{"id":69496,"date":"2007-12-12T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-12-12T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/12\/12\/courage-rentrons\/"},"modified":"2007-12-12T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-12-12T00:00:00","slug":"courage-rentrons","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/12\/12\/courage-rentrons\/","title":{"rendered":"Courage, rentrons<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Courage, rentrons<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t12 d\u00e9cembre 2007 Gordon Brown a un plan pour quitter l’Afghanistan. The Independent<\/em> annonce la chose aujourd’hui<\/a>, avec un \u00e9ditorial approbateur<\/a>. Le quotidien annon\u00e7ait ce matin que le Premier ministre d\u00e9taillerait ce plan devant les Communes aujourd’hui m\u00eame. Le plan consiste \u00e0 parler aux talibans pour trouver un terrain d’entente et envisager un retrait de l’Afghanistan.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBien \u00e9videmment, ce programme est tr\u00e8s lourdement nuanc\u00e9 du fait que les talibans sont loin d’\u00eatre ce qu’ils paraissent \u00eatre lorsqu’on s’en tient \u00e0 cette \u00e9tiquette. Les Britanniques pensent qu’il s’agit en fait d’une r\u00e9sistance tr\u00e8s fractionn\u00e9e, tr\u00e8s diverse, souvent localis\u00e9e, et regroup\u00e9e sous l’\u00e9tiquette taliban pour la facilit\u00e9. Il y a donc, selon ces m\u00eames analyses, une possibilit\u00e9 d’envisager des accords locaux pouvant mener \u00e0 un apaisement g\u00e9n\u00e9ral acceptable, permettant de passer la patate chaude de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 en Afghanistan au gouvernement afghan.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSelon The Independent<\/em>:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abSix years after British troops were first deployed to oust the Taliban regime, the Prime Minister believes the time has come to open a dialogue in the hope of moving from military action to consensus-building among the tribal leaders. Since 1 January, more than 6,200 people have been killed in violence related to the insurgency, including 40 British soldiers. In total, 86 British troops have died. The latest casualty was Sergeant Lee Johnson, whose vehicle hit a mine before the fall of Taliban-held town of Musa Qala.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThe Cabinet yesterday approved a three-pronged plan that Mr Brown will outline for security to be provided by Nato’s International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) and the Afghan national army, followed by economic and political development in Afghanistan.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBut the intention to engage Taliban leaders in a constructive dialogue, which Mr Brown will make clear in a parliamentary statement today, will be by far the most controversial element of the plan. A senior Downing Street source confirmed the move last night and one Brown aide who accompanied the Prime Minister on his recent visit to Kabul, said: We need to ask who are we fighting? Do we need to fight them? Can we be talking to them?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbSenior government officials said it was an error to see the Taliban as a unified organisation rather than as a disparate group of Afghan tribesmen, often farmers recruited at the end of the gun, infiltrated by foreign fighters. The aim is to divide the Taliban’s local support from al-Qa’ida and militants from Pakistan.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSi cette orientation se confirme, il y aurait alors une analyse g\u00e9n\u00e9rale pour affirmer que la nouvelle position britannique sous la direction de Gordon Brown est d’\u00e9tablir une certaine distance vis-\u00e0-vis de la politique US, ou, plus justement dit, des impr\u00e9cations US \u00e0 l’intention des alli\u00e9s de la guerre contre la terreur. C’est ce que craignent les Britanniques, comme The Independent<\/em> le pr\u00e9cise. Mais on voit mal, malgr\u00e9 les pr\u00e9cautions de l’\u00e9quipe Brown pour pr\u00e9senter ses intentions de compromis avec l’espoir d’un retrait d’Afghanistan, ce qui pourrait arr\u00eater la d\u00e9gradation de l’image d’alli\u00e9 inconditionnel des USA qui affecte le Royaume-Uni depuis le d\u00e9part de Blair, dans tous les cas aux yeux des publicistes extr\u00e9mistes de Washington qui continuent \u00e0 influencer l’opinion, ou plus simplement \u00e0 la faire puisque l’opinion US semble incapable de se faire elle-m\u00eame. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe determination to draw a line under the Bush-Blair years is threatening to heighten tensions between No 10 and the hardline neocons who still dominate the White House. The pace of the Basra handover has already caused dismay in hawkish Washington circles. The administration was also sceptical of the British deal with tribal elders that led to Musa Qala falling into the hands of the Taliban earlier this year and has also been pushing Britain to carry out an opium poppy eradication programme by spraying fields, a policy that Downing Street has said would drive farmers into the arms of the militants. But with Mr Bush in the final year of his presidency, his influence on events on the ground is waning.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThere are also hopes that since the departure of hawks such as Donald Rumsfeld, the US Defence Department is prepared to accept change. There has been full consultation with the White House, and they have been talked through all of this, a senior source at No 10 said last night.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbInside the heavily fortified walls of the presidential palace in the capital, Kabul, Mr Brown was given a fresh commitment by Mr Karzai to prevent parts of Afghanistan from returning to the control of the militants who led to the country being used as a training camp for terrorism before the attacks on the US in September 2001.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n

La fin de l’extravagante aventure anglo-saxonne?<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette intention britannique d’amorcer une situation pouvant mener au retrait d’Afghanistan compl\u00e8te la politique britannique en Irak (de retrait \u00e9galement) et, d’une certaine fa\u00e7on, la politique US en Irak (la victoire \u00e0 la Petraeus<\/a>).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tS’agit-il d’un tournant? Bien qu’en en prenant pr\u00e9texte, on ne parle pas ici seulement de la d\u00e9cision de Brown de lancer une strat\u00e9gie de dialogue qui est un faux-nez pour une tentative de repli d’Afghanistan, mais bien d’une tendance plus g\u00e9n\u00e9rale. Cette tendance est illustr\u00e9e par les premiers replis britanniques en Irak, la victoire \u00e0 la Petraeus des USA en Irak, l’affirmation grandissante<\/a> du gouvernement irakien vis-\u00e0-vis des USA, etc. L’affaire de la NIE 2007 concourt \u00e9galement, m\u00eame si indirectement, \u00e0 la m\u00eame tendance, en bloquant presque compl\u00e8tement la possibilit\u00e9 d’une mont\u00e9e de la tension dans la r\u00e9gion du Moyen-Orient par le moyen d’un engagement US renouvel\u00e9, par une attaque contre l’Iran. On ajouterait, bien s\u00fbr, pour la sc\u00e8ne am\u00e9ricaniste, que le changement de perspective<\/a> en cours aux USA pour la campagne \u00e9lectorale, sur fond de menace de crise fondamentale<\/a>, renforce encore l’hypoth\u00e8se analytique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAinsi se dessinerait un mouvement g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de retrait de la part des Anglo-Saxons, apr\u00e8s l’extravagante entreprise lanc\u00e9e par Bush-Blair \u00e0 l’automne 2001. Nous serions tr\u00e8s fortement tent\u00e9 d’\u00e9carter tout plan structur\u00e9 et orient\u00e9 \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, toute tactique d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9e, que ce soit de retrait r\u00e9el ou d’apparence de retrait. Aucun des deux syst\u00e8mes anglo-saxons, l’am\u00e9ricaniste et le britannique, n’est plus capable de telles machinations. La machine anglo-saxonne est, du point de vue du renseignement et de la communication, et du point de vue de la planification par cons\u00e9quent, plong\u00e9e dans le plus complet chaos, compl\u00e8tement prisonni\u00e8re de son virtualisme, de ses propres montages, des dissensions en son sein pouvant mener \u00e0 des coups d’Etat postmodernes et ainsi de suite.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPlus simplement, il s’agit \u00e0 notre sens de la soumission \u00e0 l’\u00e9vidence de la dynamique de la situation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale. Les deux pays, les USA et le Royaume-Uni, chacun avec ses sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9s et ses priorit\u00e9s, ne peuvent plus tenir face au d\u00e9sastre que leur politique commune a engendr\u00e9. Ils sont en train de se soumettre \u00e0 une \u00e9volution historique qu’ils ont largement contribu\u00e9 \u00e0 acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer, mais qui les d\u00e9passe \u00e9videmment, et dans la conception, et dans la dynamique, et dans les effets.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVery<\/em> maistrien, indeed<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Courage, rentrons 12 d\u00e9cembre 2007 Gordon Brown a un plan pour quitter l’Afghanistan. The Independent annonce la chose aujourd’hui, avec un \u00e9ditorial approbateur. Le quotidien annon\u00e7ait ce matin que le Premier ministre d\u00e9taillerait ce plan devant les Communes aujourd’hui m\u00eame. Le plan consiste \u00e0 parler aux talibans pour trouver un terrain d’entente et envisager un… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3236,7293,4038,4255,4849,4146],"class_list":["post-69496","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-afghanistan","tag-aznglo-saxon","tag-brown","tag-defaite","tag-retrait","tag-talibans"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69496","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69496"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69496\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69496"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69496"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69496"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}