{"id":69607,"date":"2008-01-15T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-01-15T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/01\/15\/la-navy-accomodante\/"},"modified":"2008-01-15T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-01-15T00:00:00","slug":"la-navy-accomodante","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/01\/15\/la-navy-accomodante\/","title":{"rendered":"La Navy accomodante"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"titleset_b.deepblue\" style=\"color:#0f3955; font-size:1.65em; font-variant:small-caps\">La Navy accomodante<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Il se confirme qu&rsquo;un aspect important de l'\u00a0\u00bbincident du Golfe Persique\u00a0\u00bb entre Iraniens et U.S. Navy est le comportement de l&rsquo;U.S. Navy \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de ce qui est en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme sa \u00ab\u00a0politique\u00a0\u00bb autonome d&rsquo;accommodement vis-\u00e0-vis de l&rsquo;Iran. Nous citons un texte d&rsquo;analyse de Philip Geraldi, <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/orig\/giraldi.php?articleid=12209\">aujourd&rsquo;hui<\/a> dans <em>Antiwar.com<\/em>, parce que Geraldi est un ancien analyste de la CIA et qu&rsquo;il a gard\u00e9 beaucoup de contact avec ses anciens coll\u00e8gues et, en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, dans le monde de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale \u00e0 Washington. Son commentaire vient en appui d&rsquo;une partie de la th\u00e8se pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e par <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=4822\">Jim Lobe<\/a>, concernant justement le r\u00f4le de la Navy et de <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=4821\">Central Command<\/a> qui en est une annexe puisque sous le commandement du d\u00e9sormais fameux amiral Fallon. Il inscrit son commentaire dans le cadre du voyage de Bush dans la r\u00e9gion, et des v\u00e9ll\u00e9it\u00e9s bellicistes persistantes du pr\u00e9sident.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Geraldi fait \u00e0 peine mention de l&rsquo;incertitude \u00e0 propos de la question de la cause initiale, en rapport avec <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=4831\">le fascinant<\/a> \u00ab\u00a0<em>Filipino Monkey<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0. Ce n&rsquo;est pas son propos. Il s&rsquo;attache surtout au d\u00e9tail de l&rsquo;incident et en tire ses conclusions, sans doute \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re des informations que lui ont communiqu\u00e9es ses sources.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"normal\" style=\"font-size:1.05em\">\n<p><p>&laquo;<em>The U.S. response, which was generally restrained and far from being close to a shooting incident as presented in the media, reflected legitimate concern for the ships&rsquo; safety in light of the 2000 bombing of the destroyer USS Cole in Yemen, in which a small craft loaded with explosives staged a suicide attack that killed 17 sailors and almost sank the ship. Since the U.S. does not have diplomatic relations with Tehran and cannot discuss areas that could potentially lead to conflict, Adm. William Fallon of the U.S. Central Command has reportedly been seeking to set up incident-response protocols and a hotline with the Iranians to prevent a minor incident escalating into an act of war. As is often the case, the soldiers and sailors are reluctant to rush into wars that the politicians like President Bush are much more inclined to embrace.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>The lesson of the incident in the Persian Gulf, and the political hay that was made out of it by both sides, is that as long as the United States refuses to talk to Iran, the potential for something very small turning into something that would be devastating to both countries remains. President Bush still apparently dreams of confronting Iran, even if the imploding situation in Pakistan makes it unlikely that he will risk doing so. Israel makes no secret of the fact that it would like Washington to act, and Israel&rsquo;s wishes are seldom denied in Washington. And then there are the hotheads on the Iranian side. The U.S. national interest in the Middle East would be best served by marginalizing those who want war and beginning to negotiate seriously. As Winston Churchill put it, \u00ab\u00a0To jaw jaw is better than to war war.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>&raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Mis en ligne le 15 janvier 2008 \u00e0 09H57<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>La Navy accomodante Il se confirme qu&rsquo;un aspect important de l&rsquo;\u00a0\u00bbincident du Golfe Persique\u00a0\u00bb entre Iraniens et U.S. Navy est le comportement de l&rsquo;U.S. Navy \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de ce qui est en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme sa \u00ab\u00a0politique\u00a0\u00bb autonome d&rsquo;accommodement vis-\u00e0-vis de l&rsquo;Iran. Nous citons un texte d&rsquo;analyse de Philip Geraldi, aujourd&rsquo;hui dans Antiwar.com, parce&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[6296,7377,3723,3319],"class_list":["post-69607","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-fallon","tag-geraldi","tag-golfe","tag-navy"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69607","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69607"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69607\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69607"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69607"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69607"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}