{"id":69472,"date":"2007-12-05T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-12-05T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/12\/05\/les-europeens-avaient-raison-contre-les-usa\/"},"modified":"2007-12-05T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-12-05T00:00:00","slug":"les-europeens-avaient-raison-contre-les-usa","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/12\/05\/les-europeens-avaient-raison-contre-les-usa\/","title":{"rendered":"Les Europ\u00e9ens avaient raison contre les USA"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"titleset_b.deepblue\" style=\"color:#0f3955;font-size:1.65em;font-variant:small-caps;\">Les Europ\u00e9ens avaient raison contre les USA<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Parmi les multiples retomb\u00e9es de la divulgation de la NIE 2007, il y a la r\u00e9flexion <em>a posteriori<\/em> sur la validit\u00e9 de la politique europ\u00e9enne (Allemagne, France, UK) entreprise en octobre 2003, et aussit\u00f4t suivie selon cette m\u00eame NIE de la d\u00e9cision iranienne d&rsquo;arr\u00eater le programme nucl\u00e9aire militaire. Nous notions la chose <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=4684\">hier<\/a> et l&rsquo;historien Gareth Porter d\u00e9veloppe l&rsquo;argument <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/porter\/?articleid=12007\">aujourd&rsquo;hui<\/a> sur <em>Antiwar.com<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&laquo;<em>Despite the White House spin that the new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) supports its policy of increasing pressure on Iran, the estimate not only directly contradicts the George W. Bush administration&rsquo;s line on Iranian intentions regarding nuclear weapons, but points to a link between Tehran&rsquo;s 2003 decision to halt research on weaponization and its decision to negotiate with European foreign ministers on both nuclear and Iranian security concerns.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>By using unusually strong and precise language in characterizing its pivotal judgment that Iran ended work relating to nuclear weapons four years earlier, the estimate deals a serious blow to the administration&rsquo;s claim that Iran is determined to acquire nuclear weapons. The key judgment released Monday said, \u00ab\u00a0We assess with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program [and] that the halt lasted at least several years.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>&raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Apr\u00e8s avoir d\u00e9crit les multiples affrontements entre mod\u00e9r\u00e9s et radicaux \u00e0 T\u00e9h\u00e9ran devant cette approche europ\u00e9enne, et l&rsquo;inclination iranienne \u00e0 finalement accepter les termes de cette approche, Porter conclut sur ces remarques significatives:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&laquo;<em>The signal event of that period was the agreement in Tehran on Oct. 21, 2003, between the foreign ministers of Iran and the three European states.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>In the agreement, Iran renounced nuclear weapons, pledged to sign and begin ratification of the Additional Protocol, and \u00ab\u00a0voluntarily to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>The three European foreign ministers pledged, in turn, to \u00ab\u00a0cooperate with Iran to promote security and stability in the region, including the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>The Bush administration had opposed the initiative of the European three in offering a political agreement with Iran that would offer security and other concessions as part of a broader deal. The administration wanted to bring Iran quickly before the United Nations Security Council so that it would be subject to international sanctions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>Britain, France, and Germany reached an agreement with Iran in mid-November 2004 under which Iran pledged to \u00ab\u00a0provide objective guarantees that Iran&rsquo;s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes\u00a0\u00bb and the EU three promised \u00ab\u00a0firm guarantees on nuclear, technological, and economic cooperation and firm commitments on security issues.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>The European three then began to backtrack from that agreement under pressure from Washington. But the new evidence that Iran made the decision to drop all weapons-related research at that time appears to confirm the correctness of the original European negotiating approach.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>Paul Pillar, the former national intelligence officer for the Middle East who managed the 2005 NIE on the Iranian nuclear program and other NIEs on Iran, told IPS he considers it \u00ab\u00a0plausible\u00a0\u00bb that the decision to halt weapons-related work was part of a broader change in strategy that included a decision to enter into negotiations that promised security benefits in return for demonstrating restraint on enrichment.<\/em>&raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Ainsi peut-on mieux compl\u00e9ter quelques remarques d\u00e9j\u00e0 esquiss\u00e9es, et en ajouter d&rsquo;autres:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&bull; L&rsquo;initiative des trois grands pays de l&rsquo;UE (plus qu&rsquo;une initiative UE, c&rsquo;est l\u00e0 o&ugrave; il faut pr\u00e9ciser et \u00e9ventuellement corriger l&rsquo;analyse de Porter) d&rsquo;octobre 2003 repr\u00e9sentait une perc\u00e9e diplomatique europ\u00e9enne majeure et un espoir de revenir \u00e0 une diplomatie abandonnant la barbarie des m\u00e9thodes am\u00e9ricanistes. A l&rsquo;\u00e9poque, la chose \u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=908\">per\u00e7ue<\/a> dans ce sens.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&bull; Ce sont effectivement les pressions US qui mirent fin \u00e0 cette orientation autonome et constructive des europ\u00e9ens. Ce fut une bien belle chance g\u00e2ch\u00e9e, certes de r\u00e9soudre la crise iranienne et de nous \u00e9pargner quelques ann\u00e9es de g\u00e2chis hyst\u00e9rique et stupide, cette bouillie pour chat sauvage et moralisateur faisant fonction de diplomatie occidentale, mais surtout d&rsquo;\u00e9tablir les fondements d&rsquo;une politique europ\u00e9enne bas\u00e9e sur l&rsquo;\u00e9vidence du \u00ab\u00a0directoire \u00e0 trois\u00a0\u00bb des trois puissances europ\u00e9ennes. Autant pour tous les grands \u00ab\u00a0Europ\u00e9ens\u00a0\u00bb, des intellectuels aux ministres de service et bien en cours dans les d&icirc;ners en ville qui recommandent de voter \u00ab\u00a0oui\u00a0\u00bb aux divers r\u00e9f\u00e9rendums europ\u00e9ens, qui ont \u00e9videmment pr\u00e9f\u00e9r\u00e9 l&rsquo;inspiration \u00e9lev\u00e9e de la politique am\u00e9ricaniste.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&bull; Dans cette capitulation europ\u00e9enne des ann\u00e9es 2004-2005, les Fran\u00e7ais n&rsquo;ont pas la moindre des responsabilit\u00e9s. Britanniques et Allemands ont \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9gaux \u00e0 eux-m\u00eames, &ndash; l&rsquo;instant d&rsquo;une tentation enivr\u00e9e d&rsquo;ind\u00e9pendance de Washington suivie d&rsquo;une rapide rentr\u00e9e dans le rang. Les Fran\u00e7ais, c&rsquo;est diff\u00e9rent puisqu&rsquo;ils nous disent qu&rsquo;ils sont souverains et ind\u00e9pendants. Il y aussi le fardeau accablant de leur intelligence. Ils avaient donc conclu qu&rsquo;il \u00e9tait pr\u00e9f\u00e9rable de sacrifier cette occasion d&rsquo;une politique europ\u00e9enne ind\u00e9pendante \u00e0 un intelligent \u00ab\u00a0retour en gr\u00e2ce\u00a0\u00bb dans le giron US apr\u00e8s l&rsquo;escapade onusienne de 2002-2003. On remarquera que nous parlons ici de la pr\u00e9sidence Chirac, &ndash; pas besoin d&rsquo;attendre Sarkozy pour cette sorte de man&oelig;uvre. D&rsquo;autre part, les Fran\u00e7ais \u00e9taient engag\u00e9s dans l&rsquo;int\u00e9ressante affaire <em>Clairstream<\/em>, qui ne d\u00e9plaisait pas vraiment \u00e0 la CIA, et Chirac cultivait ses liens avec la famille Hariri, qui lui firent pr\u00e9f\u00e9rer une position commune avec les USA sur le Liban d\u00e9but 2005 \u00e0 la tentative de poursuivre la politique iranienne autonome des Europ\u00e9ens de 2003.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Mis en ligne le 5 d\u00e9cembre 2007 \u00e0 09H42<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Les Europ\u00e9ens avaient raison contre les USA Parmi les multiples retomb\u00e9es de la divulgation de la NIE 2007, il y a la r\u00e9flexion a posteriori sur la validit\u00e9 de la politique europ\u00e9enne (Allemagne, France, UK) entreprise en octobre 2003, et aussit\u00f4t suivie selon cette m\u00eame NIE de la d\u00e9cision iranienne d&rsquo;arr\u00eater le programme nucl\u00e9aire militaire.&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[7282,5963,779,7283,2773,5085,3004,2609],"class_list":["post-69472","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-7282","tag-5963","tag-chirac","tag-directoire","tag-iran","tag-nie","tag-nucleaire","tag-ue"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69472","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69472"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69472\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69472"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69472"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69472"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}