On a une indication de ce que va \u00eatre la tactique raisonnable (par opposition \u00e0 la tactique hyst\u00e9rique de type gesticulatoire) des n\u00e9o-conservateurs vis-\u00e0-vis de l’Iran, apr\u00e8s la parution de la NIE 2007. Un article du Weekly Standard<\/em> du 21 d\u00e9cembre<\/a>, du journaliste Charlie Szrom, nous en donne une indication s\u00e9rieuse. Il s’agit d’un expos\u00e9 de tactique m\u00e9diatique et publicitaire pure, sans vocif\u00e9ration excessive, qui prend en compte les r\u00e9alit\u00e9s des cons\u00e9quences de la NIE 2007. Il est largement inspir\u00e9 par la faction des neocons<\/em> proche du complexe militaro-industriel US et travaillant principalement sur l’Europe de l’Est, en liaison avec les relais est-europ\u00e9ens du mouvement. Il s’agit notamment de gens regroup\u00e9s autour de Bruce P. Jackson<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tD’une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, l’article nous montre combien le camp n\u00e9o-conservateur est en d\u00e9sarroi apr\u00e8s cette publication de la NIE 2007. L’article d\u00e9taille implicitement les causes de ce d\u00e9sarroi en constatant qu’il n’existe plus qu’une seule possibilit\u00e9 de pression contre l’Iran, qui est le soutien et l’acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration du d\u00e9ploiement du r\u00e9seau anti-missiles, particuli\u00e8rement en Europe (BMDE). L’article constate notamment:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t que la publication de la NIE 2007 rend quasiment impossible l’id\u00e9e d’une action militaire contre l’Iran;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t que cette publication rend l’action contre l’Iran \u00e0 l’ONU fortement entrav\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe threat still exists. How can we continue to pressure Iran? The report dashed hopes for any broad UN sanctions against Iran, as Russia and China, reluctant beforehand to impose serious punitive measures on Iran, now have a ready excuse. Military strikes now also seem highly unlikely, given the lack of urgency precipitated by the NIE.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLa recommandation d’appuyer le d\u00e9ploiemet de la BMDE est faite en donnant des indications tronqu\u00e9es ou d\u00e9form\u00e9es, selon l’habitude des n\u00e9o-conservateurs. En effet elle s’attarde essentiellement \u00e0 l’attitude de la Tch\u00e9quie, dont le gouvernement continue \u00e0 faire la promotion de la BMDE, et mentionne rapidement que la Pologne est engag\u00e9e sur la voie du d\u00e9plmoiement, ce qui est \u00e9videmment faux par rapport \u00e0 l’\u00e9volution de la situation polonaise. (\u00abThe Czech Republic, in addition to the rhetoric mentioned above, continues to lay the ground for its portion of the missile defense program. On December 4, the central government approved a $69 million development fund for the Brdy region, the eventual location of the radar portion of the defense program; Poland would host the actual interceptors.<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl semble bien que l’argent investi par les Tch\u00e8ques pour pr\u00e9parer la base BMDE, et dont le d\u00e9blocage a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9cid\u00e9 le lendemain de la publication de la NIE, vienne directement du Pentagone, comme une tentative de garantir que la NIE ne contecarre pas le d\u00e9ploiement de la BMDE. L’article sugg\u00e8re \u00e9galement une alliance anti-iranienne entre les USA et les pays centre-europ\u00e9ens (ex-pays de l’Europe communiste entr\u00e9s dans l’OTAN), ce qui sugg\u00e8re de fa\u00e7on plus large quel type de tactique les extr\u00e9mistes washingtoniens (et le Pentagone) vont \u00e9ventuellement suivre pour soutenir le syst\u00e8me BMDE. (\u00abOur allies continue to recognize the threat. Why don’t we take this opportunity to pressure Iran and build a strong military alliance with Central European states?<\/em>\u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCi-apr\u00e8s, quelques extraits de l’article.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00abThe Intelligence Estimate has led many to call for a new policy towards Iran. Sen. Hillary Clinton vehemently disagree[s] that nothing in American policy has to change. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said the report confirmed the Russian view that there is no military element in [Iran’s] nuclear program.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbDoesn’t all this mean we should drop support for missile defense?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbNo. The threat has not changed significantly and missile defense remains one of the few options still available to lessen the power of potential Iranian nukes. The program can also turn positive relationships with Central European states into long-term, mutually-dependent alliances.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbIran tested a new missile, called the ‘Ashura,’ as recently as late last month. This 2000-kilometer-range weapon could potentially reach U.S bases in the Middle East and parts of Eastern Europe, including such U.S. allies as Romania, Georgia, or Ukraine. The announcement may just be bluster, but the unveiling alone shows that Iran has no intention of backing down militarily.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbA careful reading of the NIE makes an even stronger case for a continued menace. The report admits that Iran continues to enrich uranium, that Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame, and that it will be difficult to convince the Iranian leadership to abandon eventual development of a nuclear capability.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbThe basic facts remain the same; perhaps the only revelation is that Iran, if anything, has made a tactical decision to delay warhead production so it can buy enough time for the more difficult task of enriching uranium. After the marathon of amassing sufficient fuel, Tehran just has to sprint through the relatively simple process of developing warheads.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bbOur missile defense partners recognize the enduring danger. The Czech foreign ministry stated that, According to the report, Iran will probably be capable of producing a sufficient quantity of nuclear material for the production of a nuclear bomb between 2010 and 2015. This corresponds with the previous estimates. By this date the European pillar of anti-missile defense should be in place.’<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 27 d\u00e9cembre 2007 \u00e0 07H14<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" On a une indication de ce que va \u00eatre la tactique raisonnable (par opposition \u00e0 la tactique hyst\u00e9rique de type gesticulatoire) des n\u00e9o-conservateurs vis-\u00e0-vis de l’Iran, apr\u00e8s la parution de la NIE 2007. Un article du Weekly Standard du 21 d\u00e9cembre, du journaliste Charlie Szrom, nous en donne une indication s\u00e9rieuse. Il s’agit d’un expos\u00e9… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4314,2773,3169,3216,5085,3333,3332],"class_list":["post-69543","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bmde","tag-iran","tag-jackson","tag-neocon","tag-nie","tag-standard","tag-weekly"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69543","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69543"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69543\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69543"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69543"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69543"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}