{"id":69568,"date":"2008-01-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-01-04T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/01\/04\/les-irresistibles-uav-et-ucav-dans-les-cieux-de-la-guerre-changeante\/"},"modified":"2008-01-04T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-01-04T00:00:00","slug":"les-irresistibles-uav-et-ucav-dans-les-cieux-de-la-guerre-changeante","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/01\/04\/les-irresistibles-uav-et-ucav-dans-les-cieux-de-la-guerre-changeante\/","title":{"rendered":"Les irr\u00e9sistibles UAV et UCAV dans les cieux de la guerre changeante"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>En Irak, les Am\u00e9ricains acc\u00e9l\u00e8rent \u00e0 un tr\u00e8s grand rythme l&rsquo;utilisation des UAV et UCAV (v\u00e9hicules a\u00e9riens sans pilotes et v\u00e9hicules a\u00e9riens arm\u00e9s sans pilotes). L&rsquo;Irak est aujourd&rsquo;hui un lieu de pr\u00e9dilection pour leur emploi, ce qui n&rsquo;\u00e9tait pas le cas \u00e0 l&rsquo;origine. Associated Press a recueilli des pr\u00e9cisions chiffr\u00e9es, publi\u00e9es dans une d\u00e9p\u00eache du <a href=\"http:\/\/news.yahoo.com\/s\/ap\/20080101\/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe\/unmanned_killers&#038;printer=1;_ylt=AqizhMkw_bDRVw4PdZFKmJGWwvIE\" class=\"gen\">1er janvier 2008<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEn voici quelques extraits:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab<em>The military&rsquo;s reliance on unmanned aircraft that can watch, hunt and sometimes kill insurgents has soared to more than 500,000 hours in the air, largely in Iraq, The Associated Press has learned.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>And new Defense Department figures obtained by The AP show that the Air Force more than doubled its monthly use of drones between January and October, forcing it to take pilots out of the air and shift them to remote flying duty to meet part of the demand.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The dramatic increase in the development and use of drones across the armed services reflects what will be an even more aggressive effort over the next 25 years, according to the new report.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em> For some Air Force pilots, that means climbing out of the cockpit and heading to places such as Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, where they can remotely fly the Predators, one of the larger and more sophisticated unmanned aircraft.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>About 120 Air Force pilots were recently transferred to staff the drones to keep pace with demands, the Air Force said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Air Force officials said that Predator flights steadily increased last year, from about 2,000 hours in January to more than 4,300 hours in October. They are expected to continue to escalate when hours are calculated for November and December, because the number of combat air patrols had increased from about 14 per day to 18.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The bulk of the unmanned flight hours belong to the Army&rsquo;s workhorse drone, the Raven, which weighs just four pounds and is used by smaller units, such as companies and battalions, in Iraq and Afghanistan.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The Ravens, which soldiers fling into the air and use for surveillance, will rack up about 300,000 hours this year  double the time they were used last year, said Quackenbush.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>The Army has a total of 361 unmanned aircraft in Iraq alone  including Shadows, Hunters and Ravens. And in the first 10 months of 2007, they flew more than 300,000 hours.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>Army officials have fought to maintain control of their unmanned vehicle usage, saying their unit commanders can quickly launch the smaller systems, and respond to the immediate needs of soldiers who may be pursuing insurgents or trying to avoid roadside bombs.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb<em>When the Raven&rsquo;s massive numbers are not included, UAV usage across all the military services jumped from nearly 165,000 flight hours in the 2006 fiscal year, to more than 258,000 for the fiscal year that ended Sept. 30, 2007.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCette augmentation consid\u00e9rable de l&rsquo;utilisation des avions sans pilote en Irak accompagne le <em>surge<\/em> et l&rsquo;am\u00e9lioration des conditions de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 enregistr\u00e9e depuis le milieu de l&rsquo;ann\u00e9e dans ce pays. On sait \u00e0 quoi correspond cette am\u00e9lioration (voir notre <em>F&#038;C<\/em> du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=4632\" class=\"gen\">16 novembre 2007<\/a>). L&rsquo;\u00e9volution de la situation en Irak du fait des Am\u00e9ricains ressemble \u00e0 une sorte d&rsquo;afghanisation de la guerre, avec l&rsquo;utilisation de l&rsquo;argent, <em>the ultimate weapon<\/em>, la corruption de divers chefs de clans ou de chefs tribaux, comme ce fut le cas en Afghanistan, le transfert du pouvoir \u00e0 des autorit\u00e9s locales, l&rsquo;exacerbation des concurrences inter-ethniques, etc. L&rsquo;usage d&rsquo;UAV et d&rsquo;UCAV, qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 important en Afghanistan d\u00e8s l&rsquo;origine, semble appuyer cette tendance. (A noter que, depuis l&rsquo;arriv\u00e9e de l&rsquo;OTAN, la situation en Afghanistan a, elle, \u00e9volu\u00e9 un peu dans le sens inverse avec une part beaucoup plus grande faite \u00e0 des op\u00e9rations conventionnelles.) L&rsquo;usage d&rsquo;UAV et d&rsquo;UCAV correspond mieux au type d&rsquo;op\u00e9rations possible comme \u00e0 l&rsquo;implication moindre des forces US dans les op\u00e9rations en cours.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLa question que pose cet emploi en tr\u00e8s forte augmentation des UAV\/UCAV est celle de l&rsquo;effet sur la programmation des forces US, notamment de l&rsquo;USAF. Les UAV\/UCAV constituent un \u00e9quipement particuli\u00e8rement propice \u00e0 la concurrence entre l&rsquo;USAF et l&rsquo;U.S. Army. L&rsquo;USAF, qui conna\u00eet d\u00e9j\u00e0 d&rsquo;\u00e9normes probl\u00e8mes financiers, va se trouver devant un dilemme de choix. Si elle accentue son effort sur les UAV\/UCAV, elle devra d\u00e9forcer ses grands programmes d&rsquo;armement conventionnel, notamment les avions de combat classique (F-22 et F-35) ; si elle n&rsquo;accentue pas son effort, elle risque de perdre une partie de sa pr\u00e9pond\u00e9rance au niveau des activit\u00e9s a\u00e9riennes, au profit de l&rsquo;U.S. Army. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 4 janvier 2008 \u00e0 05H40<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>En Irak, les Am\u00e9ricains acc\u00e9l\u00e8rent \u00e0 un tr\u00e8s grand rythme l&rsquo;utilisation des UAV et UCAV (v\u00e9hicules a\u00e9riens sans pilotes et v\u00e9hicules a\u00e9riens arm\u00e9s sans pilotes). L&rsquo;Irak est aujourd&rsquo;hui un lieu de pr\u00e9dilection pour leur emploi, ce qui n&rsquo;\u00e9tait pas le cas \u00e0 l&rsquo;origine. Associated Press a recueilli des pr\u00e9cisions chiffr\u00e9es, publi\u00e9es dans une d\u00e9p\u00eache du&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3236,857,5797,4211],"class_list":["post-69568","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-afghanistan","tag-irak","tag-uav","tag-ucav"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69568","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69568"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69568\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69568"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69568"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69568"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}