{"id":69415,"date":"2007-11-15T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-11-15T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/11\/15\/moscou-fourbit-ses-iskander-un-peu-beaucoup\/"},"modified":"2007-11-15T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-11-15T00:00:00","slug":"moscou-fourbit-ses-iskander-un-peu-beaucoup","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/11\/15\/moscou-fourbit-ses-iskander-un-peu-beaucoup\/","title":{"rendered":"Moscou fourbit ses Iskander<\/em><\/strong>, \u2013 un peu, beaucoup\u2026"},"content":{"rendered":"

Moscou fourbit ses Iskander<\/em><\/strong>, un peu, beaucoup<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tUn g\u00e9n\u00e9ral russe, le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Vladimir Zaritsky qui commande les unit\u00e9s de missiles de l’arm\u00e9e de terre russe, a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que des missiles sol-sol \u00e0 courte port\u00e9e Iskander<\/em> (SS-26<\/a>) pourraient \u00eatre d\u00e9ploy\u00e9s en Belarus si les USA, la Pologne et la Tch\u00e9quie poursuivent dans leur intention suppos\u00e9e de d\u00e9ployer des \u00e9l\u00e9ments de la BMDE sur les territoires des deux pays europ\u00e9ens. La nouvelle est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e aujourd’hui<\/a> par le Daily Telegraph<\/em> (le d\u00e9ploiement en Belarus est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme un deuxi\u00e8me possible point de d\u00e9ploiement du Iskander<\/em>).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abRussia threatened to site short-range nuclear missiles in a second location on the European Union’s border yesterday if the United States refuses to abandon plans to erect a missile defence shield.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn what appeared to be a fresh attempt to divide the West, a senior army general said that Iskander missiles could be deployed in Belarus if US proposals to place 10 interceptor missiles and a radar in Poland and the Czech Republic go ahead.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAny action meets a counter-action, and this is the case with elements of the US missile defence in Poland and the Czech Republic, said Gen Vladimir Zaritsky, the chief of artillery and rocket forces for Russia’s ground troops.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIn itself, the warning is unlikely to alarm Western governments. Nato brushed off the suggestion yesterday. Any discussion of targeting Western Europe with missiles, from any party, is a) anachronistic; b) unwelcome and c) unhelpful, said James Appathurai, a Nato spokesman in Brussels.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbRussia, which insists that the missile shield is a plot to undermine its nuclear deterrents, has already said that Iskander missiles could be deployed in the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad, which lies in EU territory.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbPresident Vladimir Putin has also threatened to retrain Russia’s nuclear arsenal on targets within Europe.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe creation of a second launch pad in Belarus, however, would allow Russia to place tactical and psychological pressure on neighbouring Poland, where public support for the proposed shield is low.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Nous pourrions m\u00eame aller au-del\u00e0 et avancer que la pression russe sur la Pologne concerne certes un pays o\u00f9 le soutien populaire pour le syst\u00e8me BMDE est faible, mais o\u00f9, surtout, \u00e0 ce moment pr\u00e9cis, un nouveau gouvernement va entrer en fonction, pour lequel la question du BMDE est centrale<\/a>. C’est \u00e9galement et surtout ce gouvernement que vise la d\u00e9claration russe. (Si elle est officielle, cette d\u00e9claration n’engage pas pour autant le gouvernement russe ; disons que c’est une d\u00e9claration semi-officielle, en plus faite au conditionnel, tous les \u00e9l\u00e9ments pour en faire effectivement une manuvre de pression, qu’on peut accentuer ou rel\u00e2cher \u00e0 volont\u00e9.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes pressions et les manuvres russes dans cette affaire du syst\u00e8me BMDE sont redoutables d’efficacit\u00e9 et les Russes ne prennent pas de gants pour en user. Le but de la Russie est effectivement de diviser les Europ\u00e9ens et les Am\u00e9ricains. C’est, du point de vue russe, un but \u00e9vident. D\u00e9sormais, il y a, du c\u00f4t\u00e9 russe, une volont\u00e9 \u00e9vidente d’appr\u00e9hender cette affaire avec une vision antagoniste. Par leur maladresse, leur incons\u00e9quence, \u00e0 cause de la pression bureaucratique du Pentagone pour d\u00e9velopper un projet qui a un caract\u00e8re provocateur \u00e9vident, les Occidentaux et les Am\u00e9ricains semblent donc \u00eatre parvenus \u00e0 leurs fins, une situation o\u00f9 sont r\u00e9unies les pr\u00e9misses d’une crise active \u00e9voluant vers une tension pressante pour la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne. Mission accomplished<\/em>, comme disait l’autre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 15 novembre 2007 \u00e0 11H49<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Moscou fourbit ses Iskander, un peu, beaucoup Un g\u00e9n\u00e9ral russe, le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Vladimir Zaritsky qui commande les unit\u00e9s de missiles de l’arm\u00e9e de terre russe, a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que des missiles sol-sol \u00e0 courte port\u00e9e Iskander (SS-26) pourraient \u00eatre d\u00e9ploy\u00e9s en Belarus si les USA, la Pologne et la Tch\u00e9quie poursuivent dans leur intention suppos\u00e9e de… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3453,4314,6582,2827,2730],"class_list":["post-69415","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-anti-missiles","tag-bmde","tag-iskander","tag-pologne","tag-russie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69415","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69415"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69415\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69415"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69415"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69415"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}