{"id":69509,"date":"2007-12-17T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-12-17T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/12\/17\/les-rafale-du-colonel\/"},"modified":"2007-12-17T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-12-17T00:00:00","slug":"les-rafale-du-colonel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2007\/12\/17\/les-rafale-du-colonel\/","title":{"rendered":"Les <em>Rafale<\/em> du colonel"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>La visite du colonel Khadafi \u00e0 Paris fut ce que l&rsquo;on sait, une pantalonnade fastueusement grotesque qui est une part du spectacle de notre monde et un signe de notre temps historique, bien plus qu&rsquo;une marque de l&rsquo;exception fran\u00e7aise. Mais les Fran\u00e7ais, s&rsquo;ils ont quelques qualit\u00e9s, n&rsquo;ont certainement pas celle de l&rsquo;exceptionnelle capacit\u00e9 d&rsquo;hypocrisie des Anglo-Saxons. L&rsquo;aventure <em>Rafale<\/em>-Khadafi (l&rsquo;intention annonc\u00e9e du Libyen d&rsquo;acheter 14 <em>Rafale<\/em>, un des points de pol\u00e9mique du s\u00e9jour), c&rsquo;est du tout petit th\u00e9 \u00e0 la menthe compar\u00e9e au <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=3610\" class=\"gen\">complexe<\/a> <em>Typhoon<\/em>-Arabie, type <em>Yamamah<\/em> reconverti, avec r\u00e9ception des mille-et-un princes saoudiens \u00e0 Londres (en octobre), rachat de la moiti\u00e9 de la <em>City<\/em> par Douba\u00ef, activit\u00e9s humanitaires diverses de <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=4664\" class=\"gen\">BAE<\/a> et ainsi de suite. Cela dit, l&rsquo;article de <em>Time Magazine<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.time.com\/time\/world\/article\/0,8599,1694635,00.html\" class=\"gen\">14 d\u00e9cembre<\/a> sur l&rsquo;affaire des <em>Rafale<\/em> promis \u00e0 Khadafi vaut la lecture.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>But Sarkozy&rsquo;s welcome of Gaddafi concerns a bigger ticket issue than human rights  arms deals worth potentially about $5.86 billion and thousands of French jobs. Gaddafi has agreed to negotiate exclusively with France for six months to buy 14 Rafale fighter jets, made by Dassault Aviation, and 35 combat and transport helicopters. For France, the deal is crucial in reviving its faltering arms industry against the United States and Russia. Six years after the first Rafale jet was built, France has yet to sell a single new fighter abroad.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Despite his feisty talk, Gaddafi is a near-perfect customer for Sarkozy, if not quite yet his savior. Flush with revenues from record-high oil prices, the Libyan leader is rebuilding his military virtually from scratch, since decades-long Western sanctions banned him from purchasing arms and replacing broken equipment. \u00a0\u00bbLibya&rsquo;s military inventories during the embargoes degraded to the point of being useless,\u00a0\u00bb says Matthew Smith, economics analyst for Jane&rsquo;s, the London-based defense research group. The organization this week estimates Libya&rsquo;s military spending was about $620 million last year  small change for the gargantuan defense industry. And since Libya has few military factories, Gaddafi is also unlikely to demand offsets  a common practice in arms deals, where a country agrees to buy expensive military items, in return for doing future maintenance on its own soil.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Sarkozy must surely hope Gaddafi does not veer off script again, by ultimately shopping for arms elsewhere, after the negotiations expire next June. France is the world&rsquo;s fourth-biggest arms exporter. But the top three  the United States, Britain, and Russia  account for nearly three-quarters of global arms sales, and they could increase that share in the future, leaving France ever-further behind.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Europe itself is not a big arms customer. The real hunger lies in oil-rich and third-world countries eager to modernize their armies. Unlike the 1980s, when France nurtured military ties with African governments  selling massive arms systems in return for political backing  France has few natural allies to whom to sell weapons. Two months ago Morocco  France&rsquo;s former colony and close neighbor  rejected the Rafale and instead bought Lockheed Martin&rsquo;s F-16 fighter jet, which has seen years of combat, including in Afghanistan and Iraq. Even the French Air Force hasn&rsquo;t bought all the Rafale jets it promised, says Andrew Brookes, military analyst for the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. It&rsquo;s like buying a car that no one has bought from a showroom. For the same reason, France has been squeezed out of the arms industry&rsquo;s hottest contest underway  a $10-billion deal to overhaul India&rsquo;s Air Force, with 126 new combat jets. Military analysts believe India will choose between Russia&rsquo;s MIG-35 and the F-16.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>And so Gaddafi has emerged has the bright hope for French weapons. The defense minister Morin told reporters on Thursday that the government has learned bitter lessons, like France&rsquo;s failure to coordinate negotiations at a top level, or to streamline its cumbersome bureaucracy. We have to make sure we are in tune, speak the same language, and are quick enough not to be overtaken by someone else, Morin said. Libya&rsquo;s negotiations will be run out of the Elysee Palace, rather the Defense Ministry.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;attaque anglo-saxonne contre l&rsquo;industrie d&rsquo;armement fran\u00e7aise est impeccable. Appuy\u00e9e effectivement sur l&rsquo;hypocrisie des cousins britanniques et am\u00e9ricaniste, habile \u00e0 m\u00e9langer dans ses accusations et son d\u00e9nigrement des domaines qu&rsquo;elle s\u00e9pare avec minutie pour son propre compte,  la morale en politique, le r\u00e9alisme, les n\u00e9cessit\u00e9s industrielles, l&rsquo;importance de l&rsquo;industrie d&rsquo;armement,   cette attaque n&rsquo;a qu&rsquo;\u00e0 p\u00eacher ses arguments dans le comportement incoh\u00e9rent des Fran\u00e7ais dans ce domaine de l&rsquo;exportation des armements depuis une quinzaine d&rsquo;ann\u00e9es pour laisse se d\u00e9rouler son acte d&rsquo;accusation. Ainsi voit-on p\u00eale-m\u00eale les Fran\u00e7ais accus\u00e9s d&rsquo;immoralit\u00e9 fonci\u00e8re et r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice parce qu&rsquo;ils cherchent \u00e0 exporter des armements et de maladresse chronique et r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice parce qu&rsquo;ils ne parviennent pas \u00e0 exporter leurs armements,  par rapport \u00e0 la r\u00e9ussite fastueuse de leurs concurrents US, UK et russes. Les ennuis du <em>Rafale<\/em>, c&rsquo;est bien <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=4457\" class=\"gen\">document\u00e9<\/a>, sont dus \u00e0 cette incoh\u00e9rente politique des Fran\u00e7ais, dont se gardent bien les Britanniques avec leur <em>Typhoon<\/em> et leurs contrats <em>Yamamah<\/em> et consorts, et les USA avec leur famille nombreuse, du F-16 au JSF.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tA signaler l&rsquo;argument particuli\u00e8rement r\u00e9jouissant de cette roborative hypocrisie anglo-saxonne de Brookes, l&rsquo;expert respectueusement cit\u00e9 de l&rsquo;IISS: \u00ab<em>If Libyan Rafales were to end up with a third party who used them against Western forces, the French government could be seriously embarrassed.<\/em>\u00bb Que dire des futurs <em>Typhoon<\/em> saoudiens, s&rsquo;ils tombent dans les mains d&rsquo;un <em>third party<\/em> subventionn\u00e9 par la famille Ben Laden, ou des <a href=\"http:\/\/www.atimes.com\/atimes\/South_Asia\/GC30Df04.html\" class=\"gen\">F-16<\/a> du pr\u00e9sident pakistanais et nucl\u00e9aire Musharraf? Par ailleurs, Brookes sait bien que les Fran\u00e7ais prennent leur pr\u00e9caution au niveau de l&rsquo;\u00e9lectronique des avions qu&rsquo;ils vendent, au cas malheureux o\u00f9 l&rsquo;avion tomberait effectivement dans ces mauvaises troisi\u00e8mes mains&#8230; Reconnaissons tout de m\u00eame \u00e0 la journaliste qui a sign\u00e9 l&rsquo;article (Vivienne Walt) un sens des r\u00e9alit\u00e9s et une juste mesure des choses puisqu&rsquo;elle fait imm\u00e9diatement suivre ce commentaire de Brookes, comme pour le r\u00e9duire \u00e0 sa simple fonction de propagande, de cette phrase qui termine l&rsquo;article: \u00ab<em>More embarrassing, perhaps, would be losing the deal altogether.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 17 d\u00e9cembre 2007 \u00e0 07H08<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>La visite du colonel Khadafi \u00e0 Paris fut ce que l&rsquo;on sait, une pantalonnade fastueusement grotesque qui est une part du spectacle de notre monde et un signe de notre temps historique, bien plus qu&rsquo;une marque de l&rsquo;exception fran\u00e7aise. Mais les Fran\u00e7ais, s&rsquo;ils ont quelques qualit\u00e9s, n&rsquo;ont certainement pas celle de l&rsquo;exceptionnelle capacit\u00e9 d&rsquo;hypocrisie des&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3426,5597,7304,3219,3129],"class_list":["post-69509","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-anglo-saxon","tag-exportation","tag-khadafi","tag-rafale","tag-typhoon"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69509","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69509"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69509\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69509"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69509"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69509"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}