sans peu de pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent. Tout se passe de mani\u00e8re barbare et cela n’a rien pour \u00e9tonner Et, au bout du compte, devant l’ampleur de la catastrophe, \u00abjust this stunned silence<\/em>\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 21 octobre 2007 \u00e0 15H44<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Tout de m\u00eame, lire cet avis dit par le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral britannique qui fut en charge de la pr\u00e9paration et de la planification de l’apr\u00e8s-guerre en Irak, en coordination constante avec les Am\u00e9ricains :\u00abThere is still no coherent national campaign plan for the so-called global war on terror which is, after all, where this all started,… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[7155,7156,2645,857,3607,610],"class_list":["post-69344","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-cross","tag-garner","tag-guerre","tag-irak","tag-planification","tag-virtualisme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69344","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69344"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69344\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69344"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69344"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69344"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}