Les vieux de la vieille de la communaut\u00e9 de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale US sont particuli\u00e8rement m\u00e9contents de la NIE 2007. On parle ici, essentiellement, du couple Kissinger-Schlesinger (secr\u00e9taires d’Etat et \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense du temps de Nixon et de Ford), qui se ha\u00efrent avec constance \u00e0 leur \u00e9poque des ann\u00e9es 1970, qui se retrouvent aujourd’hui dans une commune insatisfaction.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t Le 13 d\u00e9cembre<\/a>, dans le Washington Post<\/em>, Kissinger distingue bien qu’il y a eu un coup d’Etat (postmoderne<\/a>) des services de renseignement, et il s’en plaint avec amertume et col\u00e8re, pour le bien de l’autorit\u00e9 du gouvernement. (Dans les ann\u00e9es 1969-1974, Kissinger fut un ma\u00eetre des manipulations de la CIA, notamment des chiffres des forces nucl\u00e9aires sovi\u00e9tiques d\u00e9termin\u00e9s par l’Agence, pour faire triompher ses vues dans les n\u00e9gociations SALT. On comprend parfaitement sa fureur.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe extraordinary spectacle of the president’s national security adviser obliged to defend the president’s Iran policy against a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) raises two core issues: How are we now to judge the nuclear threat posed by Iran? How are we to judge the intelligence community’s relationship with the White House and the rest of the government?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe intelligence community has a major role in helping to design such a vision. But it must recognize that the more it ventures into policy conjecture, the less authoritative its judgments become. There was some merit in the way President Richard Nixon conducted National Security Council discussions at the beginning of his first term. He invited the CIA director to brief on the capabilities and intentions of the countries under discussion but required him to leave the room during policy deliberations. Because so many decisions require an intelligence input, this procedure proved unworkable.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbI have often defended the dedicated members of the intelligence community. This is why I am extremely concerned about the tendency of the intelligence community to turn itself into a kind of check on, instead of a part of, the executive branch. When intelligence personnel expect their work to become the subject of public debate, they are tempted into the roles of surrogate policymakers and advocates. Thus the deputy director for intelligence estimates explained the release of the NIE as follows: Publication was chosen because the estimate conflicted with public statements by top U.S. officials about Iran, and we felt it was important to release this information to ensure that an accurate presentation is available. That may explain releasing the facts but not the sources and methods that have been flooding the media. The paradoxical result of the trend toward public advocacy is to draw intelligence personnel more deeply than ever into the public maelstrom.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t Schlesinger, lui, dans le Wall Street Journal<\/em> du 19 d\u00e9cembre<\/a>, s’attache \u00e0 la question de savoir pourquoi les Iraniens ont arr\u00eat\u00e9 leur programme militaire nucl\u00e9aire fin 2003. Pour lui, une seule explication : l’irr\u00e9sistible puissance des forces arm\u00e9es US.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abLet us examine what else has not been considered. The NIE asserts that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure and that indicates that Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach. Now what might have constituted the principal elements in that international pressure to induce Tehran, at least temporarily, to halt its covert weaponization program?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb The American invasion of Iraq, resulting in the seizure of Baghdad in 10 days time something that had widely been suggested could not be accomplished.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb The earlier destruction of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, another display of American military prowess.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb The decision of Col. Moammar Gadhafi to abandon his nuclear program and to renounce and make amends for terrorism.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb The exposure and partial demolition of the A.Q. Khan nuclear technology network, Khan’s confession and his confinement by the Pakistani government to his home.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbDoes it not seem likely that Tehran took notice of these events, and may have been intimidated by them into more circumspect behavior? The NIE argues that Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach. Given those successful American actions, those who guide decisions in Iran may well have decided that the potential costs of being caught with a clandestine program had risen sharply, and that the presumed benefits of early clandestine weaponization efforts could safely be deferred.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbStill, the achievements of American arms and American policy during that period were undoubtedly noted in Tehran. Why not mention them in the NIE as possibly influencing Tehran’s decision in 2003?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tC’est un raisonnement typique de politique de force, d’un homme qui n’imagine pas autre chose que cette politique de force pour r\u00e9gler les relations internationales. Pourquoi les Iraniens ont-ils attendu la fin 2003 pour leur d\u00e9cision, alors que les prouesses am\u00e9ricaines \u00e9taient largement d\u00e9montr\u00e9es en octobre 2001-avril 2003? Leur panique indescriptible aurait d\u00fb pourtant les conduire \u00e0 porter tout leur uranium enrichi aux pieds des vainqueurs \u00e0 Bagdad, d\u00e8s le 11 avril 2003, sans attendre, de crainte que la prouesse am\u00e9ricaine encha\u00eene imm\u00e9diatement vers T\u00e9h\u00e9ran. Leur d\u00e9cision de fin 2003 n’a par contre aucun rapport<\/a> avec l’accord<\/a> entre les trois ministres europ\u00e9ens et les Iraniens en octobre 2003, dont Schlesinger semble tout ignorer. Par ailleurs, pourquoi n’ont-ils pas, les Iraniens, repris leur programme militaire d\u00e8s que la prouesse am\u00e9ricaine s’est transform\u00e9e, en Irak et Afghanistan, en merdier am\u00e9ricain, d\u00e8s le courant 2004? Mais c’est bien s\u00fbr: ils l’ont repris, comme les Isra\u00e9liens et les neocons<\/em> l’affirment, ce qui justifie \u00e9videmment et plus que jamais, NIE 2007 \u00e0 l’appui, une attaque contre l’Iran. Une vingtaine de t\u00eates nucl\u00e9aires et, on vous l’affirme, il ne sera plus question du programme nucl\u00e9aire militaire iranien, au cas o\u00f9 il n’aurait pas repris, et au cas o\u00f9 il reprendrait d’ailleurs, lecture faite de la NIE 2007.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 24 d\u00e9cembre 2007 \u00e0 01H39<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Les vieux de la vieille de la communaut\u00e9 de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale US sont particuli\u00e8rement m\u00e9contents de la NIE 2007. On parle ici, essentiellement, du couple Kissinger-Schlesinger (secr\u00e9taires d’Etat et \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense du temps de Nixon et de Ford), qui se ha\u00efrent avec constance \u00e0 leur \u00e9poque des ann\u00e9es 1970, qui se retrouvent aujourd’hui dans… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5963,2773,3736,5085,3408],"class_list":["post-69534","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-5963","tag-iran","tag-kissinger","tag-nie","tag-schlesinger"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69534","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69534"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69534\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69534"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69534"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69534"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}