aujourd’hui<\/a> consacre un long texte \u00e0 cet aspect de la question, mettant en lumi\u00e8re des noms d’analystes jusqu’alors inconnus.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abBut pivotal to the US investigation into Iran’s suspect nuclear weapons programme was the work of a little-known intelligence specialist, Thomas Fingar. He was the principal author of an intelligence report published on Monday that concluded Iran, contrary to previous US claims, had halted its covert programme four years ago and had not restarted it. Almost single-handedly he has stopped or, at the very least, postponed any US military action against Iran.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00bbFlynt Leverett, a former CIA analyst and former National Security Council adviser in the Bush administration, was among those celebrating this week, and praised Fingar and his colleagues. We seem to have lucked out and have individuals who resist back-channel politics and tell it how it is, he said. That is what the CIA and other agencies are supposed to do.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbHe continued that Fingar and one of his co-authors, Vann Van Diepen, national intelligence officer for weapons of mass destruction, had opposed the war in Iraq. They both felt the intelligence was misused in the run-up to the Iraq war. The conservatives are now attacking them, saying they are taking their revenge, Leverett said. It is not mutiny for intelligence officers to state their honest views.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbFingar, Van Diepen and Kenneth Brill, a former US ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), were able to put out what they regard as an objective assessment because those occupying senior roles in the Bush administration had changed. Paul Wolfowitz, John Bolton, Douglas Feith and Donald Rumsfeld have given way to those who oppose war with Iran, including Robert Gates, the defence secretary and former CIA director, and the secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00bbIran’s covert programme can be traced back to the mid-1980s when the country was at war with Iraq and fearful that the then Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, might secure a nuclear weapon. The programme involved design, ballistic delivery systems and uranium enrichment; the NIE concluded in 2005 that it was continuing. In July that year US intelligence officials showed IAEA officials an alleged stolen Iranian laptop with thousands of pages relating to nuclear weapons experiments. It was nicknamed the Laptop of Death it is still not clear whether it was genuine.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbFingar and his colleagues have gone back over the material and subjected it to a higher level of scrutiny. They took the same data but reached different conclusions. They also had some new material.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb[Joseph Cirincione, author of Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons<\/em>] said everyone was pointing towards General Ali-Reza Asgari, a former deputy defence minister, who disappeared in Turkey in February. But he insisted Asgari had been a long-term agent run by the West who has since been debriefed and given a new identity. It is not a single source, said Cannistraro. It is multiple: technical, documents, electronic.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tDans la derni\u00e8re partie de la citation, on observe le rappel de l’historique du programme nucl\u00e9aire iranien, qui comporte plusieurs enseignements par rapport \u00e0 l’appr\u00e9ciation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de la politique iranienne qu’on rencontre, dans tous les cas qu’on rencontrait syst\u00e9matiquement avant la NIE 2007. Ce programme, dit le document cit\u00e9, a commenc\u00e9 dans les ann\u00e9es 1980, parce que les dirigeants iraniens craignaient le d\u00e9veloppement d’un programme nucl\u00e9aire par l’Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tOn retrouve par cons\u00e9quent tous les ingr\u00e9dients des responsabilit\u00e9s indirectes mais quasi-exclusives des USA dans les situations des crises actuelles. A cette \u00e9poque des ann\u00e9es 1980 avait lieu la guerre Iran-Irak, \u00e0 la suite d’une attaque de l’Irak, ce qui justifiait les craintes des Iraniens concernant les ambitions nucl\u00e9aires de l’Irak. Saddam avait \u00e9t\u00e9 encourag\u00e9 et \u00e9tait soutenu dans cette guerre contre l’Iran par les Occidentaux, les USA en premiers. Plus tard, comme chacun le sait abondamment, les USA partirent en guerre contre Saddam, notamment \u00e0 cause de ses armes de destruction massive, dont un programme nucl\u00e9aire qui s’av\u00e9ra inexistant. A part les variations des analyses des capacit\u00e9s des uns et des autres, analyses fausses ou vraies, on dispose avec ces d\u00e9tails d’une explication du programme nucl\u00e9aire iranien qui n’a rien \u00e0 voir, ni avec l’irrationalit\u00e9 des dirigeants, ni avec l’islamo-fascisme sorti de nos imaginations enfi\u00e9vr\u00e9es.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tEnfin, on trouve dans tous ces points une des explications principales du jugement fondamental<\/a> de la NIE 2007 sur le comportement de la direction iranienne, pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme rationnel et r\u00e9pondant \u00e0 une analyse mesur\u00e9e de la situation (l’abandon du programme nucl\u00e9aire en 2003 par les Iraniens peut \u00e9galement \u00eatre expliqu\u00e9 par l’\u00e9limination de Saddam et la mise en \u00e9vidence de l’inexistence du nucl\u00e9aire irakien). Ce jugement de rationalit\u00e9 des Iraniens contenu dans la NIE 2007 est effectivement le coup le plus rude port\u00e9 \u00e0 la th\u00e8se anti-iranienne des n\u00e9o-conservateurs et des Isra\u00e9liens de droite. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 8 d\u00e9cembre 2007 \u00e0 12H46<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Quels sont les dessous de la d\u00e9sormais fameuse NIE 2007? Quels sont les analystes qui ont d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 cette nouvelle analyse de la situation iranienne? Le Guardian d’aujourd’hui consacre un long texte \u00e0 cet aspect de la question, mettant en lumi\u00e8re des noms d’analystes jusqu’alors inconnus. \u00abBut pivotal to the US investigation into Iran’s suspect nuclear… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5963,3104,2773,5085,3004],"class_list":["post-69484","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-5963","tag-cia","tag-iran","tag-nie","tag-nucleaire"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69484","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69484"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69484\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69484"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69484"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69484"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}