Apr\u00e8s l’effet tonitruant, aux USA et dans les diverses r\u00e9gions et diplomaties int\u00e9ress\u00e9es par la crise iranienne, de la publication<\/a> de la NIE 2007 sur le nucl\u00e9aire iranien, le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense US Robert Gates a fait une rapide visite au Moyen-Orient pour une mission de damage control<\/em> paradoxale. Le paradoxe est dans ce que, d’une part Gates a favoris\u00e9 la publication de la NIE, faite notamment pour d\u00e9samorcer la possibilit\u00e9 d’une attaque de l’Iran \u00e0 laquelle il s’oppose; et que, d’autre part, il a du ensuite mettre en \u00e9vidence la menace iranienne pour \u00e9viter une d\u00e9mobilisation des alli\u00e9s arabes des USA, ou\/et une perte de cr\u00e9dit de la puissance US apr\u00e8s la NIE.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tGates a particip\u00e9 \u00e0 une conf\u00e9rence \u00e0 Manhama, au Bahrain, le 11 d\u00e9cembre. Il y a pris la parole pour remplir son contrat, et insister \u00e0 nouveau sur le danger de la menace iranienne, avec en arri\u00e8re-plan l’\u00e9clairage paradoxal de la NIE 2007. L’int\u00e9r\u00eat de son intervention est dans la fa\u00e7on dont elle a \u00e9t\u00e9 accueillie, mise ici en \u00e9vidence par le commentateur George S. Hishmeh, dans un article d’opinion pour Gulf News<\/em>, publi\u00e9 le 13 d\u00e9cembre<\/a>. On y entend le rire sonore de divers ministres de pays arabes du Golfe apr\u00e8s que Gates, coinc\u00e9 par une question, ait assur\u00e9 que les capacit\u00e9s nucl\u00e9aires d’Isra\u00ebl ne constituent pas une menace pour la r\u00e9gion.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abGates chose to stress the danger of Iran’s nuclear programme and in the same breath appealed to his Arab audience to force Iran to abandon its uranium enrichment plans, which the Tehran government has repeatedly argued was a peaceful programme. His remarks came a few days after the release of a declassified consensus view of 16 US intelligence agencies that maintained Tehran had halted atomic weapons development in 2003 and had not resumed it since. This surprise revelation was seen as a slap in the face of President George W. Bush, who only recently was talking about a third world war should Iran proceed with its alleged secret plans. In fact, an earlier intelligence report had erroneously insisted that Iran had restarted its programme in 2005, a point still being made by Israeli intelligence.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbSoon after Gates’s speech, the defence secretary was challenged by Bahraini Minister of Labour Majid Al Alawi, who wanted to know whether Gates thought the Zionist (Israeli) nuclear weapon is a threat to the region.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe defence secretary paused, and answered tersely: No. I don’t.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe statement was greeted by laughter from a room filled with senior Arab government officials.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAnother Arab official, Abdul Rahman Al Attiyah, the secretary-general of the Council, responded: Not considering Israel a threat to security in the region is considered a biased policy that is based on a double standard.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbAlso, Qatari Prime Minister Shaikh Hamad Bin Jassem Al Thani took to task Gates’s disparaging comparison of Iran and Israel. We can’t really compare Iran with Israel. Iran is our neighbour, and we shouldn’t really look at it as an enemy, he said, continuing I think Israel through 50 years has taken land, kicking out the Palestinians, and interferes under the excuse of security, blaming the other party.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tHishmeh rappelle \u00e9galement combien Gates, en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral comme tous les officiels US, marche sur des ufs lorsqu’il est oblig\u00e9 d’\u00e9voquer la question de l’armement nucl\u00e9aire d’Isra\u00ebl (y compris durant cette conf\u00e9rence, dans la fa\u00e7on dont il r\u00e9pondit): \u00abA year ago, Gates had reportedly angered Israelis during testimony before the US Congress by including Israel in a list of nuclear-armed countries in the region around Iran to explain why Tehran might have sought the means to build an atomic bomb. The defence secretary has not publicly discussed the subject since, and when responding to the questions from the Bahrain audience, according to Reuters, he carefully referred to its nuclear programme, thus allowing himself room to dismiss any suggestion that he implicitly confirmed the existence of nuclear weapons in Israel.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCette situation anecdotique d\u00e9crit assez bien la tromperie fondamentale sur laquelle est construite la crise iranienne, avec la situation d’Isra\u00ebl comme puissance nucl\u00e9aire majeure au Moyen-Orient. Cette situation d’Isra\u00ebl doit \u00eatre jug\u00e9e, du point de vue de la stabilit\u00e9 des relations internationales, comme mena\u00e7ante et m\u00eame ill\u00e9gale dans l’esprit de la chose (elle ne l’est pas dans la lettre puisque Isra\u00ebl n’est pas signataire du trait\u00e9 de non-prolif\u00e9ration), si l’on se place du point de vue selon lequel la prolif\u00e9ration du nucl\u00e9aire est un danger. Au-del\u00e0 des p\u00e9rip\u00e9ties, le caract\u00e8re g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de la crise iranienne appara\u00eet ainsi \u00e9vident, chaque fois que cette crise est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e dans son cadre r\u00e9el. Le proc\u00e8s fait \u00e0 l’Iran concerne un programme nucl\u00e9aire militaire arr\u00eat\u00e9 en 2003, au nom d’une part d’une menace nucl\u00e9aire iranienne hypoth\u00e9tique pour apr\u00e8s 2015, d’autre part d’une signature iranienne du trait\u00e9 de non-prolif\u00e9ration, alors que le pays qui d\u00e9nonce hyst\u00e9riquement le danger nucl\u00e9aire iranien poss\u00e8de d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 un arsenal \u00e9valu\u00e9 \u00e0 200 t\u00eates nucl\u00e9aires. Ce proc\u00e8s rel\u00e8ve d’une situation o\u00f9 le grotesque le dispute \u00e0 l’hypocrisie, et il constitue, de la part des diplomaties europ\u00e9ennes occidentales qui y sont partie prenante, une insulte \u00e0 l’intelligence. (On met les USA \u00e0 part, \u00e0 cause des sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9s de leur politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re qui rend leur probl\u00e8me encore plus grave.) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLe seul argument acceptable dans le proc\u00e8s fait \u00e0 l’Iran serait finalement l’argument de l’irrationalit\u00e9 des dirigeants iraniens. Apr\u00e8s d’autres<\/a>, la NIE 2007 nous a \u00e9galement<\/a> appris que le renseignement US consid\u00e8re ces dirigeants iraniens comme rationnels. La question de l’irrationalit\u00e9 de ceux qui d\u00e9noncent hyst\u00e9riquement l’Iran devient \u00e0 cette lumi\u00e8re compl\u00e8tement l\u00e9gitime.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 20 d\u00e9cembre 2007 \u00e0 10H18<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Apr\u00e8s l’effet tonitruant, aux USA et dans les diverses r\u00e9gions et diplomaties int\u00e9ress\u00e9es par la crise iranienne, de la publication de la NIE 2007 sur le nucl\u00e9aire iranien, le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense US Robert Gates a fait une rapide visite au Moyen-Orient pour une mission de damage control paradoxale. Le paradoxe est dans ce… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[7312,3984,2773,2774,3004],"class_list":["post-69522","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bahrain","tag-gates","tag-iran","tag-israel","tag-nucleaire"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69522","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69522"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69522\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69522"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69522"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69522"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}