{"id":69448,"date":"2007-11-26T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-11-26T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/11\/26\/quand-laffaire-bae-yamamah-risque-de-devenir-americaniste-sur-lautel-de-la-lutte-anti-corruption\/"},"modified":"2007-11-26T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-11-26T00:00:00","slug":"quand-laffaire-bae-yamamah-risque-de-devenir-americaniste-sur-lautel-de-la-lutte-anti-corruption","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/11\/26\/quand-laffaire-bae-yamamah-risque-de-devenir-americaniste-sur-lautel-de-la-lutte-anti-corruption\/","title":{"rendered":"Quand l’affaire BAE-Yamamah<\/em> risque de devenir am\u00e9ricaniste, sur l’autel de la lutte anti-corruption\u2026"},"content":{"rendered":"

L’habitude \u00e9tait prise. Lorsqu’on voulait des nouvelles sur la saga du scandale BAE (principalement l’affaire des march\u00e9s Yamamah<\/em> et des diverses enqu\u00eates de corruption entre le Royaume-Uni et l’Arabie Saoudite<\/a>), on ouvrait les pages du Guardian<\/em> (ou bien la nouvelle \u00e9tait en premi\u00e8re page). C’est un tournant: les derni\u00e8res nouvelles de l’affaire BAE, apr\u00e8s plusieurs semaines de silence qui firent croire \u00e0 son enterrement, sont dans le New York Times<\/em> du 25 novembre<\/a> et c’est seulement dans le Guardian<\/em> du lendemain, c’est-\u00e0-dire d’aujourd’hui<\/a>, qu’on en trouve l’\u00e9cho.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous parlons ici de la perception, c’est-\u00e0-dire de l’int\u00e9r\u00eat des m\u00e9dias et (ensuite) du Congr\u00e8s, en attendant d’autres cercles dirigeants. On sait que l’affaire BAE est dans les mains du d\u00e9partement de la justice US depuis le 15 juin<\/a>. Jusqu’ici, on ne distinguait pas, dans la presse et dans les processus qui font l’opinion \u00e0 Washington, des signes s\u00fbrs permettant de penser que cette affaire \u00e9tait entr\u00e9e dans le cycle de l’information US, avec, dans ce cas, des cons\u00e9quences possibles pour BAE. (Le consortium BAE est tr\u00e8s fortement impliqu\u00e9 aux USA, o\u00f9 il fait pr\u00e8s de 50% de son chiffre d’affaires. Il y serait beaucoup moins prot\u00e9g\u00e9 si l’affaire y \u00e9clatait vraiment, au contraire du Royaume-Uni o\u00f9 le gouvernement est presque totalement engag\u00e9 dans sa protection.) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe climat pourrait \u00eatre en train de changer. L’article du New York Times<\/em>, extr\u00eamement long, donne certaines indications dans ce sens. Il indique notamment que l’affaire BAE s’inscrit dans une mobilisation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale pour une bataille (aux USA et hors des USA) contre la corruption dont il y a beaucoup \u00e0 dire, sans aucun doute, mais qui s’av\u00e8re effectivement<\/strong> \u00eatre une bataille contre la corruption.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abWhile the BAE investigation apparently ran aground in Britain, it has gained enough interest in the United States to cause some of those in the middle of it to secure high-profile legal advisers. Prince Bandar, a confidant of the Bush family, recently retained the former Federal Bureau of Investigation director Louis J. Freeh, as well as one of the fathers of the F.C.P.A., the retired federal judge Stanley Sporkin, to represent him.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThere have been no charges filed, Mr. Freeh said in an interview. The prince denies any impropriety and violating any statutes in the United Kingdom or the United States.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe revelation that British investigators had discovered that BAE deposited $2 billion in payments into Prince Bandar’s Washington bank accounts led the Justice Department to enter what analysts describe as the highest-profile F.C.P.A. case to date. Passed by Congress three decades ago in the wake of Watergate, it is only in the last five years that the F.C.P.A. has become a powerful tool for prosecuting domestic and overseas companies suspected of bribing foreign officials to secure business.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbLawyers, prosecutors and corporate executives in the United States and abroad say they are closely watching the BAE investigation because it offers a test of how aggressively anti-corruption initiatives will be pursued globally, particularly in countries like Britain and Japan that have resisted enforcing such efforts. The BAE case is a watershed moment, says Mark Pieth, who oversees anti-bribery efforts for the O.E.C.D. Large multinationals in many countries have come to us and told us that.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tComme on peut le lire, l’article indique que l’effort anti-corruption est en train de prendre son \u00e9lan aux USA, notamment en activant une loi datant de l’\u00e9poque du Watergate et jusqu’ici peu appliqu\u00e9e (la FCPA d\u00e9j\u00e0 mentionn\u00e9e, ou Foreign Corrupt Practices Act); c’est une situation typiquement am\u00e9ricaniste o\u00f9 la Loi (en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral) n’est appliqu\u00e9e que si cela rencontre des int\u00e9r\u00eats majoritaires, mais elle est alors appliqu\u00e9e avec rigueur. Quelles que soient les causes de cet \u00e9v\u00e9nement possible, causes qui doivent \u00eatre analys\u00e9es avec attention, et qui peuvent s’av\u00e9rer paradoxales, l’article est tr\u00e8s pr\u00e9cis \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, notamment en ce qui concerne la position du monde des affaires US, dont l’influence est d\u00e9terminante:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abAlthough some American companies once actively lobbied to water down the F.C.P.A., arguing that it made it hard to compete overseas, many corporations here have now thrown their weight behind it in the belief that it can be used to prevent competitors from indulging in bribes. So anti-corruption efforts in the United States are now gathering legal steam.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThere has been a dramatic increase in the resources dedicated to enforcing the law by the Justice Department and the F.B.I., and even more important, a strong public commitment to compliance as well as enforcement, says Peter B. Clark, who oversaw F.C.P.A. prosecutions at the Justice Department from the enactment of the law in 1977 until his retirement two years ago.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’article indique que la menace que fait peser cette loi, notamment sur BAE, est principalement de l’ordre de la relation publique, de la bonne r\u00e9putation si l’on veut, ou plut\u00f4t de l’apparence de bonne r\u00e9putation pour r\u00e9pondre aux r\u00e8gles de fonctionnement du virtualisme qui comprend une dimension moralisante formelle \u00e9vidente \u00e0 laquelle tous doivent se soumettre. (Ce n’est pas une question d’argent : il semble bien qu’aucune amende ne fait peur \u00e0 BAE, qui dispose de tous les fonds n\u00e9cessaires \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard.) Ainsi l’article peut-il \u00e9crire \u00e0 propos du risque couru par BAE:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe threat of an indictment under the F.C.P.A., more than financial penalties, is what worries most companies that may come under scrutiny as part of the Justice Department’s crackdown on bribery.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbNo publicly traded company wants to be branded with the stigma of an indictment, says David Zornow, who directs the white-collar criminal practice in New York for the law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom. It’s potentially ruinous.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(Sur les circonstances elles-m\u00eames de l’affaire d\u00e9taill\u00e9e par le NYT, voir notre note<\/a> suivante.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 26 novembre 2007 \u00e0 13H41<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

L’habitude \u00e9tait prise. Lorsqu’on voulait des nouvelles sur la saga du scandale BAE (principalement l’affaire des march\u00e9s Yamamah et des diverses enqu\u00eates de corruption entre le Royaume-Uni et l’Arabie Saoudite), on ouvrait les pages du Guardian (ou bien la nouvelle \u00e9tait en premi\u00e8re page). C’est un tournant: les derni\u00e8res nouvelles de l’affaire BAE, apr\u00e8s plusieurs… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3792,3858,6640,3256,2852,4364,3257],"class_list":["post-69448","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bae","tag-corruption","tag-doj","tag-new","tag-times","tag-yamamah","tag-york"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69448","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69448"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69448\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69448"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69448"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69448"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}