2 f\u00e9vrier<\/a>) a recueilli plusieurs avis de sp\u00e9cialistes sur cette question. Il s’agit en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral d’observations \u00e9videntes, ou de bon sens, que l’on peut faire depuis plusieurs ann\u00e9es. Il s’agit de constater que le terrorisme ne peut se combattre sur le terrain de la guerre conventionnelle; qu’\u00e0 force de d\u00e9moniser l’adversaire (Al Qa\u00efda), on le nimbe d’une force qu’il n’avait pas au d\u00e9part; qu’\u00e0 force de frapper d’une fa\u00e7on aveugle, on parvient \u00e0 pousser dans les bras de cette organisation des gens qui lui \u00e9taient indiff\u00e9rents et hostiles, et ainsi de suite.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tL’AFP cite trois chercheurs sur cesquestions.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t Bruce Hoffman, professeur \u00e0 Georgetown University \u00e0 Washington DC, insiste sur la m\u00e9connaissance des USA de leurs adversaires: \u00abThe attention of the US military and intelligence community is directed almost uniformly towards hunting down militant leaders or protecting US forces, (and) not towards understanding the enemy we now face.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThis is a monumental failing not only because decapitation strategies have rarely worked in countering mass-mobilisation terrorist or insurgent campaigns, but also because Al-Qaeda’s ability to continue this struggle is based absolutely on its capacity to attract new recruits and replenish its resources.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbWithout knowing our enemy, we cannot fulfill the most basic requirements of an effective counter-terrorist strategy: pre-empting and preventing terrorist operations and deterring their attacks.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Le Fran\u00e7ais Jean-Pierre Filiu, auteur de Frontieres du Jihad<\/em>, insiste sur les effets nocifs des habitudes bureaucratiques, qui r\u00e9clament d’abord des statistiques et des r\u00e9sultats comptables de l’action contre le terrorisme. Ces r\u00e9sultats, expos\u00e9s et promus par la publicit\u00e9 in\u00e9rente aux syst\u00e8me, produisent des effets pervers et encouragent le recrutement et l’extension de l’adversaire. \u00ab[Using] body-counts as a criterion to measure effectiveness is a bit like Guantanamo: you produce a tally, you mix up Al-Qaeda members or just hired hands with people who have only the vaguest of connections, people who have none at all and finally even pure civilians. When you reach that point, air-strikes and the elimination of wanted’ individuals not only prove fruitless, but actually become counter-productive.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbThese actions only intensify<\/em> [Al-Qaeda] recruitment, instead of weakening the organisation. The problem is this innate tendency within all administrations or bodies to stack up figures, pull out statistics, use them to show how they are winning, how they are liquidating their enemies, etc.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t Fawaz Gerges, Am\u00e9ricain d’origine libanaise, sp\u00e9cialiste des relations internationales au coll\u00e8ge Sarah Lawrence de New York, enfonce une autre porte ouverte en annon\u00e7ant que la guerre contre le terrorisme ne peut se livrer sur le champ de bataille. Choisir cette voie ne conduit qu’\u00e0 exacerber et \u00e0 \u00e9largir les tensions et \u00e0 reforcer la cause de ceux qu’on pr\u00e9tend d\u00e9truire. \u00abYou cannot win this war on the battlefield, because there is none. You’re facing an unconventional war. The more you rely on military might, the more you lose the war of ideas against Al-Qaeda and the militants. In Iraq, we fell into their trap, we gave them more ideological ammunition.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bbSo many Muslims all over the world are now convinced, and this feeling is so entrenched, that the war in Iraq is not against Al-Qaeda, but against Islam<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tLe m\u00eame Gerges nous dit qu’il per\u00e7oit des signes d’incertitude dans le gouvernement et la bureaucratie washingtoniennes, qu’il se pourrait apr\u00e8s tout qu’ils se soient aper\u00e7us de quelque chose et qu’ils songent \u00e0 modifier leur action. Sans doute le feront-ils en fabriquant de nouveaux chars et de nouveaux avions de combat et en ajoutant une guerre de plus pour alimenter le recrutement d’Al Qa\u00efda. La vraie guerre se fait en v\u00e9rit\u00e9 autour de l’enfermement de l’esprit am\u00e9ricaniste et de la paralysie de sa psychologie, et on ne voit pas comment les USA pourraient esp\u00e9rer la gagner.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 4 f\u00e9vrier 2008 \u00e0 10H28<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Il y a plus de six ans que la guerre contre la terreur a commenc\u00e9. Nous en sommes encore, ou \u00e0 peine, \u00e0 observer que la strat\u00e9gie suivie par l’Occident am\u00e9ricaniste ne pourrait \u00eatre plus compl\u00e8tement fauss\u00e9e et contre-productive qu’elle n’est. L’AFP (sur RAW Story le 2 f\u00e9vrier) a recueilli plusieurs avis de sp\u00e9cialistes sur… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3936,4058,4242,3744],"class_list":["post-69654","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-al","tag-echec","tag-qaida","tag-terreur"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69654","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69654"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69654\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69654"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69654"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69654"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}