Au reste, il est vrai que les pertes US en Irak n’ont cess\u00e9 de d\u00e9cliner depuis plusieurs mois (quatre au moins). Grande joie du c\u00f4t\u00e9 de la civilisation car c’est le signe indubitable que le surge<\/em> marche du tonnerre. Donc, tout va mieux et notre commentaire amer<\/a> n’a pas de raison d’\u00eatre? (De la bile d’anti-am\u00e9ricaniste, cela.) Pourtant<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tUn texte int\u00e9ressant \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard est celui de Fred Kaplan, sur Slate.com<\/em> le 24 octobre<\/a>. La chose est assez simple. Les pertes US d\u00e9croissent \u00e0 mesure que les interventions a\u00e9riennes augmentent. Brave g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Petraeus, qui a trouv\u00e9 le truc: moins on se bat \u00e0 terre, moins on a de pertes. (Et moins on a, tenez-vous bien, de pertes dues \u00e0 ces \u00e9pouvantables voitures-suicide pi\u00e9g\u00e9es; la technologie US a enfin triomph\u00e9 de ces horribles IED<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tEt plus on cogne d’en haut, mieux on se porte. D’abord, des pr\u00e9cisions chiffr\u00e9es:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abFrom January to September of this year, according to unclassified data, U.S. Air Force pilots in Iraq have flown 996 sorties that involved dropping munitions. By comparison, in all of 2006, they flew just 229 such sorties one-quarter as many. In 2005, they flew 404; in 2004, they flew 285.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIn other words, in the first nine months of 2007, Air Force planes dropped munitions on targets in Iraq more often than in the previous three years combined.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tVous avez compris? S’il le faut, Kaplan nous explique la chose encore plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThis month has seen the smallest number of Americans killed in Iraq than any other month since March 2006. But the reasons may have less to do with progress in the war than with the way we’re now fighting it.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbJust 29 U.S. military personnel have died in Iraq in October so far down from 65 in September, 84 in August, 78 in July, 101 in June You get the picture: Fewer, in most cases far fewer, than half as many American soldiers have died this month than in any previous month all year.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbHowever, some perspective is warranted. First, all told, 2007 has been a horrible year for American lives lost in this war 832 to date, more than the 822 lost in all of 2006, and, by the time the year ends, almost certainly more than the 846 killed in 2005 or the 849 in 2004.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbTrue, this month marks the second month in a row in which fatalities have declined, and that’s noteworthy. But it doesn’t quite constitute a trend, much less an occasion for celebrating.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbSecond, the slight increase in American fatalities this year, up until recently, is no surprise. When Gen. David Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq, announced a shift to a counterinsurgency strategyin which his troops would move more aggressively against militias and live among the Iraqi people instead of hunkering down in their massive baseshe acknowledged that the strategy carried risks and that more American casualties would be one of the consequences.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbSo, what accounts for the decline in American deaths since the summer? It’s hard to say for sure, but one little-reported cause is almost certainly a relative shift in U.S. tactics from fighting on the ground to bombing from the air.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbOn Sunday, U.S. soldiers were searching for a leader of a kidnapping ring in Baghdad’s Sadr City. The soldiers came under fire from a building. Rather than engage in dangerous door-to-door conflict, they called in air support. Army helicopters flew overhead and shelled the building, killing several of the fighters but also at least six innocent civilians. (The bad guy got away.)<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIn other words, though the shift means greater safety for our ground troops, it also generates more local hostility. Striking urban targets from the air inevitably means killing more innocent bystanders. This makes some of the bystanders’ relatives yearn for vengeance. And it makes many Iraqisrelatives, neighbors, and others watching the news of the attack on television less trusting of the American troops who are supposedly protecting them.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIn a conventional war, these consequences might be deemed unavoidable side-effects. But in a counterinsurgency campaign, where the point is to sway the hearts and minds of the population, wreaking such damage is self-defeating.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe U.S. Army’s field manual on counterinsurgency, which Gen. Petraeus supervised shortly before he returned to Iraq, makes the point explicitly:<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAn air strike can cause collateral damage that turns people against the host-nation government and provides insurgents with a major propaganda victory. Even when justified under the law of war, bombings that result in civilian casualties can bring media coverage that works to the insurgents’ benefits. For these reasons, commanders should consider the use of air strikes carefully during [counterinsurgency] operations, neither disregarding them outright nor employing them excessively.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n