Les interpr\u00e9tations concernant la gen\u00e8se, le but et les circonstances de la r\u00e9daction et de la publication de la NIE 2007 deviennent d\u00e9sormais un domaine consid\u00e9rable de l’analyse politique. Une r\u00e9flexion rapide sur ce sujet est celle de Jim Lobe, en date du 5 d\u00e9cembre<\/a>. Lobe, journaliste ind\u00e9pendant adversaire farouche des extr\u00e9mistes type-neocon<\/em> et le reste, est particuli\u00e8rement partisan de l’aile r\u00e9aliste de l’establishment<\/em> US, qui s’est notamment signal\u00e9e il y a un an par le rapport Baker-Hamilton<\/a> sur l’Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLobe estime que la NIE 2007 est fortement inspir\u00e9e par les r\u00e9alistes du groupe Baker-Hamilton, auquel il ajoute Zbigniew Brzezinski<\/a>, dont la position s’est marqu\u00e9e r\u00e9cemment par un activisme anti-Bush tr\u00e8s radical. A l’appui de cette th\u00e8se, Lobe cite des correspondances de texte avec la NIE 2007, qui concerne l’\u00e9valuation de la position iranienne. En effet, Lobe juge comme tr\u00e8s remarquable dans la NIE 2007 le fait que la direction iranienne soit consid\u00e9r\u00e9e non plus \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re id\u00e9ologique des extr\u00e9mistes US (un gouvernement irrationnel fait d’extr\u00e9mistes pr\u00eats \u00e0 tout, ce qui est en fait la description de ceux-l\u00e0 m\u00eame qui professent ce jugement sur les Iraniens) mais comme un ensemble rationnel, capable d’entendre raison et de mener une politique calcul\u00e9e et mesur\u00e9e ; c’est-\u00e0-dire, un gouvernement avec lequel on peut, et m\u00eame l’on doit n\u00e9gocier. (Voir aussi notre Bloc-Notes<\/em> du 4 d\u00e9cembre<\/a>: \u00abL’une des critiques implicites de l’administration est que les agences de renseignement (les 16 agences dont la NIE est la synth\u00e8se de leurs estimations) semblent juger l’Iran comme un \u00e9tat rationnel, et non pas l’\u00e9tat-voyou tel que repr\u00e9sent\u00e9 par GW Bush depuis son discours sur l’axe du mal de janvier 2002, bref, le reproche est celui de ne pas adh\u00e9rer aux phantasmes de la direction am\u00e9ricaniste.<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tJim Lobe:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abWhat I think is particularly remarkable about the NIE aside from its conclusions and willingness to virtually repudiate the main conclusions of the 2005 NIE (a reflection no doubt in addition to new intelligence and analysis of the political space created by the hawks’ decline and the realist rise in the intervening period) is its implicit policy recommendations which (surprise, surprise) echo that the realists (particularly SecDef Gates and Zbigniew Brzezinski who co-chaired the Council on Foreign Relations task force on Iran in July 2004 less than a year after Iran’s decision to suspend its apparently secret military nuclear program) have long argued:<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbOur assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achiedve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAside from the factual findings of the NIE, this is by far the most important passage in the NIE, because it asserts that the Iranian leadership is a fundamentally rational actor a traditional nation-state, if you will that calculates what it does in recognizable terms and that, in any event, is not a an ideologically-crazed, fanatical regime of the kind that neo-conservatives and their aggressive nationalist allies have tried so hard to depict. This depiction, if accepted by the mainstream media, completely undermines the hawks’ efforts to compare the Islamic Republic with the Nazis. (For the latest example of this comparison and a particularly strained one, at that see Max Boot’s piece today’s Wall Street Journal in which, reacting to the NIE, he quotes one senior Arab official as saying, If we accept Iran as a nuclear power that is like accepting Hitler in 1933-34.) And, while it professes not to be certain about what carrots and sticks will do the trick with Iran, the underlying message is, as I read it, engage without preconditions, even while maintaining sanctions. It reinforces what Baker was shouting from the rooftops after publication of the Baker-Hamilton report almost exactly one year ago.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 6 d\u00e9cembre 2007 \u00e0 12H09<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Les interpr\u00e9tations concernant la gen\u00e8se, le but et les circonstances de la r\u00e9daction et de la publication de la NIE 2007 deviennent d\u00e9sormais un domaine consid\u00e9rable de l’analyse politique. Une r\u00e9flexion rapide sur ce sujet est celle de Jim Lobe, en date du 5 d\u00e9cembre. Lobe, journaliste ind\u00e9pendant adversaire farouche des extr\u00e9mistes type-neocon et le… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5963,4094,1006,3897,1094,5085,6074],"class_list":["post-69476","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-5963","tag-baker","tag-brzezinski","tag-hamilton","tag-lobe","tag-nie","tag-realiste"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69476","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69476"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69476\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69476"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69476"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69476"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}