{"id":69627,"date":"2008-01-23T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-01-23T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/01\/23\/larme-absolue-du-cmi-et-le-talon-dachille-du-pentagone\/"},"modified":"2008-01-23T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-01-23T00:00:00","slug":"larme-absolue-du-cmi-et-le-talon-dachille-du-pentagone","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2008\/01\/23\/larme-absolue-du-cmi-et-le-talon-dachille-du-pentagone\/","title":{"rendered":"L’arme absolue du CMI et le talon d’Achille du Pentagone"},"content":{"rendered":"

La question du complexe militaro-industriel (CMI) et du Pentagone qui en est le cur devient de plus en plus l’objet d’analyse critique fondamentale. Cela est justifi\u00e9 par la crise que conna\u00eet cette structure, crise qui est le coeur de la crise plus g\u00e9n\u00e9rale du syst\u00e8me de l’am\u00e9ricanisme.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe th\u00e8me se concr\u00e9tise aujourd’hui avec la probl\u00e9matique \u00e9conomique du budget du Pentagone et du poids de ce budget sur l’\u00e9conomie US et la structure de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 am\u00e9ricaine. Chalmers Johnson est l’un des ma\u00eetres de ce type d’observation. Il est l’auteur d\u00e9sormais connu d’une trilogie (The Blowback Trilogy<\/em>) analysant au travers de trois ouvrages l’\u00e9volution monstrueuse du ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne du CMI, de son expression syst\u00e9mique que sont devenues l’administration et la bureaucratie washingtoniennes, de son application politique qu’est la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale des USA. Il est tr\u00e8s attentif \u00e0 mettre ce ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne en perspective en le fixant dans le contexte g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes analyses de Johnson sont r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement publi\u00e9es sur le site Tomdispatch.com<\/em> de Tom Engelhardt. La derni\u00e8re en date a \u00e9t\u00e9 publi\u00e9e hier<\/a>. Elle \u00e9largit encore le th\u00e8me de la critique en montrant comment le ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne sp\u00e9cifique du budget du Pentagone est devenu une v\u00e9ritable pompe mortelle de la puissance de l’Am\u00e9rique, qui d\u00e9truit l’\u00e9conomie et la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 de ce pays. Bien entendu, on retrouve les caract\u00e9ristiques habituelles de ce budget, son caract\u00e8re absolument incontr\u00f4lable et l’incapacit\u00e9 o\u00f9 l’on est d’en donner une comptabilit\u00e9 acceptable. Johnson estime que 30% \u00e0 40% du budget du Pentagone est black<\/em>, c’est-\u00e0-dire dissimul\u00e9. Il ne s’agit pas de ce qu’on cat\u00e9gorise habituellement comme les black programs<\/em>, c’est-\u00e0-dire les programmes officiellement secrets auxquels on alloue une somme officielle sans la justifier dans le d\u00e9tail. Il s’agit bien d’une dissimulation syst\u00e9mique, qui ne concerne pas des programmes ou des domaines identifi\u00e9s, d’une dissimulation relevant \u00e0 la fois du d\u00e9sordre, de l’app\u00e9tit et du secret bureaucratiques, du gaspillage, de la corruption, etc. C’est cela qui fait dire \u00e0 Robert Higgs, de l’Independent Institute, cit\u00e9 par Johnson: \u00abA well-founded rule of thumb is to take the Pentagon’s (always well publicized) basic budget total and double it.<\/em>\u00bb (Cette comptabilit\u00e9 nous conduit autour de $1.500 milliards par an)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’aspect syst\u00e9matique et g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’\u00e9tude de Johnson donne une bonne id\u00e9e du ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne. Il fixe la d\u00e9finition fondamentale du syst\u00e8me de l’am\u00e9ricanisme, d\u00e9finitivement devenue un syst\u00e8me militaro-industriel qui est en train de briser par l’int\u00e9rieur la puissance et la structure des USA. L’introduction du texte de Chalmers \u00e9claire l’ambition de l’analyse. La d\u00e9monstration est convaincante.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abThe military adventurers of the Bush administration have much in common with the corporate leaders of the defunct energy company Enron. Both groups of men thought that they were the smartest guys in the room, the title of Alex Gibney’s prize-winning film on what went wrong at Enron. The neoconservatives in the White House and the Pentagon outsmarted themselves. They failed even to address the problem of how to finance their schemes of imperialist wars and global domination.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAs a result, going into 2008, the United States finds itself in the anomalous position of being unable to pay for its own elevated living standards or its wasteful, overly large military establishment. Its government no longer even attempts to reduce the ruinous expenses of maintaining huge standing armies, replacing the equipment that seven years of wars have destroyed or worn out, or preparing for a war in outer space against unknown adversaries. Instead, the Bush administration puts off these costs for future generations to pay or repudiate. This utter fiscal irresponsibility has been disguised through many manipulative financial schemes (such as causing poorer countries to lend us unprecedented sums of money), but the time of reckoning is fast approaching.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThere are three broad aspects to our debt crisis. First, in the current fiscal year (2008) we are spending insane amounts of money on defense projects that bear no relationship to the national security of the United States. Simultaneously, we are keeping the income tax burdens on the richest segments of the American population at strikingly low levels.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbSecond, we continue to believe that we can compensate for the accelerating erosion of our manufacturing base and our loss of jobs to foreign countries through massive military expenditures so-called military Keynesianism, which I discuss in detail in my book Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic. By military Keynesianism, I mean the mistaken belief that public policies focused on frequent wars, huge expenditures on weapons and munitions, and large standing armies can indefinitely sustain a wealthy capitalist economy. The opposite is actually true.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThird, in our devotion to militarism (despite our limited resources), we are failing to invest in our social infrastructure and other requirements for the long-term health of our country. These are what economists call opportunity costs, things not done because we spent our money on something else. Our public education system has deteriorated alarmingly. We have failed to provide health care to all our citizens and neglected our responsibilities as the world’s number one polluter. Most important, we have lost our competitiveness as a manufacturer for civilian needs an infinitely more efficient use of scarce resources than arms manufacturing. Let me discuss each of these.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn notera que, dans son introduction au texte de Johnson, Tom Engelhardt cite un des deux \u00e9ditoriaux d’Aviation Week & Space Techology<\/em> sur lesquels nous nous sommes nous-m\u00eames appuy\u00e9s (le 14 janvier<\/a>) pour noter l’inqui\u00e9tude des milieux journalistiques et d’analyse proches du CMI devant la spirale incontr\u00f4lable et totalement destructrice qu’est devenu le budget du Pentagone, \u00e9chappant d\u00e9sormais \u00e0 toute possibilit\u00e9 de gestion et produisant de plus en plus une \u00e9conomie improductive et pr\u00e9datrice pour lui-m\u00eame (importance des gaspillages, de la corruption, etc.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(On notera \u00e9galement un erreur de Johnson, \u00e9videmment accidentelle, dans sa mention des dix plus importants budgets de la d\u00e9fense du monde. Le Royaume-Uni a \u00e9t\u00e9 oubli\u00e9.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 23 janvier 2008 \u00e0 09H35<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

La question du complexe militaro-industriel (CMI) et du Pentagone qui en est le cur devient de plus en plus l’objet d’analyse critique fondamentale. Cela est justifi\u00e9 par la crise que conna\u00eet cette structure, crise qui est le coeur de la crise plus g\u00e9n\u00e9rale du syst\u00e8me de l’am\u00e9ricanisme. Le th\u00e8me se concr\u00e9tise aujourd’hui avec la probl\u00e9matique… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3560,3806,4544,2866,3194,3014],"class_list":["post-69627","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-chalmers","tag-cmi","tag-gaspillage","tag-johnson","tag-pentagone","tag-systeme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69627","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69627"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69627\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69627"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69627"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69627"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}