{"id":69625,"date":"2008-01-23T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-01-23T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/01\/23\/la-panique-de-la-fed\/"},"modified":"2008-01-23T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-01-23T00:00:00","slug":"la-panique-de-la-fed","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/01\/23\/la-panique-de-la-fed\/","title":{"rendered":"La panique de la Fed<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

L’intervention de la Federal Reserve hier a constitu\u00e9 une surprise importante. Les pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents de cette intervention, tant par l’importance de la mesure (trois-quarts de point de r\u00e9duction du taux d’int\u00e9r\u00eat) que par la proc\u00e9dure choisie, mesurent le caract\u00e8re exceptionnel de la d\u00e9cision. Pourquoi la Federal Reserve a-t-elle agi de cette fa\u00e7on?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’analyse publi\u00e9e aujourd’hui<\/a> par Gerald Baker, chroniqueur du Times<\/em> charg\u00e9 des affaires am\u00e9ricaines, est int\u00e9ressante. Baker a une opinion tranch\u00e9e, tr\u00e8s pro-am\u00e9ricaniste, et son analyse ne peut ainsi \u00eatre suspect\u00e9e d’un parti pris d’appr\u00e9ciation d\u00e9favorable. Cet \u00e9l\u00e9ment renforce encore l’int\u00e9r\u00eat qu’on peut trouver dans son appr\u00e9ciation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPour Baker, La Federal Reserve et son pr\u00e9sident Ben Bernanke ont r\u00e9agi \u00e0 la panique qui les saisissait face aux \u00e9v\u00e9nements des derniers jours. Baker pr\u00e9cise le caract\u00e8re historique de la d\u00e9cision de la Fed<\/em> et commente:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abPutting yesterday’s almost unprecedented move in this historical context gives some idea of the concern at the US central bank about the outlook for the economy. But the timing of this extraordinary rate cut also raises a serious question for the Fed’s credibility: did the leadership of the world’s most powerful central bank panic in response to a financial market crisis?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbOnly six weeks ago, at the last regular meeting of its Federal Open Market Committee, the Fed seemed relatively unfazed by the proliferating evidence of economic weakness caused by the continuing credit crunch. At that meeting Ben Bernanke, the Chairman, and his colleagues explicitly rejected the pleas of many in financial markets and one of their own committee members for a more aggressive response. They cut rates by just a quarter-point. Since then, of course, the economic picture has darkened considerably with further stagnation in the labour market, in consumer spending and in housing.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBut all of this has been known for at least the past week or so. The Fed’s next regularly scheduled meeting is only a week away, and recent comments by Mr Bernanke had indicated that the Fed was going to cut rates then by at least half a percentage point. So why move yesterday?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBaker propose deux explications. Dans les deux cas, la panique a jou\u00e9. Dans les deux cas, craint Baker, le r\u00e9sultat est similaire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa premi\u00e8re explication est la plus simple: une r\u00e9action imm\u00e9diate par crainte d’une explosion financi\u00e8re. \u00abBut there is a real danger that Mr Bernanke is now held hostage to the panics of jittery financial markets<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa seconde est mitig\u00e9e de tactique: provoquer un effet psychologique qui serait poursuivi et amplifi\u00e9 par une seconde mesure de r\u00e9duction (un demi-point) du taux d’int\u00e9r\u00eat \u00e0 la fin du mois.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe problem is that, even if that was the reason for yesterday’s decision, Mr Bernanke is going to have a hard time dispelling the notion that he did not engineer the Fed’s biggest interest-rate cut in a generation primarily in response to a swoon in equity markets.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbWhatever his real intentions, the world’s most powerful central banker looks like he has been forced into a hurried decision by panicked global equity traders.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tComme toute analyse de ces questions, nous sommes ramen\u00e9s dans le domaine de la psychologie. Nous ne l’avons jamais quitt\u00e9 d’ailleurs, s’il s’agit de donner une explication \u00e0 l’hypoth\u00e8se de la panique. Le comportement de Bernanke, comme celui de l’administration Bush, depuis des semaines, depuis des mois, est de refuser de prendre r\u00e9ellement au s\u00e9rieux les signes de la crise, les tensions, les alertes et les pouss\u00e9es de fi\u00e8vre. C’est l’habituelle psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste, la confiance aveugle dans la puissance am\u00e9ricaniste, \u00e9galement \u00e9vidente lors de la chute du dollar de l’automne (ce qui \u00e9tait d\u00e9crit en novembre 2007 par Clyde Prestowitz, de l’Economic Strategy Institute, de cette fa\u00e7on: \u00abIt’s ignorance and arrogance. The candidates, the voters, the country’s elite they all take it for granted that the US currency is always going to be the world’s currency. It hasn’t hit them yet.<\/em>\u00bb).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 23 janvier 2008 \u00e0 02H25<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

L’intervention de la Federal Reserve hier a constitu\u00e9 une surprise importante. Les pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents de cette intervention, tant par l’importance de la mesure (trois-quarts de point de r\u00e9duction du taux d’int\u00e9r\u00eat) que par la proc\u00e9dure choisie, mesurent le caract\u00e8re exceptionnel de la d\u00e9cision. Pourquoi la Federal Reserve a-t-elle agi de cette fa\u00e7on? L’analyse publi\u00e9e aujourd’hui par… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4094,6936,5393,4551,4207],"class_list":["post-69625","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-baker","tag-bernanke","tag-federal","tag-panique","tag-reserve"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69625","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69625"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69625\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69625"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69625"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69625"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}