{"id":69562,"date":"2008-01-02T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-01-02T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/01\/02\/comment-poutine-manuvre-washington-sur-liran\/"},"modified":"2008-01-02T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-01-02T00:00:00","slug":"comment-poutine-manuvre-washington-sur-liran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/01\/02\/comment-poutine-manuvre-washington-sur-liran\/","title":{"rendered":"Comment Poutine man\u0153uvre Washington sur l&rsquo;Iran"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Le constat sur la question iranienne que font deux auteurs US, dont l&rsquo;excellent sp\u00e9cialiste Nikolas Gvosdev (directeur de <em>National Interest<\/em>),  est sans appel. Poutine a compl\u00e8tement pris la mesure de Washington et impose son rythme dans la crise iranienne, surtout depuis la publication de la NIE 2007 qui paralyse Washington dans une position d\u00e9fensive. Les Russes n&rsquo;h\u00e9sitent pas \u00e0 d\u00e9ployer leur strat\u00e9gie sans la moindre restriction.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;analyse de Nikolas Gvosdev et de Ray Takeyh para\u00eet aujourd&rsquo;hui dans l&rsquo;International <em>Herald Tribune<\/em> le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.iht.com\/articles\/2008\/01\/01\/opinion\/edtakeyh.php\" class=\"gen\">1er janvier 2008<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>If the deadlock in the UN Security Council over the final status of Kosovo signals any future trends, it is that Russia has finally dispensed with any lingering beliefs that it should work with the United States to set the global agenda.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>One of the legacies that Vladimir Putin bequeaths to his successor is Russia&rsquo;s changed position in the world. Moscow no longer has any interest in making minor modifications to a policy largely predetermined in Washington. And the principal beneficiary of this changed perception may be Iran.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em> Despite its unsavory reputation in the West, Iran has acted responsibly in dealing with Muslim republics and populations of Central Asia. The United States may view Iran as a revolutionary power bent on upending the regional order. But for Russia, Iran is largely a status quo state whose continued cooperation is critical for stability in the Middle East and the projection of Russian influence in that region. The strategic alignment between the two nations only reinforces the economic interests.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The Bush administration, which has dedicated so much of its efforts to rebuilding ties with Europe, has utterly failed to bridge the gap with the Russian Federation. Having failed to stop the United States over Kosovo and Iraq, Moscow&rsquo;s stance on Iran demonstrates Russia&rsquo;s return as a major actor. For its part, Tehran has learned to love Russia&rsquo;s strategy of placating the United States with superficial gestures while enhancing its relations with Iran. In the coming months, there will be ample Russian and American pledges of cooperation against Iran&rsquo;s persistent nuclear violations. However, the strategic landscape has changed. And that does not bode well for America&rsquo;s attempt to rein in Iran.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDeux remarques peuvent \u00eatre propos\u00e9es pour accompagner cette analyse.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t La premi\u00e8re est \u00e9videmment une confirmation. La Russie a compl\u00e8tement repris son autonomie de puissance et, dans cette perspective, sa diplomatie s&rsquo;av\u00e8re beaucoup plus habile et cr\u00e9atrice que celle de l&rsquo;Occident (pour le coup, on peut effectivement parler d&rsquo;Occident, l&rsquo;aveuglement am\u00e9ricaniste ayant compl\u00e8tement infect\u00e9 les pays ouest-europ\u00e9ens). C&rsquo;est en effet le plus remarquable du c\u00f4t\u00e9 russe, qui montre bien la rupture effectu\u00e9e entre le mod\u00e8le sovi\u00e9tique et l&rsquo;actuel cadre souverainiste de la politique russe (au contraire des USA, qui en restent plus que jamais \u00e0 la vision d&rsquo;une politique de force, sans doute incapables d&rsquo;imaginer autre chose). Le retour de la puissance russe n&rsquo;a nullement pr\u00e9cipit\u00e9 la Russie vers un retour \u00e0 la politique de force, mais a fait rena\u00eetre une vraie diplomatie, que la puissance russe sert plut\u00f4t qu&rsquo;elle ne l&rsquo;oriente.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t L&rsquo;\u00e9chec fran\u00e7ais de la politique maximaliste d\u00e9cid\u00e9e l&rsquo;\u00e9t\u00e9 dernier est aujourd&rsquo;hui compl\u00e8tement mis en lumi\u00e8re. Les Fran\u00e7ais sont enferm\u00e9s dans la m\u00eame position que les USA, mis sur la d\u00e9fensive avec une rh\u00e9torique d&rsquo;intransigeance qui n&rsquo;a plus de raison d&rsquo;\u00eatre et qui n&rsquo;a pas les moyens de s&rsquo;affirmer. Le tournant fran\u00e7ais de l&rsquo;\u00e9t\u00e9 2007 pouvait se d\u00e9fendre \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9t\u00e9 2007, et tant que planait une menace d&rsquo;attaque des USA que les Fran\u00e7ais pouvait pr\u00e9tendre contenir en accompagnant Washington. Aujourd&rsquo;hui, il appara\u00eet futile, ent\u00eat\u00e9 et appuy\u00e9 sur une rigueur de raisonnement compl\u00e8tement marginalis\u00e9 par les \u00e9v\u00e9nements. Cette persistance dans une position politique devenue caduque avec la publication de la NIE 2007 montre une scl\u00e9rose et un dogmatisme de la diplomatie fran\u00e7aise, assortis d&rsquo;un comportement de suffisance \u00e0 ne pas vouloir modifier ce que les \u00e9v\u00e9nements vous imposent de modifier. R\u00e9sultat : aujourd&rsquo;hui, dans la crise iranienne, les Fran\u00e7ais n&rsquo;existent plus. Ils s&rsquo;occupent donc des avatars des organisations humanitaires et des SDF. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 2 janvier 2008 \u00e0 09H40<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Le constat sur la question iranienne que font deux auteurs US, dont l&rsquo;excellent sp\u00e9cialiste Nikolas Gvosdev (directeur de National Interest), est sans appel. Poutine a compl\u00e8tement pris la mesure de Washington et impose son rythme dans la crise iranienne, surtout depuis la publication de la NIE 2007 qui paralyse Washington dans une position d\u00e9fensive. Les&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2687,7339,2773,916,2779,2884,3248],"class_list":["post-69562","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-france","tag-gvosdev","tag-iran","tag-poutine","tag-puissance","tag-russe","tag-washington"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69562","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69562"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69562\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69562"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69562"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69562"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}