Certains analystes US ne sont pas m\u00e9contents de la crise du dollar. Ils en font une analyse g\u00e9opolitique et estiment que cette crise forcera les USA \u00e0 renoncer \u00e0 leurs engagements militaro-strat\u00e9giques dans le monde. C’est un raisonnement quasiment ron-paulien (Ron Paul, d\u00e9nonciateur et adversaire de l’h\u00e9g\u00e9monie du dollar<\/a>). Il appara\u00eet essentiellement dans la conclusion de l’analyse d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e par Edward A. Olsen, professeur des affaires de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale \u00e0 la Naval Postgraduate School \u00e0 Monterey, en Californie, dans un article mis en ligne le 16 novembre<\/a>, sur Antiwar.com<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tSelon ses conceptions, Olsen appara\u00eet proche des tendances libertariennes. Son raisonnement conduit \u00e0 proposer une sorte d’isolationnisme par n\u00e9cessit\u00e9, selon la fameuse doctrine dite America First<\/em> en vogue jusqu’\u00e0 l’attaque de Pearl Harbor, mais qui serait cette fois appliqu\u00e9e aux activit\u00e9s postmodernes : tourisme, achats en ville, etc., et, au-del\u00e0, aux d\u00e9penses consid\u00e9rables qu’impliquent les engagements militaires outre-mer et les aides militaires accord\u00e9es par les USA. Avec un dollar r\u00e9duit \u00e0 la portion congrue et ces d\u00e9penses multipli\u00e9es \u00e0 mesure, Olsen esp\u00e8re que les pressions populaires convaincront le pouvoir am\u00e9ricanistes d’abandonner sa co\u00fbteuse politique ext\u00e9rieure d’engagement strat\u00e9gique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abWhile the domestic tourism business for obvious marketing reasons does not utilize that "America First" label, the more American travelers choose to not go abroad because of higher costs, the more the hidden geopolitical virtues of a declining dollar will become evident. As Americans become less inclined to travel to other countries deemed to be too expensive, the more likely such Americans are to question the logic of the United States being substantially entangled in these wealthy countries’ national security as part of American commitments to internationalist geopolitical paradigms.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe more that many Americans become aware of how expensive it is to be a tourist in these countries because of the foreign currency exchange rates, the more likely it will be that such Americans shall raise questions about how expensive it is for the U.S. government to continue to be a strategic benefactor for such countries. Becoming more conscious of these exchange rates may well cause a growing number of Americans to think about the rising costs in U.S. dollars of maintaining extensive military bases and some very large diplomatic posts with substantial security perimeters in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East which includes paying local supplies, transportation, and infrastructure bills as well as the salaries of numerous local employees. This will become even more evident as "host nation support" programs are cut back due to serious questioning about their virtues in several strategic partners. The more the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the currencies of these allied states shifts in those states’ favor, the more expensive the United States’ strategic burden shall become. Similarly, as Americans become more conscious of this situation, they may well raise questions about the growing costs of large scale U.S. foreign aid programs in diverse countries due to how currency exchange rates influence the U.S. dollar’s buying power overseas. In turn, this may cause Americans to ask why other wealthy countries are not doing more in this regard.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIf Americans become more willing to question the fiscal rationality of such growing internationalist costs, a major example of a hidden geopolitical consequence of the dollar’s decline in the international currency exchange system would be how it could create incentives for Americans to press the U.S. government to save money by refocusing upon truly "national" national defense. The more Americans become fiscal conservatives who are aware of, and sensitive to, the growing costs of interventionist international strategic commitments the more likely they are to exert political pressure on the U.S. government to shift the high costs of defending existing allies to all those countries’ own national and regional defense programs. Just as Americans are being attracted to a de facto "America First" brand of less expensive domestic tourism as they become conscious of the high costs of traveling abroad, so too may Americans be attracted to a literally "America First" brand of defending their own country utilizing a "Made in USA" form of defense industrial base due to the excessively high costs of being an overly generous strategic benefactor for a number of countries around the world. Whether the currency exchange rate shift proves to be of short or long duration it can teach useful lessons to Americans about genuinely conservative U.S. priorities internationally.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 17 novembre 2007 \u00e0 18H43<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Certains analystes US ne sont pas m\u00e9contents de la crise du dollar. Ils en font une analyse g\u00e9opolitique et estiment que cette crise forcera les USA \u00e0 renoncer \u00e0 leurs engagements militaro-strat\u00e9giques dans le monde. C’est un raisonnement quasiment ron-paulien (Ron Paul, d\u00e9nonciateur et adversaire de l’h\u00e9g\u00e9monie du dollar). Il appara\u00eet essentiellement dans la conclusion… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4366,2933,3396,3438,1242,7233],"class_list":["post-69422","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-america","tag-bases","tag-dollar","tag-first","tag-isolationnisme","tag-olsen"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69422","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69422"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69422\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69422"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69422"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69422"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}