Un article de l’AFP du 7 d\u00e9cembre 2007, sans d\u00e9tails particuliers concernant le processus d’\u00e9laboration de la NIE 2007 mais bas\u00e9e sur quelques d\u00e9clarations de sources US du renseignement, marque \u00e0 notre sens une affirmation (une confirmation) tr\u00e8s convaincante du fait qu’il y a eu effectivement une d\u00e9marche consciente et r\u00e9ussie de mise en cause de la politique de l’administration. En d’autres termes, il s’agit pour nous de la confirmation qu’il y a bien eu coup d’Etat postmoderne<\/a><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl s’agit d’une d\u00e9p\u00eache AFP que nous avons trouv\u00e9e d’abord sur RAW Story<\/em> le 7 d\u00e9cembre<\/a> (jour de sa diffusion), puis qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 repris ce jour<\/a> sur le site SpaceWar.com<\/em>. Le titre indique lui-m\u00eame l’id\u00e9e de rupture de la communaut\u00e9 du renseignement par rapport \u00e0 la ligne du gouvernement: \u00abUS reversal on Iran intel reflects breaking of the ranks: analysts<\/em>\u00bb. On remarquera dans l’extrait ci-dessous l’affirmation (\u00abThis is ours<\/em>\u00bb) d’une source cit\u00e9e par l’article, indiquant combien la communaut\u00e9 du renseignement tient \u00e0 pr\u00e9ciser qu’elle a refus\u00e9 l’incursion du pouvoir politique dans NIE 2007, imposant au gouvernement un document exempt de toute pression politique. L’avis de Ray Takeyh, un expert du puissant Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), qui repr\u00e9sente l’aide r\u00e9aliste de l’establishment<\/em> US, est particuli\u00e8rement \u00e9clairant \u00e9galement. La description de l’op\u00e9ration que fait Ray Takeyh est effectivement celle d’un coup, et son appartenance au CFR indique l’approbation de cet organisme de la proc\u00e9dure suivie.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe US reversal on Iran’s nuclear weapons program has exposed a breaking of ranks within a waning administration, with US intelligence and military professionals asserting themselves on issues of war and peace, analysts said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbSenior US intelligence officials said this week they were responding to new information, subjected to more rigorous analysis than in the past, in declaring with high confidence that Iran halted a covert nuclear weapons program in 2003.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbBut their willingness to set aside all previous assumptions flowed from a determination not to repeat the errors made in 2002, when bogus intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction set the United States on a course to war, they said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAnd unlike 2002, when US intelligence officials complained of administration pressure to cherry-pick intelligence that supported going to war, the intelligence community this time has asserted its independence.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThis is ours, a senior intelligence official said this week, telling reporters that policymakers had no input in the conclusions of the National Intelligence Estimate, as the assessment is called.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIt’s a fundamental reversal of civil-military relations, and intelligence and political relationships, that were obvious in 2002, said Ray Takeyh, an expert on the Middle East at the Council on Foreign Relations.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbHe said the new intelligence assessment was part of a larger narrative, namely how the formal institutions of government are now determined to resist the White House, which wasn’t the case in 2002.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIn many ways this narrative suggests the irrelevance of the Bush White House, the irrelevance of the president himself, he said.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tEnfin, il faut \u00e9galement noter dans cette d\u00e9p\u00eache l’avis d’un ancien officier de la CIA, Bruce Riedel, qui juge que l’option de l’attaque de l’Iran a \u00e9t\u00e9 pulv\u00e9ris\u00e9e par NIE 2007 et que le Congr\u00e8s a jou\u00e9 un r\u00f4le important dans la publicit\u00e9 de ce document: \u00abAnd the Congress I think can be credited with having forced the administration to go public with these kinds of things, and to put them out there.<\/em>\u00bb Cela rappelle effectivement combien les parlementaires ont mis en \u00e9vidence<\/a>, d\u00e8s les premiers jours de sa publication, l’importance de la NIE 2007.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 11 d\u00e9cembre 2007 \u00e0 05H41<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Un article de l’AFP du 7 d\u00e9cembre 2007, sans d\u00e9tails particuliers concernant le processus d’\u00e9laboration de la NIE 2007 mais bas\u00e9e sur quelques d\u00e9clarations de sources US du renseignement, marque \u00e0 notre sens une affirmation (une confirmation) tr\u00e8s convaincante du fait qu’il y a eu effectivement une d\u00e9marche consciente et r\u00e9ussie de mise en cause… 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