{"id":69397,"date":"2007-11-09T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-11-09T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/11\/09\/retour-a-larc-de-crise-mais-il-ne-nous-a-jamais-quittes\/"},"modified":"2007-11-09T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-11-09T00:00:00","slug":"retour-a-larc-de-crise-mais-il-ne-nous-a-jamais-quittes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/11\/09\/retour-a-larc-de-crise-mais-il-ne-nous-a-jamais-quittes\/","title":{"rendered":"Retour \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u201carc de crise\u201d, \u2014 mais il ne nous a jamais quitt\u00e9s"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Qui est assez v\u00e9n\u00e9rable pour avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 actif dans l&rsquo;attention pour les affaires du monde se souviendra de l&rsquo;expression favorite de Zbigniew Brzezinski des ann\u00e9es 1978-1980: arc de crise. C&rsquo;est ce croissant des terres bordant l&rsquo;Oc\u00e9an Indien, de la Somalie \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re avec l&rsquo;Inde, de l&rsquo;Afrique australe au sous-continent indien. C&rsquo;\u00e9tait, en Iran en 1978, la r\u00e9volution khomeyniste (de l&rsquo;ayatollah Khomeiny, au nom duquel le Shah avait \u00e9t\u00e9 renvers\u00e9), que l&rsquo;amiral Turner, patron de la CIA, n&rsquo;avait pas vu venir parce que l&rsquo;ayatollah Khomeiny \u00e9tait un monsieur \u00e2g\u00e9; l&rsquo;aggravation incessante de la situation en Afghanistan, avec un r\u00e9gime communiste et une r\u00e9bellion islamiste en plein d\u00e9veloppement; l&rsquo;instabilit\u00e9 suppos\u00e9e ou crainte de l&rsquo;Arabie Saoudite, avec l&rsquo;attaque de la Grande Mosqu\u00e9e de La Mecque en 1979, et ainsi de suite. En 1980, apr\u00e8s l&rsquo;invasion de d\u00e9cembre 1979 de l&rsquo;Afghanistan par l&rsquo;URSS (en fait, un coup d&rsquo;Etat de palais par des forces sp\u00e9ciales sovi\u00e9tiques, suivi du remplacement d&rsquo;un leader communiste afghan pas s\u00fbr par un autre plus s\u00fbr), la r\u00e9gion devint vraiment l&rsquo;arc de crise.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tC&rsquo;est en 1980 que fut cr\u00e9\u00e9 Central Command, dont la t\u00e2che \u00e9tait de commander les forces US dans cette zone de l&rsquo;Oc\u00e9an Indien. Les craintes anglo-am\u00e9ricanistes se concentraient \u00e9galement sur l&rsquo;id\u00e9e que le parti communiste iranien pourrait prendre le pouvoir et ouvrir la voie \u00e0 l&rsquo;URSS. Le MI6, ou Intelligence Service, donna aux islamistes du pouvoir khomeinyste tous les noms qu&rsquo;il avait des communistes du PC iranien, permettant plusieurs centaines d&rsquo;arrestations et de liquidations sommaires. (\u00ab<em>L&rsquo;Intelligence Service a gard\u00e9 une fascination pour le monde musulman et pour cette r\u00e9gion, comme du temps du colonel Lawrence<\/em>\u00bb, commentait un agent fran\u00e7ais de renseignement, qui avait suivi les tractations du MI6 avec les khomeinystes.) En 1980, le Pentagone faisait des plans avec emploi de nucl\u00e9aire tactique en cas d&rsquo;invasion sovi\u00e9tique de l&rsquo;Iran. Comme les temps changent<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe fait est que l&rsquo;expression est \u00e0 nouveau \u00e0 la mode. Jim Lobe rapporte dans une analyse, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/lobe\/?articleid=11881\" class=\"gen\">aujourd&rsquo;hui<\/a>, avec quelle soudainet\u00e9 l&rsquo;administration GW et Washington d\u00e9couvrent l&rsquo;extraordinaire foyer de crise qu&rsquo;est redevenu cette r\u00e9gion, mena\u00e7ant de provoquer une d\u00e9faite strat\u00e9gique fondamentale pour les int\u00e9r\u00eats US, peut-\u00eatre le commencement de la fin pour une politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re expansionniste vieille de plus d&rsquo;un demi-si\u00e8cle. Le lien avec 1980 est vite fait car l&rsquo;arc de crise a-t-il jamais cess\u00e9 d&rsquo;exister depuis Brzezinski? La crise pakistanaise, encha\u00eenant sur celle de la Turquie contre les Kurdes d&rsquo;Irak, transforme soudain la perception et fait rena\u00eetre ce qu&rsquo;il y a de catastrophique dans cette notion d&rsquo;arc de crise<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Just as the White House claims that it has finally turned the corner in what it defines as the central front in the war on terror  Iraq  it has found itself desperately trying to contain new crises in the war&rsquo;s periphery stretching east to Pakistan, west to Turkey, and south to the Horn of Africa.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf&rsquo;s latest coup d&rsquo;Etat&rsquo; last weekend, combined with the continuing threat of a Turkish invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan and the looming probability of war between US-backed Ethiopia and Eritrea, have added to the growing impression here that Washington has ever more become hostage to forces and personalities far beyond its control or understanding.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The fact that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was reduced to making eleventh-hour telephone appeals to heads of state to heed Washington&rsquo;s wishes  in Turkey&rsquo;s case not to invade Kurdistan; in Musharraf&rsquo;s, not to declare a state of emergency  has only underlined just how impotent and unprepared the world&rsquo;s sole superpower appears to have become.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Worse, if they turn out badly, these crises could deal devastating setbacks to Washington&rsquo;s hopes of bolstering moderate forces against its perceived enemies, be they Sunni jihadists or the allegedly Tehran-led axis of Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The latest events come amid a lack of concrete progress on the Israel-Palestinian peace process, the ongoing political impasse in Lebanon, and still-mounting tensions between Iran and the US.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>To some veteran observers, the current rash of crises recalls the situation 1979-80 when the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, an Islamist uprising in Saudi Arabia, the execution by Pakistan&rsquo;s military regime of former President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and the bloody, superpower-fueled Ogaden war between Somalia and Ethiopia formed what was then called the arc of crisis that persuaded President Jimmy Carter to launch a major build-up in Washington&rsquo;s military presence from the Red Sea to the Gulf.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>But [t]he situation we face today is much more difficult, one former senior State Department official told IPS this week. Back then, we didn&rsquo;t have 200,000 US troops fighting on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan; nor did we have the anti-Americanism that now pervades the entire region. And, frankly, to deal with all this, we don&rsquo;t even have the regional expertise in the government that we had in 1979.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tUn lecteur, monsieur Roberto Buffagni que nous remercions vivement, nous signale un article de Ata Atun, ancien (en 2004) chef des n\u00e9gociateurs turcs aux n\u00e9gociations entre chypriotes turcs et chypriotes grecs, dans <em>Turkish Weekly<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.turkishweekly.net\/news.php?id=50010#\" class=\"gen\">5 novembre<\/a>. Cette r\u00e9flexion ne manquera pas de mettre de l&rsquo;huile sur le feu de notre pens\u00e9e toujours sur le qui-vive de l&rsquo;observation de l&rsquo;arc de crise, sous le titre r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur de: \u00ab<em>Inevitable Turkey-Iran-Syria-Russia alliance<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tMonsieur Ata Atun nous d\u00e9crit l&rsquo;effet \u00e9trangement unificateur de la non moins \u00e9trange politique US dans la r\u00e9gion, confirmant la remarque rapport\u00e9e par Jim Lobe (\u00ab<em>And, frankly, to deal with all this, we don&rsquo;t even have the regional expertise in the government that we had in 1979<\/em>\u00bb). L&rsquo;avis de Ata Atun est int\u00e9ressant, en tant qu&rsquo;ancien officiel turc notamment.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>The US and Iran are increasingly at odds over a range of issues, and Turkey has stood nearby the US as an old and devoted ally for the past 57 years.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Surprisingly, US strategists seem to be pushing Turkey and Iran together to fight against violent Kurdish attacks or into an alliance to fight together against the common enemy in the region at the cost of losing Turkey as a faithful ally. The sympathy of Turkish people towards the US had fallen sharply over the past couple of years, and it will take decades for US to recover it.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>It seems it is now mandatory for Turkey and Iran to form a common cooperative ground in regard to common problems and interests. New and stronger cooperative action in the economic field by Turkey and Iran will play a major role in the eradication of the political distrust and concerns between the two countries. The parties have announced an upcoming doubling of the volume of their trade.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Both countries have already agreed on the elimination of the main source of discord: support for each other&rsquo;s separatist and oppositional organizations. Iran has committed to adding the PKK to its list of terrorist organizations. Turkey has done the same concerning the Iranian group Mojahedin Halk.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The second stage is the escalation of high-level cooperation between Turkey, Iran and Syria and this is moving forward, as well.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Aversion to American global policy, in particular to the actions of the US in Iraq, the common allies of Syria and Iran, and also shared economic interests, will lead to the merging of the political strategies of Russia and Turkey. Countries that were previously historical opponents will turn into partners in the creation of a new Eurasian coalition.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The final effect of the region&rsquo;s aversion to American policies will be the formation of the union of four: Russia, Turkey, Iran and Syria. Of course, this rapprochement between Ankara, Moscow, Damascus and Teheran will definitely affect Washington&rsquo;s position in the Middle East.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 9 novembre 2007 \u00e0 15H34<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Qui est assez v\u00e9n\u00e9rable pour avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 actif dans l&rsquo;attention pour les affaires du monde se souviendra de l&rsquo;expression favorite de Zbigniew Brzezinski des ann\u00e9es 1978-1980: arc de crise. C&rsquo;est ce croissant des terres bordant l&rsquo;Oc\u00e9an Indien, de la Somalie \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re avec l&rsquo;Inde, de l&rsquo;Afrique australe au sous-continent indien. C&rsquo;\u00e9tait, en Iran en&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[7200,1006,3228,2631,2773,3379,3509,2613],"class_list":["post-69397","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-arc","tag-brzezinski","tag-crise","tag-de","tag-iran","tag-pakistan","tag-turner","tag-turquie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69397","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69397"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69397\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69397"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69397"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69397"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}