croyant<\/a> jusqu’au bout dans la mission civilisatrice par l’avion et le char de l’Occident anglo-saxonis\u00e9. Brown est d’un style diff\u00e9rent et il semble que la mission civilisatrice en Afghanistan commence \u00e0 le lasser.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tL’article cit\u00e9 est empli de d\u00e9tails assez sombres et pessimistes, sugg\u00e9rant effectivement que l’Afghanistan est un trou noir sans espoit pour l’OTAN (pour le Royaume-Uni) et qu’il est temps de chercher une decent exit strategy<\/em>, y compris en s’acoquinant avec les talibans. La derni\u00e8re consigne \u00e0 leur \u00e9gard est de ne plus les d\u00e9moniser. (\u00ab A hint at a shift in UK attitudes may have come in Gen Dannatt’s September speech, in which he said he preferred not to demonise Nato’s adversaries. There is a hard core of Islamist extremists of varied ethnic and national origin, but the great majority of the people we are engaged against are those who are fighting with the Taliban for financial, social and tribal reasons. So we must beware of tarring them all with the same brush, as I am sure that one day we will need to deal with and eventually reconcile the elected government with the majority of these people.<\/em>\u00bb) Un virage dans la politique de propagnde officielle, cette virtualisation constante de la situation de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9, est un signe important pour un syst\u00e8me qui \u00e9volue effectivement sur sa capacit\u00e9 de constante recr\u00e9ation et modification de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tQuelques d\u00e9tails de plus sur cette pr\u00e9cautionneuse approche d’une possible strat\u00e9gie de fuite dans l’apparence de l’honneur que les Britanniques pourraient bien un jour prochain proposer \u00e0 l’OTAN…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abThe United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan rates 78 districts, almost one-fifth of the country, as extremely risky and therefore inaccessible to UN agencies for humanitarian work. Rates of insurgent and terrorist violence have been running 20 per cent higher, at an average of 548 incidents a month, than in 2006 and there are eight times as many suicide attacks as there were just two years ago.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbSuch setbacks are important. Losing Afghanistan threatens to recreate a failed state in a strategically important region, provide a haven for terrorists and drug traffickers and undermine, perhaps fatally, the credibility of the Nato alliance in its first big out-of-area operation. Some 40,000 of the foreign troops are under Nato command, the rest with a US-led anti-terrorist coalition.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abYet signs of impatience among some western governments are unmistakable. Nato, according to its own calculation, is a minimum four battalions (totalling 4,000 soldiers) short of what it needs and the force lacks crucial equipment such as helicopters.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbMeanwhile, perhaps one-quarter of Nato’s troops present in Afghanistan, including those from Germany, Italy and Spain, are under strict operational restrictions. Fifty so-called national caveats are maintained, including some that prevent military assets in the relatively peaceful north of the country from being shifted south where they are most needed. According to one senior Nato officer, the restrictions have an insidious impact on operations.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThis shortage seems unlikely to be remedied. Two nations currently providing combat troops Canada, with 1,700 soldiers there, and the Netherlands, with 1,300 face parliamentary debates in the coming months about whether their mandates should be renewed. Poland (950 troops), Denmark (450) and Nato partner Australia (900) all engaged in the difficult south or east have held or face elections that may lead their troops to be brought home.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbWestern officials say the solution to this shortfall lies in building the capacity of Afghanistan’s own security forces. But progress has been slow. The Afghan National Army comprises fewer than 35,000 men, compared with a stated goal of 70,000 by 2010 itself held to be insufficient by some analysts. Plagued by desertions in the early days, retention rates have improved to 45-60 per cent of recruits, depending on the unit.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbBut Nato governments are still falling short of their commitment to provide teams to train army units on the job. There are fewer than 30 of them, compared with a target of 100. Officials expect more commitments in coming months it is one possible future role for Canadian forces but as the number of such teams increases, so does the number needed, as new Afghan units are deployed.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe picture for the police is worse. An estimated 71,000 policemen are on duty, of whom 50,000 are ostensibly trained and equipped, compared with a goal of 82,000. Yet their quality is often poor many police chiefs are illiterate and police and justice system corruption is widely said to be undermining support for the government. Implicitly recognising past failures, the US has committed $2.5bn (1.7bn, \u00a31.2bn) to retrain the force, planning to put more than 2,500 advisers in police stations all over the country.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAnother failure has been in counter-narcotics policy. Since the end of Taliban rule, poppy cultivation has risen to the point that Afghanistan is now estimated to be responsible for 93 per cent of the world’s opium supplies. The UN Office of Drugs and Crime reported in August that opium production had increased by 34 per cent over the previous year. The growth mostly came from Helmand province, where British troops are operating. Officials talk of a vicious cycle in which the proceeds of drug trafficking sustain the insurgency.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbGeneral Sir Richard Dannatt, Britain’s army chief, said in a September speech that the UK military decided against a strong eradication policy for poppy fields when moving into Helmand in 2006 because to have done so would have handed an important propaganda tool to the Taliban. But he said that over a lengthy campaign, it was necessary to turn the tide against drugs and he had told his commanders this summer that in 2008 we will be judged in progress terms by this poppy harvest and we have now got to see it going down.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThese difficulties are leading some western governments to suggest the west’s strategy to build confidence in elected institutions and encourage justice, reconstruction, development and better government is too ambitious.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tReste donc la r\u00e9conciliation, avec les talibans consid\u00e9r\u00e9s \u00e0 nouveau comme des gens pas si mauvais que cela. C’\u00e9tait le sens du discours du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Dannatt, cit\u00e9 plus haut. Le probl\u00e8me principal, pour l’instant, est Washington, o\u00f9 la politique standard est \u00e9videmment le maximalisme partout, toujours et de toutes les fa\u00e7ons, y compris pour les combats dont les autres assurent le principal. (\u00abAlthough the idea of reconciliation is gaining ground elsewhere, it finds little favour in the Bush administration, where one US official says the word Taliban is regarded as radioactive.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 19 novembre 2007 \u00e0 07H13<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
R\u00e9trospectivement, on pourrait penser que l’arriv\u00e9e de Gordon Brown au pouvoir \u00e0 Londres repr\u00e9sente un tournant pour la situation en Afghanistan. C’est l’id\u00e9e qui flotte autour de cette remarque, dans un article significatif du Financial Times du 18 novembre: \u00abIn the UK, a review of Afghan strategy has followed Gordon Brown’s takeover as prime minister… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3236,4038,5998,2851,4849,2852],"class_list":["post-69426","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-afghanistan","tag-brown","tag-dannatt","tag-financial","tag-retrait","tag-times"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69426","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69426"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69426\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69426"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69426"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69426"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}