Il est vrai que, depuis quelques semaines, le sentiment g\u00e9n\u00e9ral est que la perspective jusqu’alors cataclysmique d’une arme nucl\u00e9aire iranienne est en train de s’\u00e9vader vers une certaine relativit\u00e9 de la chose. On l’a d\u00e9j\u00e0<\/a> signal\u00e9 et il est bon d’observer que cette \u00e9volution se poursuit. Une analyse en date du 11 novembre<\/a> de McClatchy Newspapers d\u00e9veloppe ce th\u00e8me.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abWould I like Iran to have a nuclear bomb? No, said Robert Jervis, a Columbia University professor of international politics who has written widely on nuclear deterrence. But, the fears (voiced) by the administration and a fair number of sensible people as well, just are exaggerated. The idea that this will really make a big difference, I think is foolish.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbEven some commentators in Israel, whose leaders see themselves in Iran’s crosshairs, present a more nuanced view of the potential threat than the White House does.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAn Iranian nuclear bomb could present Israel with the real potential for an existential threat, Ephraim Kam of the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv wrote in February.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbBut Kam noted that Israel has its own unacknowledged nuclear deterrent estimated at 100 to 200 warheads larger than anything Iran could marshal for years to come.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbDespite Iran’s messianic religious motivations, he wrote, it is highly doubtful that Tehran would want to risk an Israeli nuclear response by attempting a first strike.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMoreover, Iran, which says its nuclear research is aimed at generating electric power, is not thought to be close to having a nuclear weapon. In the worst-case scenario, it could have enough highly enriched uranium, a basic weapon ingredient in weapons, in two to three years.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbWe haven’t talked to the Iranians well enough. We talked to the Soviets all the time, said former CIA analyst Judith Yaphe, now at the National Defense University. She added: But I don’t trust someone like (Iranian President Mahmoud) Ahmadenijad to understand where the red lines are.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbOthers, including Columbia’s Jervis, say the U.S. government has not examined in depth how a nuclear armed Iran might behave for a simple reason: Bush’s policy is that Iran will not be allowed to have the bomb.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbU.S., Israeli and European concerns about a nuclear Iran generally fall into three categories:<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe first is that it would hand over a nuclear weapon to terrorists, hoping to elude responsibility for an attack on Israel or America.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbBut Kam, the Israeli analyst, wrote that the chance of this appears low. A more serious worry, he wrote, is that Iran could deter Israel from acting against Hezbollah, Iran’s terrorist proxy that opposes Israel’s existence.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbMohsen Sazegara, who helped found Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and is now a U.S.-based dissident, also predicted Iran would not engage in nuclear terrorism. If I found out somebody was thinking of this, I’d have to say I don’t know my country, he said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tQuand on observe que certains continuent \u00e0 s’appuyer sur, ou \u00e0 fr\u00e9quenter encore les th\u00e8ses apocalyptiques, type Troisi\u00e8me Guerre mondiale de GW ou l’arme nucl\u00e9aire iranienne est inacceptable de Sarko, on se dit que tout cela commence \u00e0 faire d\u00e9sordre. Il faut mesurer la stupidit\u00e9 himalayesque de l’intelligentsia occidentale type BHL<\/a> lorsqu’elle se paye des jugements comme celui<\/a> de Dame Daley, philosophe consacr\u00e9e (sottise presque parfaite d’un jugement tel que \u00abIran, whose nuclear ambitions are the greatest threat to international security in our time<\/em>\u00bb). Si le courant relativiste du nucl\u00e9aire iranien progresse encore et devient jugement commun, peut-\u00eatre m\u00eame jugement officiel dans certains cas, nous devrons alors observer avec int\u00e9r\u00eat les difficiles contorsions des moralistes publicitaires pour \u00e9voluer et tenter de se d\u00e9tacher d’une position si compl\u00e8tement verrouill\u00e9e dans le radicalisme absolue. C’est un des grands sports de notre \u00e9poque.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 12 novembre 2007 \u00e0 18H37<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Il est vrai que, depuis quelques semaines, le sentiment g\u00e9n\u00e9ral est que la perspective jusqu’alors cataclysmique d’une arme nucl\u00e9aire iranienne est en train de s’\u00e9vader vers une certaine relativit\u00e9 de la chose. On l’a d\u00e9j\u00e0 signal\u00e9 et il est bon d’observer que cette \u00e9volution se poursuit. Une analyse en date du 11 novembre de McClatchy… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5656,3017,3004,4517],"class_list":["post-69408","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-experts","tag-iranien","tag-nucleaire","tag-relativisme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69408","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69408"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69408\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69408"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69408"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69408"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}