{"id":69446,"date":"2007-11-26T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-11-26T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/11\/26\/lemay-et-les-sac-people-lobsession-de-loverkill-1\/"},"modified":"2007-11-26T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-11-26T00:00:00","slug":"lemay-et-les-sac-people-lobsession-de-loverkill-1","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/11\/26\/lemay-et-les-sac-people-lobsession-de-loverkill-1\/","title":{"rendered":"LeMay et les SAC people\u00a0<\/em>: l’obsession de l’\u201coverkill<\/em>\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"

LeMay et les SAC people <\/em>: l’obsession de l'\u00a0\u00bboverkill<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

On n’en finit pas et on n’en finira pas durant longtemps de d\u00e9couvrir les sous-sols laborieux et effrayants de l’am\u00e9ricanisme, tandis que les divers bands of brothers<\/em> (BHL, Glucksmann et compagnie) continuent \u00e0 nous chanter ses louanges dans les hauteurs morales, fid\u00e8les \u00e0 leur parcours professionnel. Cela dit pour introduire les plus r\u00e9centes trouvailles des National Security Archives (NSA), qui poursuit pour l’universit\u00e9 de Georgetown la mise \u00e0 jour et \u00e0 la disposition du public de documents secrets d\u00e9classifi\u00e9s. Les NSA continuent ainsi la mise \u00e0 jour de l’\u00e9difiant domaine des SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan<\/em>), c’est-\u00e0-dire les plans d’attaque nucl\u00e9aire strat\u00e9gique qui furent dress\u00e9s \u00e0 partir de 1962 (sans traduction n\u00e9cessaire : \u00ab\u00a0All-Out Strategic Nuclear War<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0). Les NSA viennent de mettre en ligne le 22 novembre<\/a> une nouvelle s\u00e9rie de document sur l’histoire, les modalit\u00e9s, la mise en place et les objectifs des divers plans SIOP (\u00e0 partir de 1962, le premier d’entre eux, SIOP-62). (Une premi\u00e8re s\u00e9rie avait \u00e9t\u00e9 mise en ligne le 13 juillet 2004<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Il s’agit d’une plong\u00e9e r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice dans l’univers d\u00e9lirant, infernal et faustien de la bureaucratie des \u00ab\u00a0SAC people<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0, les hommes de LeMay, cr\u00e9ateur et chef du Strategic Air Command de 1948 \u00e0 1957, et de son successeur et \u00ab\u00a0homme de main\u00a0\u00bb, le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Thomas Power. (Sur LeMay et le Strategic Air Command, voir aussi ce texte du 15 mai 2001<\/a> sur ce site.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

• Les \u00ab\u00a0SAC people<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb faisaient m\u00eame peur \u00e0 leurs coll\u00e8gues de la Navy et de l’Army… Les documents parlent de «The internal debate within the military over the war plan, especially Army and Navy concern about excessive destruction and radiation hazards to U.S. troops and people in allied countries near targeted countries.<\/em>» Ils observent \u00e9galement que la notion d'\u00a0\u00bboverkill<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb \u00e9taient la caract\u00e9ristique \u00e9vidente des SIOP :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

«Goals of high levels of damage (\u00ab\u00a0damage expectancy\u00a0\u00bb) were intrinsic to the SIOP, which prompted criticism from some members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior commanders about excessive destruction (\u00ab\u00a0overkill\u00a0\u00bb) and radiation hazards. This explains why some historians have treated \u00ab\u00a0overkill\u00a0\u00bb as one of the SIOP’s most distinctive features.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

• On peut suivre l’\u00e9volution d’une expression destin\u00e9e \u00e0 une fortune consid\u00e9rable avec l’attaque du 11 septembre 2001: \u00ab\u00a0Ground Zero<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0. Les objectifs promis \u00e0 une destruction compl\u00e8te, type Carthage apr\u00e8s le passage des Romains, sont d\u00e9sign\u00e9s \u00ab\u00a0Desired Ground Zero<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb (DGZ). Bien qu’il reste de tr\u00e8s nombreux domaines censur\u00e9s dans les documents d\u00e9classifi\u00e9s, on peut d\u00e9terminer qu’en 1970 les plans SIOP pr\u00e9voyaient 1.700 DGZ au cours de l’attaque ainsi planifi\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

«The JSTPS’s use of the \u00ab\u00a0target island\u00a0\u00bb concept to help plan strikes on groups of adjacent military or industrial installations that were to be destroyed by striking a \u00ab\u00a0desired ground zero\u00a0\u00bb (DGZ) somewhere on the \u00ab\u00a0island.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

»Significant details remain classified, of which the most important may be the numbers of DGZs. Information on page 20 shows that the history includes a breakdown of targets in the \u00ab\u00a0Sino-Soviet bloc,\u00a0\u00bb including the Soviet Union, China, Eastern Europe, and possibility North Korea and North Vietnam. Previous declassifications show that the total number of DGZs as of the fall of 1960 was around 1700. This excision, among other, is under appeal at the Information Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) at the National Archives.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

• D\u00e8s l’origine, les SIOP furent l’objet d’une bataille constante entre d’une part le pouvoir civil et souvent les autres pouvoirs militaires, et d’autre part le SAC, pour tenter de faire abaisser le seuil des destructions pr\u00e9vues. Sans grand succ\u00e8s, en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral… Le SAC n’\u00e9tait guid\u00e9 que par une chose : \u00ab\u00a0overkill<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

«The important section on \u00ab\u00a0Reappraisal of Strategy\u00a0\u00bb (pages 2 through 9) which recounts the critiques of SIOP-62 by the White House Science Adviser George Kistiakowsky as well as by the Army, the Navy, CINCLANT, and CINCPAC. All of them believed that the \u00ab\u00a0conservative\u00a0\u00bb methodology employed to produce SIOP-62 had produced an instrument of \u00ab\u00a0overkill,\u00a0\u00bb with excessive destruction and casualties. Moreover, commanders in the field worried that the plan did not have enough constraints on nuclear weapons employed so that \u00ab\u00a0friendly peoples\u00a0\u00bb would not be as vulnerable to radiation. Also shaping the discussion was significant pressure from the Office of Secretary of Defense for \u00ab\u00a0greater flexibility\u00a0\u00bb and a \u00ab\u00a0wider range of options and alternatives\u00a0\u00bb in nuclear strategy, such avoiding attacks on urban-industrial targets in the early stages of a nuclear war and the creation of a secure strategic reserve force that could be used to threaten an adversary’s cities in the later stages.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

»Nevertheless, the Director of the JSTPS, Thomas Power, was unimpressed by the criticisms and resolved to continue with \u00ab\u00a0existing guidance.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

»A major difficulty was the application of constraints policies so that weapons bursts did not create fallout that could threaten \u00ab\u00a0friendly, neutral, and satellite areas\u00a0\u00bb on the Soviet and Chinese periphery. SIOP-62 had no constraints policy because it assumed the detonation of the \u00ab\u00a0single largest weapon\u00a0\u00bb on each target, but SIOP-63 guidance was not rigorous enough to prevent fallout from accumulating in some areas. While the details are classified, it is possible that the constraints policy conflicted with damage expectancy for strategic targets and that the latter goal had priority.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

»The guidance did not require commanders to obtain specific levels of destruction except for two categories: 1) 90 percent expectancy of \u00ab\u00a0severe damage\u00a0\u00bb to nuclear-related sites (bomber bases, missile sites, etc), and 2) \u00ab\u00a0‘significant damage’ to 70 percent of the floor space in the 100 largest cities in the Soviet Union and Communist China.\u00a0\u00bb Again, overkill remained intrinsic to the SIOP—to obtain 90 percent, commanders would have to assign several weapons to each DGZ to reach required levels of damage. That SIOP planners assigned about 80 weapons to the \u00ab\u00a0greater Moscow area\u00a0\u00bb suggests the scale of the strikes.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Les documents d\u00e9classifi\u00e9s sont chapeaut\u00e9s par un jugement de l’amiral Roy L. Johnson datant du 6 d\u00e9cembre 1980. Johnson avait \u00e9t\u00e9 de 1961 \u00e0 1963 le directeur adjoint du Strategic Target Planning Staff qui contr\u00f4lait tous les plans de guerre strat\u00e9giques en inter-armes: «The SAC people never seemed to be satisfied that to kill once was enough. They want to kill, overkill, overkill, because all of this has built up the prestige of SAC, it created the need for more forces, for a larger budget. ….<\/em> [T]hat’s the way their thinking went.<\/em>» Ces documents et ces appr\u00e9ciations confirment \u00e9videmment que l’\u00e9tat d’esprit actuel de la bureaucratie de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale et du gouvernement \u00e0 Washington n’est pas accidentel. Il existe une continuit\u00e9 entre la cr\u00e9ation et le d\u00e9veloppement de la puissance nucl\u00e9aire US durant la Guerre froide et la planification actuelle, envisageant la banalisation de l’usage du nucl\u00e9aire et l’utilisation du nucl\u00e9aire en frappe pr\u00e9ventive, y compris contre des adversaires non nucl\u00e9aires.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Mis en ligne le 26 novembre 2007 \u00e0 06H45<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

LeMay et les SAC people : l’obsession de l’\u00a0\u00bboverkill\u00ab\u00a0 On n’en finit pas et on n’en finira pas durant longtemps de d\u00e9couvrir les sous-sols laborieux et effrayants de l’am\u00e9ricanisme, tandis que les divers bands of brothers (BHL, Glucksmann et compagnie) continuent \u00e0 nous chanter ses louanges dans les hauteurs morales, fid\u00e8les \u00e0 leur parcours professionnel.… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3153,3004,7261,7260],"class_list":["post-69446","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-lemay","tag-nucleaire","tag-overkill","tag-siop"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69446","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69446"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69446\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69446"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69446"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69446"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}