{"id":69429,"date":"2007-11-20T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-11-20T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/11\/20\/les-f-15-interdits-de-vol-semi-montage-mais-dans-quel-sens\/"},"modified":"2007-11-20T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-11-20T00:00:00","slug":"les-f-15-interdits-de-vol-semi-montage-mais-dans-quel-sens","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/11\/20\/les-f-15-interdits-de-vol-semi-montage-mais-dans-quel-sens\/","title":{"rendered":"Les F-15 interdits de vol: semi-montage\u2026 mais dans quel sens?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>L&rsquo;information doit aujourd&rsquo;hui se d\u00e9placer \u00e0 \u00e9gale distance entre la probable r\u00e9alit\u00e9 et les possibles n\u00e9cessit\u00e9s du lobbying et des relations publiques, surtout \u00e0 Washington, surtout au Pentagone. Ces constats nous ram\u00e8nent \u00e0 l&rsquo;affaire des F-15 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=4620\" class=\"gen\">suspendus de vol<\/a> et \u00e0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=4616\" class=\"gen\">la crise de l&rsquo;USAF<\/a>. Un article d&rsquo;<em>Aviation Week &#038; Space Technology<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.aviationweek.com\/publication\/awst\/loggedin\/AvnowStoryDisplay.do?fromChannel=awst&#038;pubKey=awst&#038;issueDate=2007-11-12&#038;story=xml\/awst_xml\/2007\/11\/12\/AW_11_12_2007_p50-16468.xml&#038;headline=F15s+Grounded+Around+the+World\" class=\"gen\">12 novembre<\/a>, donne un \u00e9clairage ambigu sur cette affaire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tD&rsquo;abord, on note que les cons\u00e9quences de cette mesure ont \u00e9t\u00e9 consid\u00e9rables.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Pr\u00e8s de 700 F-15 de l&rsquo;USAF ont \u00e9t\u00e9 interdits de vol.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t La m\u00eame mesure a \u00e9t\u00e9 prise dans divers pays qui utilisent le F-15, notamment le Japon et Isra\u00ebl.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Des F-15 \u00e9tant interdits de vol en Afghanistan, le V\u00e8me Flotte (Golfe Persique) a \u00e9t\u00e9 oblig\u00e9e de d\u00e9placer le seul porte-avions  (USS <em>Enterprise<\/em>) qu&rsquo;elle a dans la zone vers l&rsquo;Oc\u00e9an Indien, au large de l&rsquo;Afghanistan, pour assurer une couverture a\u00e9rienne avec ses F-18E\/F. (Au passage, on d\u00e9couvre combien le dispositif US est tendu puisque cette n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 conduit \u00e0 d\u00e9garnir compl\u00e8tement la zone iranienne, alors qu&rsquo;on continue \u00e0 bavarder d&rsquo;une attaque possible, du seul porte-avions pr\u00e9sent actuellement au sein de la V\u00e8me Flotte.) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDans les pr\u00e9sentations qu&rsquo;AW&#038;ST fait de l&rsquo;incident, on observe \u00e0 la fois une appr\u00e9ciation s\u00e9rieuse de l&rsquo;incident mais aussi l&rsquo;\u00e9vocation de la possibilit\u00e9 que l&rsquo;incident serve surtout \u00e0 faire une promotion en faveur de plus de F-22, voire m\u00eame la possibilit\u00e9 que l&rsquo;USAF ait dramatis\u00e9 le cas en insistant sur la mesure d&rsquo;interdiction de vol et sur la vieillesse du F-15 pour mieux plaider pour plus de F-22.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe passage ci-apr\u00e8s de l&rsquo;article va effectivement dans ce sens en pr\u00e9cisant que cette interdiction de vol est utilis\u00e9e par l&rsquo;USAF pour justifier sa demande de plus de F-22, sans affirmer explicitement que cette mesure pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment a \u00e9t\u00e9 dramatis\u00e9e pour ce cas. D&rsquo;autre part, il est affirm\u00e9 que les F-15 devraient durer jusqu&rsquo;en 2020-2035 selon les versions, ce qui obscurcit compl\u00e8tement l&rsquo;argument de l&rsquo;\u00e2ge ; mais il s&rsquo;agit \u00e9galement d&rsquo;un argument de relations publiques pour rassurer les acheteurs non-US de F-15 et ne pas torpiller d&rsquo;\u00e9ventuelles futures ventes du chasseur \u00e0 d&rsquo;autres pays. (Le F-15 est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9, lors des campagnes de vente \u00e0 des pays tiers, avec une dur\u00e9e de vie remarquablement consid\u00e9rable de 40-50 ans. C&rsquo;est beaucoup. Cette sorte d&rsquo;affirmation fait s&rsquo;interroger pour savoir o\u00f9 est le montage: une \u00e9ventuelle sur-dramatisation de la d\u00e9cision d&rsquo;interdiction ou l&rsquo;affirmation que ces avions de combat vont si bien malgr\u00e9 tout qu&rsquo;ils dureront encore entre 15 et 25 ans?)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>USAF and industry officials say fleet groundings sometimes occur every few months for various safety issues. They say senior USAF leadership is using this grounding to push for a larger F-22 force. And while USAF was grounding its F-15s, military officials briefing an international fighter conference in London said that the F-15Cs wouldn&rsquo;t be retired until 2025-30, and that the F-15E will serve beyond 2035.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The accident in Missouri could be unique to that [one] aircraft, a veteran F-15 squadron commander says. And if it&rsquo;s not, there are lots of fixes you can make to keep them flying. The pitch for more F-22s is what&rsquo;s going on.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEl\u00e9ment \u00e9galement int\u00e9ressant, la pr\u00e9cision donn\u00e9e en fin d&rsquo;article sur l&rsquo;intervention de l&rsquo;ancien g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l&rsquo;USAF McCaffrey, qui appara\u00eet comme nouveau lobbyist en faveur d&rsquo;un renforcement imm\u00e9diat de l&rsquo;USAF. McCaffrey a \u00e9t\u00e9 charg\u00e9 d&rsquo;une mission d&rsquo;\u00e9valuation des besoins de l&rsquo;USAF, par l&rsquo;USAF, et a communiqu\u00e9 ses r\u00e9sultats. Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une op\u00e9ration classique de lobbying (de l&rsquo;USAF) par consultant interpos\u00e9. Elle permet n\u00e9anmoins d&rsquo;avoir une id\u00e9e pr\u00e9cise des besoins et des priorit\u00e9s de l&rsquo;USAF,  et permet de constater, notamment, que le JSF n&rsquo;est pas sur cette liste, tandis que le F-22 y figure \u00e0 hauteur de plus de 350 exemplaires alors qu&rsquo;il est pr\u00e9vu pour l&rsquo;instant \u00e0 183 exemplaires.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>Retired Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey has joined the chorus, saying that USAF looks operationally anemic. The $12 billion per month being spent in Iraq is unbalancing war-fighting missions, McCaffrey says. In 15 years, China will be able to threaten U.S. power in the Pacific.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>More specifically, McCaffrey calls USAF badly underfunded, with its manpower falling, modernization programs lagging and aging aircraft. There&rsquo;s a need for defense capability that can guarantee a&#8230; punitive air, sea and cyber-strike using conventional weapons capable of devastating the offensive power of a foreign stateand which can hold at risk their vital national leadership and economic targets, he says. The general then notes that such airpower capabilities are not possible with the current defense allocation of 4% of GNP.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>McCaffrey listed imperatives for U.S. airpower: Maintain a fleet of more than 350 F-22s; operate more than 600 C&#8209;17s; let a centralized Joint Air Component control unmanned aircraft; better fund and defend space capabilities; develop a follow-on bomber because the B-2 is inadequate and too vulnerable; and continue investments, research and development in ballistic missile defenses.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The visits to military bases that prompted McCaffrey&rsquo;s memo were organized by USAF Secretary Michael Wynne and Chief of Staff T. Michael Moseley.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 20 novembre 2007 \u00e0 12H48<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>L&rsquo;information doit aujourd&rsquo;hui se d\u00e9placer \u00e0 \u00e9gale distance entre la probable r\u00e9alit\u00e9 et les possibles n\u00e9cessit\u00e9s du lobbying et des relations publiques, surtout \u00e0 Washington, surtout au Pentagone. Ces constats nous ram\u00e8nent \u00e0 l&rsquo;affaire des F-15 suspendus de vol et \u00e0 la crise de l&rsquo;USAF. Un article d&rsquo;Aviation Week &#038; Space Technology du 12 novembre,&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2631,3302,249,7241,4642,4173,4584],"class_list":["post-69429","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-de","tag-f-15","tag-f-22","tag-interdiction","tag-mccaffrey","tag-montage","tag-vol"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69429","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69429"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69429\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69429"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69429"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69429"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}