U.S. JCS Chief Tries To Calm Israelis Over Iran.<\/em>\u00bb) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00abIn a brief visit here by U.S. Navy Adm. Michael Mullen, the first by a chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in a decade, Israeli officials discussed not only the differences driving U.S. and Israeli force planning, but conflicting conclusions by their respective intelligence communities regarding Iran’s nuclear weapon program.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00bbU.S. officials insisted the trip was not aimed at controlling damage from the controversial National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), but Mullen’s visit allowed officials to vent frustrations over findings that Tehran had suspended its nuclear weapon program and was now less intent on acquiring atomic arms.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIn a Dec. 11 interview, an Israeli official conceded that presentations by Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, director of military intelligence, contained no new data or supporting evidence that had not already been shared with U.S. allies. Nevertheless, he said, the briefing provided a thorough chronological accounting and methodological explanation of how Israeli analysts arrived at conclusions that ran counter to the NIE, released Dec. 3.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAccording to the official, Mullen repeatedly tried to assuage Israeli angst over the damage the downgraded U.S. threat estimate would inflict on efforts to rally international opposition to Iran’s uranium enrichment program.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe chairman insisted he still viewed Iran as a significant threat to the region, and that was nice. But so what? The damage from the NIE is already done, he said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbA JCS spokesman, Capt. John Kirby, confirmed that Mullen remains concerned about the continued threat by Iran’s actions, words and intentions in the region.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tLe reste de la d\u00e9p\u00eache aborde surtout la question des capacit\u00e9s et des structures des forces isra\u00e9liennes (IDF), dont le chef d’\u00e9tat-major isra\u00e9lien a discut\u00e9 avec Muellen. Les Isra\u00e9liens ont expliqu\u00e9 \u00e0 leurs interlocuteurs US qu’ils ne peuvent organiser leurs forces en fonction de capacit\u00e9s doubles, guerre conventionnelle de haut niveau et guerre assym\u00e9trique, mais seulement pr\u00e9voir une organisation pour la guerre conventionnelle \u00e0 haut niveau avec adaptation aux guerres assym\u00e9triques selon les th\u00e9\u00e2tres.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00abIn a sanitized account of his discussions with Mullen, <\/em>[IDF Chief of Staff, General] Ashkenazi cited the Iranian nuclear threat and other negative developments in the region that may compel the IDF to wage simultaneous symmetric and asymmetric combat on multiple fronts. At the same time, the IDF must defend the Israeli home front from increasingly lethal and long-range rocket and missile attacks, he said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAddressing participants at a Dec. 12 conference by Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Ashkenazi said the IDF is reorganizing and re-equipping itself to deliver rapid, decisive victory.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThe basis for this will be determined by our ability to be decisive in symmetric engagements, he said. By preparing to win conventional wars, the IDF will acquire decisive capabilities also for asymmetrical engagements, and not vice versa.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbAt the same time, Ashkenazi said, the IDF knows how to build small numbers of smart, special units such as undercover commandos operating in the West Bank with the unique knowledge and all the special tools in the toolbox that they require.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbHe also cautioned that asymmetrical tactics, operating concepts and force structure differs in each of IDF’s geographic theaters. Not every asymmetric war is the same. There are differences in how we fight in Gaza, against Hizbollah in Lebanon and in the West Bank, and the key is to know how to distinguish among the differences and exploit them.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbBut Ashkenazi insisted that one thing remains common to all of the IDF’s asymmetric war-fighting scenarios: We’ll always need a physical presence, both for intelligence and for operative control. We cannot rely on firepower to be decisive in asymmetric war.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIn a direct reference to Iran, Ashkenazi said the coming years will require the IDF to strengthen its long-arm attack capabilities andearly warning, intelligence and networked command-and-control systems.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbIt’s up to the international community to act in a determined way to stop Iran’s nuclearization, he said. But at the same time, we have the responsibility to prepare for any scenario in the event that international efforts do not succeed.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tOn retient de toutes ces explications complexes et quelque peu n\u00e9buleuses au moins deux impressions centrales:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t La premi\u00e8re est que les Isra\u00e9liens ont admis que la NIE 2007 implique sans aucun doute l’abandon d’une possibilit\u00e9 d’attaque a\u00e9rienne contre l’Iran, non seulement avec les USA, mais y compris pour eux seuls avec l’autorisation US. Les militaires isra\u00e9liens parlent d\u00e9sormais des coming years<\/em> pour se pr\u00e9parer \u00e0 un possible affrontement avec les Iraniens et reconnaissent que c’est \u00e0 la communaut\u00e9 internationale de r\u00e9gler le probl\u00e8me du nucl\u00e9aire. L’ampleur du choc de la NIE 2007 se mesure \u00e0 cette position.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Il ne nous appara\u00eet pas \u00e9vident que l’IDF ait vraiment bien r\u00e9cup\u00e9r\u00e9 de son \u00e9chec contre le Hezbollah. Elle continue \u00e0 s’\u00e9battre dans des concepts complexes et directement h\u00e9rit\u00e9s des penseurs du Pentagone. L’\u00e9chec essuy\u00e9 par les Isra\u00e9liens avec la NIE 2007 accentue certainement cette tendance en multipliant les \u00e9quations d’affrontement possible et en \u00e9largissant le spectre de ces affrontements, avec l’inclusion de l’Iran comme acteur central dans ces hypoth\u00e8ses.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 18 d\u00e9cembre 2007 \u00e0 13H31<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Une br\u00e8ve visite en Isra\u00ebl du pr\u00e9sident du Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), l’amiral Muellen, a montr\u00e9 indirectement la force du choc que la publication de la NIE 2007 a provoqu\u00e9 chez les Isra\u00e9liens. Un article de Defense News du 17 d\u00e9cembre nous donne quelques pr\u00e9cisions \u00e0 ce propos. (Le titre ne dissimule rien :… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5963,5633,2773,2774,5751,5085],"class_list":["post-69515","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-5963","tag-idf","tag-iran","tag-israel","tag-muellen","tag-nie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69515","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69515"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69515\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69515"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69515"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69515"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}