{"id":69494,"date":"2007-12-12T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-12-12T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/12\/12\/lhistoire-de-la-nie-2007-une-bataille-contre-le-virtualisme\/"},"modified":"2007-12-12T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-12-12T00:00:00","slug":"lhistoire-de-la-nie-2007-une-bataille-contre-le-virtualisme","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/12\/12\/lhistoire-de-la-nie-2007-une-bataille-contre-le-virtualisme\/","title":{"rendered":"L’histoire de la NIE 2007: une bataille contre le virtualisme"},"content":{"rendered":"

La bataille du coup d’Etat postmoderne de la NIE 2007 est bien mis dans sa perspective historique par l’historien Gareth Porter, dans son article du 11 d\u00e9cembre<\/a> sur Antiwar.com<\/em>. Le titre (\u00abWhite House Fought NIE Over an Old Charge<\/em>\u00bb) permet de bien situer le probl\u00e8me gr\u00e2ce au qualificatif Old<\/em>. Il s’est agi essentiellement, pour le renseignement US, de parvenir \u00e0 d\u00e9truire une vieille r\u00e9alit\u00e9 virtualiste qui avait \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9tablie par une puissante offensive de communication d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e par la faction activiste de l’administration, d\u00e8s f\u00e9vrier 2003, rafra\u00eechi en 2004 par des affirmations de d\u00e9sinformation lanc\u00e9es pour contrer l’accord n\u00e9goci\u00e9 entre les Iraniens et les trois pays europ\u00e9ens \u00e0 l’automne 2003.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe original Bush administration argument was that Iranian uranium enrichment at Natanz was prima facie evidence of a nuclear weapons program. On Feb. 23, 2003, the State Department charged that Iran had exhibited an ambitious rush to develop a nuclear fuel cycle, whose true purpose can only be to produce fissile material for its nuclear weapons program.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThat line took advantage of the widespread impression that the Natanz facility was illegal when it was revealed by the anti-regime National Council of Resistance in mid-2002, even though its construction was in compliance with Iran’s safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbWhen Iran voluntarily suspended its program of uranium enrichment as part of its agreement with Britain, France and Germany in October 2003, however, it forced the Bush administration to come up with the idea of a secret Iranian nuclear weapons program.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIt was John Bolton, then undersecretary of state for arms control, who articulated the new charge. He told a press conference on March 3, 2004, We think the Iranians are still trying to conceal a clandestine weapons program.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa suite, y compris la pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente National Intelligence Estimate de 2005 sur le cas iranien, est l’histoire d’une bataille interne dans l’administration GW Bush pour faire pr\u00e9valoir une version sur l’autre. La faction maximaliste de l’administration reposait toujours sur les m\u00eames centre de pouvoir, essentiellement autour de Cheney et des influences n\u00e9o-conservatrices, avec le soutien actif du Mossad<\/em> isra\u00e9lien, toujours \u00e0 partir d’affirmations sans v\u00e9rification convaincante, comme dans le cas irakien en 2002-2003.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCe qui est effectivement remarquable dans ce rappel historique de Porter, c’est de voir la similitude de tactique des bellicistes, l’utilisation de l’invective \u00e0 la place de l’argument pour faire progresser leur projet en cr\u00e9ant un \u00e9tat d’esprit favorable. Face \u00e0 cette pouss\u00e9e continuelle influen\u00e7ant directement la politique US, la position des Europ\u00e9ens malgr\u00e9 la justesse<\/a> de leur politique, leur passivit\u00e9 dans l’acceptation des th\u00e8ses extr\u00e9mistes US, leur absence de vision critique de la politique US pourtant bas\u00e9e sur la m\u00eame construction virtualiste que dans le cas irakien, est \u00e9galement remarquable. L’explication la plus simple constamment donn\u00e9e tout au long de cette crise (toujours le m\u00eame montage par la fraction extr\u00e9miste US, provoquant par automatisme un jugement de culpabilit\u00e9 des Iraniens) s’est av\u00e9r\u00e9e la plus conforme \u00e0 la r\u00e9alit\u00e9. Le coup d’Etat postmoderne porta effectivement, essentiellement sur la communication et non sur le fond de l’argument; il s’agissait bien de renverser un courant d’opinion fabriqu\u00e9 de bout en bout.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abAnother tactic used by Cheney was to cite a new claim by Israeli intelligence that its spies inside Iran had learned that Iran had developed and tested a trigger device for a nuclear bomb. Conveniently, the alleged tests would not leave any trace of radioactivity, thus explaining why the sophisticated radiation monitoring devices placed in Iran by the United States and Israel had not detected it.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe CIA did not regard the report as reliable, especially in the absence of details that would allow verification. But Cheney asked for the original raw Israeli intelligence report, according to Hersh the same thing Cheney and top Pentagon officials had done in constructing their case for the invasion of Iraq in 2002.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbCheney’s tactics bottled up the NIE until early 2007. Last spring, however, the intelligence community came up with much more compelling evidence that no secret nuclear weapons program including covert enrichment-related activities had existed after fall 2003.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe White House responded by arguing that the new evidence might be based on an Iranian disinformation campaign, which forced a long process of proving that it was not information deliberately planted by Iran. That held up the acceptance of the NIE for several more months.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbRecent briefings by intelligence officials have carefully refrained from naming any particular White House official who pushed the disinformation theory, but it was Cheney who was in charge of managing intelligence issues in order to protect the existing policy line.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 12 d\u00e9cembre 2007 \u00e0 07H07<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

La bataille du coup d’Etat postmoderne de la NIE 2007 est bien mis dans sa perspective historique par l’historien Gareth Porter, dans son article du 11 d\u00e9cembre sur Antiwar.com. Le titre (\u00abWhite House Fought NIE Over an Old Charge\u00bb) permet de bien situer le probl\u00e8me gr\u00e2ce au qualificatif Old. Il s’est agi essentiellement, pour le… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5963,6709,5085,6333,610],"class_list":["post-69494","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-5963","tag-europeens","tag-nie","tag-porter","tag-virtualisme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69494","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69494"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69494\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69494"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69494"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69494"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}