26 novembre<\/a>, et dont on sait qu’on peut l’entendre comme une voix assez proche de l’USAF et de l’industrie de d\u00e9fense concern\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abI don’t think there’s any doubt that there will be more than 183 F-22s, said Richard Aboulafia, director of aviation consulting at the Teal Group in Fairfax, Va. What is doubtful, though, is that the Air Force will get as many of the 381 it says it needs.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIndividually, the cited reasons to buy more F-22s aren’t especially compelling, Aboulafia said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIt will take Russia and India years of effort and billions of rubles and rupees to develop a rival to the F-22 if they can, he said. As for the Chinese J-12, Nothing about it is scary, he said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIf more F-15s fall out of the sky, that’s a more compelling reason to increase F-22 production, he said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe F-22’s real challenge is going to be its price and the U.S. military’s budget for tactical aircraft. The Air Force now spends $3.1 billion a year to buy 20 F-22s annually. But it will only be able to keep that up for a few more years. Then plans call for buying Joint Strike Fighters at a rate of 48 per year or more.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIt would require a substantial increase in the Air Force’s tactical air budget to accommodate both planes, Aboulafia said. And I don’t know anyone who regards procurement<\/em> [spending] as a growth area for the foreseeable future.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tLe prudent Aboulafia p\u00e8se ses mots. Il prend garde \u00e0 prot\u00e9ger sa r\u00e9putation de s\u00e9rieux, lui qui n’est pas vraiment pro-F-22 (il l’est tout de m\u00eame puisque consultant aupr\u00e8s de l’USAF), mais qui est plut\u00f4t pro-JSF. Il \u00e9carte d’une pichenette les alarmes un peu grossi\u00e8res des chasseurs russes ou chinois comme menaces terrifiantes. Par contre, nous dit-il, les F-15 qui ont des ennuis de vieillissement, c’est bien plus s\u00e9rieux. Nous y sommes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tIl est d\u00e9j\u00e0 acquis qu’il y aura dans les deux prochains budgets du Pentagone de l’argent pour 40 \u00e0 50 F-22 suppl\u00e9mentaires. Mais apr\u00e8s? Pourquoi s’arr\u00eater en si bon chemin, alors que l’USAF veut et voudra de plus en plus au moins 381 F-22 (183 actuellement command\u00e9s, autour de 240 avec les suppl\u00e9mentaires des deux prochaines ann\u00e9es). Attention, nous dit Aboulafia, pour la troisi\u00e8me ann\u00e9e budg\u00e9taire il faudra choisir entre encore plus de F-22 et le budget annuel du JSF (essais, mise au point, premiers avions de production).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tLe pauvre JSF (F-35) a beaucoup, beaucoup d’ennuis. Celui-ci n’est pas pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment neuf car l’on sait depuis longtemps qu’il existe une concurrence potentielle entre lui et le F-22. Mais la chose se pr\u00e9cise. On peut avancer sans n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de sortir sa boule de cristal qu’il faudra s’attendre \u00e0 un recul suppl\u00e9mentaire de la production du F-35 pour l’USAF et \u00e0 une tr\u00e8s s\u00e9rieuse r\u00e9duction de la commande USAF. Aboulafia n’en dit pas plus parce qu’il y a tout le Rest Of the World<\/em> engag\u00e9 dans le JSF, et qu’il ne faut pas d\u00e9courager. Pour le reste, la route est trac\u00e9e..<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 29 novembre 2007 \u00e0 18H00<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
D\u00e9cid\u00e9ment, le F-15 pose un probl\u00e8me \u00e0 l’USAF. Apr\u00e8s un premier accident jug\u00e9 inqui\u00e9tant et entra\u00eenant une immobilisation d’une partie de la flotte, puis sa remise en service, intervient \u00e0 nouveau une mesure de restriction de vol portant sur les mod\u00e8les A, B, C et D de cet avion de combat de premi\u00e8re ligne de… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4605,3302,249,2969,250,41],"class_list":["post-69457","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-aboulafia","tag-f-15","tag-f-22","tag-f-35","tag-jsf","tag-usaf"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69457","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69457"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69457\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69457"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69457"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69457"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}